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Abstract
THE POETICS OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN LITERARY PERSONA
by
Burt Kimmelman 
Adviser: Professor Allen Mandelbaum
Literary individualism manifested itself in the twelfth 
century both trivially and profoundly. Word puzzles 
and overt self-naming within a literary work, and 
discussions of the nature of poetry and the role of the 
poet in the world, increasingly considered the purpose 
and efficacy of writing and ultimately of language per 
se. Poets asserted themselves in their works not so 
much for the sake of self-promotion, in a modern sense, 
but to address and modulate contemporary intellectual 
and spiritual issues. Speculative grammar, nominalism 
and realism, often provided the material for poets such 
as Guillem IX, Marcabru, Dante, Chaucer and Langland. 
As literacy and Aristotelian logic became widespread, 
these poets contributed to a distinction being made 
between history and fiction; they employed contemporary 
ideas about language and its relationship to experience 
as both metaphor and theme. They elaborated a Western 
sensibility that had been articulated at least as 
early as Plato, Paul, and especially Augustine who
essentially viewed the world as a text. This basic 
metaphor ultimately formed the later medieval outlook; 
text, and language and/or discourse maintained fluid 
interrelationships. Moreover, Anselm had set aside 
Augustine's criterion of intentionality as the most 
important factor when determining falsehoods. Anselm 
recognized the separateness of language; statements 
could have a natural integrity despite their lack of 
objective reference. This autonomy of language formed 
the ground for individual poetic identity. In the face 
of a hierarchical authority inherited from the past, 
poets insisted upon their presence as individuals by 
aligning themselves with their texts. Marcabru writes 
about his difficulties in forging an eloquent text that 
will always be at a remove from him. Dante undertakes 
this theme through a fictional persona, who resembles 
himself and discourses with Virgil about the 
possibility of enunciating truth. Langland, finally, 
aligns author and persona with poetic theme in the name 
Will. In measuring dream and allegory against actual 
experience, Langland discusses the individual writer's 
will and his hope for salvation.
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"We may creaunce whil we have a name"
- The Shipman's Tale
1The Poetics of Authorship in the Later Middle Ages;
The Emergence of the Modern Literary Persona
INTRODUCTION: The Poetics of Otherness
I
In the later Middle Ages contemporary beliefs about the 
nature of language, and its relationship to truth, 
unavoidably affected attempts to write both history and 
fiction. It is at this time that modern disciplines of 
thought first became distinct possibilities— or rather, 
it is at this time that an older, unified field of 
perception began to disintegrate, as it was subverted 
from within. In order to appreciate the magnitude of 
this transformation, a comparison might be made with 
struggles in the later twentieth century to define 
specific literary genres as well as broader categories. 
Recent poststructuralist thinking, for instance, 
questions the basic human impulse to retrieve from a 
past its vitality and whatever messages it might hold 
for scholar and citizen of the present. 
Poststructuralism makes possible a reassessment of the 
entire historiographical enterprise. Through the 
natural inclination to group and categorize, in the 
attempt to comprehend discrete events of a past time, 
the desire to historicize undoes its own best efforts
to arrive at truth.1 In ideal terms, it can be said 
that truth is unique, univocal. Thus, history does not 
necessarily repeat itself— contrary to the adage that 
in effect stipulates basic historicist procedure. This 
perspective was first challenged by archetypalism and 
structuralism; the making of history inevitably came to 
be viewed as the shaping of the past, according to the 
desires and assumptions of the present. That is, the 
past may be beyond the ability of the historian to 
reach; employing the tools of the literatus. to 
describe his or her subject, the historian may not, in 
any absolute way, manage the past's rescue by endowing 
it with the writer's subjective presence. This 
debunking of the historical project becomes more 
pronounced with poststructuralism, which specifically 
demonstrates that our view of ourselves, of our 
"modern" world, need not depend on what is still widely 
held to be a fundamental and monumental change in the 
way people of the Western world lived and thought, a 
change that ostensibly occurred between 13 00 and 1600.
Yet if in some sense history can repeat itself--if 
we can somehow learn from the events of our past 
through their flawed contemplation, as if in an
1. For a comprehensive summary of this problem, and its 
proposed viable solution, see Gabrielle M. Spiegel's 
"History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text 
in the Middle Ages" in Speculum 65.1 (January 1990): 
59-86.
3imperfectly polished mirror— then it must be healthy 
periodically to review and to test the assumptions upon 
which our sense of history rests. What might we not 
"know" and what "mistakes" might we have made because 
of our admittedly limited self-conceptions? As Lee 
Paterson has eloquently stated, the conception of the 
modern Western world has depended on a "grand recit 
that organizes Western cultural history, the gigantic 
master narrative by which modernity identifies itself 
with the Renaissance"; moreover, this recit or formula 
"rejects the Middle Ages as by definition premodern." 
From the time of the Renaissance, "medieval pre­
modernity has with few exceptions been experienced by 
modernity as 'Gothic'—  obscure, difficult, strange, 
alien" ("On the Margin" 92). Differance— deferral and 
difference— as Derrida would say, has on the other hand 
made for new historiographical approaches that take the 
recognition of alterity as their starting point in 
attempting descriptions of the perhaps chimerical past. 
We can presume the disappearance of the need for the 
overarching, definitive "master narrative" into which, 
by definition, the historian strives to fit all that 
there "is" within the "historical" purview.
The new approaches raise two issues that are central 
to my study. These issues are related, one leading 
inevitably to the other. Patterson strongly questions,
4as I do, the widely held belief that, in Burckhardt's 
words, medieval "man was conscious of himself only as a 
member of a race, people, party, family or 
corporation— only through some general category" (The 
Civilization of the Rena issance in Italy 8 1; in 
Paterson 95) . Within the presently determined 
narrative, the self-vision to which we held fast, 
prestructuralist history-making allowed us the choice 
to ascribe to the Renaissance and deny to the Middle 
Ages "both a historical consciousness and a sense of 
individual selfhood"— as if such a sense, and with it 
the capacity for original thinking, were by definition 
the very gift of the Renaissance to the future 
(Patterson 93).
It is possible, however, to dispense with this 
cripplingly simplistic view, and in its place to 
present a notion of what for the moment might be called 
med i e v a 1 individual i s m . as apparently s e l f ­
contradictory as such a term may, for some, still be. 
Certainly, since the millenium, the Middle Ages knew of 
the individual and had a sense of history, as is well 
documented in theological and other, literary, 
documents of the time. Great strides in the philosophy 
of language occurred this period. The troubadours and 
other poets made the most extravagant claims for their 
individual abilities to compose better verse than that 
of their predecessors or contemporaries. Comprehensive
5histories and encyclopedias were written in a unique 
attempt to gather, in a single embrace, the sum total 
of knowledge. There was no linguistic invention on the 
order of what in the Renaissance was meant by the term 
poetry. and for the medieval historian there could 
never be "a sense of the otherness and lostness of the 
past" (Patterson 93) that to a great extent accounts 
for the Renaissance and modern historical as well as 
literary sensibility. Yet the Middle Ages produced 
unique poetry that concerned itself with the individual 
poet's travail, his or her attempt to provide a fitting 
description of experience, and overall with the art of 
making literature. Witness Dante and his Virgil. And 
in its consideration of time, the Middle Ages provided, 
too, a scheme in which it could explain itself vis-a- 
vis the past; for this period "saw temporality as an 
unbroken continuity from past to present, which is why 
it consistently presented the elements of antique 
culture anachronistically" (Patterson 93).
This recognition brings me to the second, related 
issue, which is that, ironically, it has taken the 
urgency and vocabulary of a poststructuralist critique 
to reveal the very seeds of its epistemological 
approach in the theology cum philosophy of the Middle 
Ages. Early developments in epistemology in turn have 
made the vitality and indeed the modernity of this
6latter period clearly evident. This symbiosis is most 
apparent in literary studies.
Since the 1960's, the influence of postmodernist 
theories has caused a radical reevaluation of medieval 
literature (as can be seen in the work of J. B. Allen, 
Colish, Finke, Hanning, Jordan, Leicester, Patterson, 
Vance, Zumthor, and many others). In textual studies 
the principle of alterity, for example, has taught 
that variants of a text can be valid in their own 
right. As Eugene Vance has recently shown, 
furthermore, a
necessity for medievalists to define relationships 
between variants of a given text extends to that of 
defining relationships between a single text and 
the network of other texts that constitutes its 
cultural horizon. (From Topic xxvii)
In this light, Judson Allen's comparison of medieval 
and modern esthetics is instructive:
The moral centre of most modern art is the value of 
the particular as such, taken either in the 
personalist sense exemplified by Wordsworth's 
Prelude. or in the verbal and lapidary sense most 
perfectly illustrated by "Twas brillig, and the 
slithy toves . . . "  The two come together in 
Finnegans Wake. as the world of literature achieves 
perfect verbal solipsism. All these works, of 
course, make truth claims of various sorts, but 
they all have in common the axiomatic divisions of 
post-Renaissance times: life from art, mind from 
matter, science from religion, fact from value, 
word from thing. Whether these are accepted or 
opposed makes no difference; they are there. The 
medieval claim [for poetry, however,] presumes an 
axiomatic that these divisions do not exist— before 
Descartes, obviously, there was a profound sense in 
which they had not yet been thought of. (32)
7An intuitive grasp of the human mind set prior to the 
advent of empiricism plays a crucial role in the work 
of a modern poet such as Ezra Pound, and in much of 
twentieth century thought. What is unique about the 
later twentieth century's reception of the Middle Ages 
is the response to what is quintessential in the 
earlier poetry. Consider Julia Kristeva: "Any text is 
constructed as a mosaic of quotations [and is] the 
absorption and transformation of another. The notion 
of intertextuality replaces that of intersubjectivity" 
(66) . At the climax of the Middle Ages poems begin 
overtly to present a consciousness of themselves; in 
this they look ahead to the "art for art's sake" credo 
of Modernism, which fully emerges out of the 
Renaissance. As we shall see, what Allen has called a 
"verbal solipsism," which he rightly claims is a sign 
if not a product of the modern world, may very well owe 
its existence to Anselm's recognition that statements, 
in and of themselves, enjoy an integrity or rather an 
internal logic of their own, quite apart from any 
objective reality. Perhaps it is not going too far to 
suggest that the way for Joyce's "solipsism" is 
prepared by Dante, who especially anticipates Kant's 
Einbildungskraft in the Paradiso's "ephemeral balance 
f1'equilibrio fuqqente1 between idea and symbol" 
(Mandelbaum Visione 35; my trans.). (Of course, for
many, Dante resides at the threshold of the modern 
w o r l d .)
There is a striking similarity between, 
particularly, the fourteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Both are eras of great change and uncertainty (cf. Le 
Goff 20-23). The one still had no precise, authentic 
notion of literary fiction, and the other has now 
arrived at an equivalence of fiction and fact in the 
crisis of genre that conflates poetry and prose and 
demystifies the fictive moment; to the 
deconstructionist the fictional text is no better or 
worse than a news article or a philosophical argument. 
Indeed, I would contend that a medieval linguistic 
breach is mirrored in the modern loss of faith in the 
ability of language or text to supply stable meanings, 
and it is here that we can locate the primary symptom 
of these centuries' many complementary upheavals. 
Dante has Adam say
Or, figliuol mio, non il gustar del legno 
fu per se la cagion di tanto essilio, 
ma solamente il trapassar del segno 
(Par. XXVI 115-17, my italics)
[My son,] the cause of my long exile did not lie 
within the act of tasting of the tree, 
but solely in my trespass of the boundary 
[i.e., the sign].1
1. This and all subsequent translations of Dante, 
unless otherwise specified, are by Allen Mandelbaum, 
taken from The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri. Trans, 
and Intr. Allen Mandelbaum, University of California 
Press, 1984.
9in order to invoke an ancient epistemological 
meditation that for him has its origin in, after Paul, 
the "semiological consciousness" (Vance Mervelous 34) 
of Augustine (i.e., "What the Apostle says pertains to 
this problem: 'For the letter killeth, but the spirit 
quickeneth1" [De doctrina Christiana II.vi.8; in Vance 
29]). The Summa Theoloaica. philosophically at the 
heart of the C o m m e d i a . augments Augustine in 
phenomenological terms; the Summa is echoed in 
Purgatorio XVII's paen to imaginative power—
0 imaginativa che ne rube 
tavolta si di fuor [. . . ]
chi move te, se '1 senso non ti porge? (13-16)
0 fantasy, you that at times would snatch 
us so from outward things [. . .]
who moves you when the senses do not spur you?
— then it is specifically paraph r a s e d  in what 
essentially derives from the Pauline and Augustinian 
meditation (ST 1.60.5) on natural knowledge and its 
necessary adjunct, mental knowledge, by which the sign 
of an object is apprehended (the sign, according to 
Augustine, being what he calls "verbum mentis"):
Lo naturale e sempre sanza errore, 
ma l'altro puote errar per malo obietto 
o per troppo o per poco di vigore. (94-96)
The natural is always without error, 
but mental love may choose an evil object 
or err through too much or too little vigor.
Poststructuralist systems take up like issues (not
10
surprisingly, based as these issues are in Anselm, 
Abelard, Aquinas, Ockham, et. aJL. ) . There is an 
inherent discrepancy in the Christian idea of a 
singular word or sign that might represent a 
paradoxically plural Holy Trinity (Auerbach Dante 18- 
19); similarly, nineteenth century positivism is 
undermined by relativity, quantum theory, and the 
Heisenberg principle of uncertainty. Hence, the 
twentieth century mind cannot entertain a faith in 
mimetic language, just as the medieval mind could not 
apprehend signs heuristically but rather 
instrumentally— since knowledge came only with God's 
assistance (Colish Mirror ix, 172).
The issue of a shifting semantic ground speaks 
directly to the question of self-citation that is an Ur 
form of the modern autobiographical impulse. Take, for 
example, the common misconstrual of Augustine's 
Confessions. Confession, for him, was a profession of 
faith, in which,
far more than the admission of sins committed 
[. . .] it meant also the speech act of praising,
as when Christ says to God, "I confess to you 
FConfiteor tibi], Father, Lord of heaven and earth, 
since you have hidden these things from the wise."
(Vance Mervelous 5)
For Augustine, self-knowledge was an unworthy 
enterprise; he also tended to reject the notion of 
esthetic pleasure that the art of rendering such
11
knowledge might otherwise afford. Such an outlook 
could not have persisted after Descartes. This 
perspective explains how narratology, by definition, 
cannot comprehend the last four books of the 
Confessions (which deal not with the events of 
Augustine's life but with the epistemology of memory in 
the human soul, the first chapters of Genesis. and so 
forth). Augustine's "autobiography" praises, professes 
faith and sacrifice, so to bear out one or another 
sense of the word confession (5). The Confessions does 
not present an objectified, historical "I," but in fact 
declares its intention (in Book X) to reveal "what I 
now am and what I still am" (in Vance 2). Here we are 
confronted with a "dialectic between the time of 
history and that of Salvation," a dialectic that became 
acutely operative with the emergence in the twelfth 
century of the exemplum as a literary form (Le Goff 
80). While Augustine's conception of communitas is 
determined by divine love, by the time of Aquinas—  
particularly Dante's version of him--the events of 
one's life had become truly integral to the sense of 
the Christian community. This ethical sense served as 
the metaphor for poetics in Dante's polis; and it is 
this same sense of the personal life within a 
community, a self-conception driven by the realization 
of alterity, which drives poets like Marcabru, Chaucer 
and Langland. While Chaucer's recurring figure
12
"Geffrey" is perhaps the most brilliantly drawn of all 
medieval personae, those of Marcabru, Dante and 
Langland are truly pivotal in the evolution of a modern 
literary voice. My primary focus is the precision with 
which these poets accomplish their task of 
incorporating and evolving the refinements of each 
other, in the spirit of medieval auctoritas. which 
insisted upon adherence to tradition.
My study benefits from this initial comparison with 
modern thought and poetics, in whose roots we recognize 
intellectual and specifically literary movements that 
were born in the Middle Ages— a time ostensibly devoid 
of that profoundly human trait, the ability to see 
oneself (the ability to see). Appropriately, we must 
begin with a discussion of poetic authority and 
authorship in the Middle Ages. And we need to begin by 
challenging long held views such as that of Julius 
Schwietering (Die Demutsformel mittelhochdeutscher 
Dichter, 1921), who sees the medieval writer as self- 
effacing in following the precepts of Salvian, 
Sulpicius Severus, and others who caution authors not 
to commit the sin of vanitas terrestris. Anonymity is 
prescribed, and if the author has finally chosen to 
give his name, he does so "to gain forgiveness of his 
sins through the intercession of his hearers and 
readers" (in Curtius 515). I believe this view to be
13
entirely too one sided. It precludes a focus on the 
literary m a k e r . Yet it is in the very craft of 
authorship that we can discover the medieval author's 
opportunity for self-advancement, for recognition as an 
individual by others in the sense that his or her 
literary skills have created a text different from all 
others.
To comprehend the later medieval poets' self- 
assertions in their poems, as poets, we must examine 
the contemporary intellectual developments from which 
these poets appropriated their fundamental verbal 
gesture. Rather than the typical medieval manuscript's 
perrenial coda--the scribe's "Adamo me fecit"— these 
poets found numerous and increasingly ingenious ways of 
inscribing, of weaving into the very fabric of their 
poetry, the very "modern" claim, ego auctor.
Dante explicitly establishes the basis for self- 
ref erentiality in the Convivio. As John Freccero 
notes, Augustine's Confess ions is cited there as an 
instance of an author's speaking of himself, 
altruistically; Augustine wanted to set an example for 
all humanity. His description in the C o n v i v i o . 
Freccero feels, seems "almost to herald Dante's own 
'testament'," the Commedia (2). One reason to speak 
of oneself, Dante writes, is to offer the ,1m 1.3"
greatest advantage [. . .] for others by way of
instruction; and this reason moved Augustine to speak
14
of himself in his confessions, so that in the progress 
of his life, which was from bad to good, and from good 
to better, and from better to best, he furnished 
example and teaching which could not have been obtained 
from any other equally truthful testimony.
(1.2; trans. Freccero 2-3)
Freccero 1 s understanding of the Commedia 1s 
structure is illuminating; the poem's architecture 
adumbrates an ultimate merging of Dante the pilgrim 
with the author of the poem. Moreover, given a 
critical heritage that was defined by critics like 
Schwietering, it is easy to see what motivates the 
younger commentator to strike a balance between total 
self-effacement and total self-assertion. "By naming 
himself at the moment of his confession r Purct. 
XXXII.1003]," Freccero writes, "[Dante] gives to the 
abstract exemplum the full weight of vero testimonio. 
exactly as had St. Augustine before him" (3).
The evidence that can be brought to bear for this 
claim is compelling, but more can be said, for Dante 
and the other poets of his time are sometimes utterly 
self-promoting in their references to themselves. 
These are not Renaissance poets, but in their 
identifications with the very language and with the 
poetics they employ, they manage to single themselves 
out from their surrounding literary tradition— a 
tradition that to a modern mind could be seen as all­
engulfing. Yet for these poets this is a tradition
15
that not only nourishes but holds out a language whose 
very structure invites self-reference. So, in Dante, 
it is true that "the distance between protagonist and 
author is at its maximum at the beginning of the 
fCommedia1 and [that this distance] is gradually closed 
by the dialectic of the poetic process until the 
pilgrim and poet coincide at the ending of the poem" 
(25). This process will involve meditations on the 
nature of language and interpretation; in the working 
out of these problems the full depth of the Dante 
figure is realized. In the final "transformation of 
the pilgrim into the author, whose story we have just 
finished reading," there is a recapitulation that 
parallels the spiral paths the pilgrim has taken, which 
in turn are "spatial analogues of the temporal paradox 
of terza rima forward motion which recapitulates the 
beginning in the end." This structure also mimics the 
pattern of discourse, the kind of autobiography to be 
found in the Confessions. The movement of the Dante 
poem serves to represent
the paradoxical logic of all such narratives [in 
which] the beginning and end must logically 
coincide, in order for the author and his persona 
to be the same. This exigency, analogous to what 
Kenneth Burke in another context refers to as "the 
Divine tautology," takes the form, "I am I, but I 
was not always so." (264)
In Dante's attempt to recreate, as Le Goff puts it, the 
dialectic of history and of salvation (see above), he
16
must construct an autobiography that need not obey the 
strictures of time and a p rogression of s e l f ­
development— as if a personality could be posited that 
is at last made known and is a constant.
The whole of temporal sequence in such a narrative, 
then, is generated by some form of negation 
introduced into the principle of identity and then 
refined away. Logically, autobiography is a 
sequential narrative that moves toward its own 
origin. If that statement seems paradoxical, it is 
no more so than the premise of all 
autobiography— that one can judge one's own life as 
though life were concluded. The ending of such a 
story implies its beginning, for the persona1s 
experience must be concluded before the author's 
voice (and hence the story) can come into 
existence. (Freccero 2 64)
We can find another explanation of Dante's strategy, 
though, one which Freccero is on the brink of 
discovering when he observes that the "paradox of 
continuity/discontinuity in the formal representation 
of ter z a r ima is matched by the paradox of 
continuity/discontinuity involved in the logic of 
autobiographical narrative: I am I , but I was not
always so" (264). As a poet, Dante will always locate 
himself in time, but the manifestation of this 
temporality will be word and number—  for Dante, the 
poetic process itself. Virgil the poet is his guide, 
and if wisdom is to be attained, it will have to come 
through the pilgrim-poet's ability to ascend beyond his 
guide's provenance; this the pilgrim does, with the aid 
of Grace, and in the poem so does the author, through
17
poetic ingenuity that forms the poet's overall
signature, in which he will surpass the ability of his 
poetic master Virgil. We see this virtuosity in
Dante's use of the trope "io sol uno":
[. . .] e io sol uno
m 'apparecchiava a sostener la guerra 
si del cammino e si de la pietate,
che ritrarra la mente che non erra.
(Inf. II.3-6)
[. . .] and I myself
alone prepared to undergo the battle 
both of the journeying and of the pity,
which memory, mistaking not, shall show.
This poetic maneuver is the emblem of Dante's poetic 
performance in large. In its triple insistence on the 
acolyte's powers and future journey to Paradise, where 
Virgil cannot go, it places the pilgrim within and 
associates him with the very matrix of his thought, 
actions, aspirations, beliefs and fears— for it is in 
the number three that we find the links Dante has 
forged among himself, his poetry of terza rima and of 
three canticles, and the Holy Trinity.
II
Hence, if poststructuralism can offer readers anything 
beyond, simply, the injunction to indulge ourselves in 
the pleasures of our texts (to echo Roland Barthes), it 
is the lesson first to be learned in the later Middle 
Ages when poets begin to practice the art of singling
themselves out from their larger literary world, as 
individuals who are both a part of and distinct from an 
immensely influential tradition. They are made a part 
of the "auctorial" literary canon in their choice to 
employ a literary language and usually a subject matter 
inherited from the past. They seek to be a part of 
their tradition. Indeed, they locate themselves within 
that tradition by partaking of the "matter" of their 
literary heritage, and by refashioning this literary 
matter according to the demands of their own 
temperament and sense of what constitutes eloquence. A 
prime example of this intent is the large number of 
Troy stories, some considered to be literary, others 
historical, which were composed since the twelfth 
century. These stories range widely from the twelfth 
century's Erec et Enede by Chretien de Troyes and the 
Roman de Tro ie by Benoit de St. Maure, to the 
Historia Pestructionis Troiae (a quasi translation of 
Benoit) by Guido delle Collone, to Troilus and Crysede 
by Chaucer. Considering the profound differences in 
these literary works, it might be argued that each of 
them is so distinct as to have to be considered 
original, in the sense that we take the notion of 
originality to mean that which has instigated and 
ordered works written by the time of Romanticism and 
perhaps as early as the Renaissance (i.e., certainly in 
the sense that Stephen Greenblatt intends in his book
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Renaissance Self-Fashioning^. But these medieval poets 
were not interested in originality. Rather, the poets 
of the later Middle Ages were concerned with reworking 
the language— the matter and, ultimately, the textual 
nature— of an inherited tradition. And in fact this 
was a tradition that might be thought of by them to 
have been primarily textual.
These poets were not interested in going outside 
that tradition. They were part of a self-involving 
system in which their enunciatory activity could give 
rise to nothing that might exist beyond the system's 
comprehension. The nature of the system was 
doctrinally Christian, and, inasmuch as Jesus Christ 
was the Word incarnate, it followed that the cast of 
the entire Christian "system" was substantially textual 
(or, perhaps, the better term to describe the "system" 
is 1 iteral. yet the Christian word was not at all 
limited to a fixed or written form, and indeed it also 
implied both explicit discourse and implicit, silent 
thought). As we shall examine at length, all that 
existed could be seen and understood in textual terms. 
Textuality was the field on which medieval poets 
endeavored to both fit into the world in its Christian 
sense and to transcend what was a fundamentally 
Christian hierarchy of value and authority. James Hans 
stipulates how the very activity of the poet allows the
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employment of "the furrows of [a] predictable range [of 
experience] to get outside of those furrows of 
predictability and, in going outside of them, [to 
enlarge] the field of some of the furrows" (90). Thus 
the Christian system, which inevitably came to embrace 
purely literary esthetics, paradoxically made possible 
the promotion of individual literati who could turn the 
hierarchy of (now, a literary) authority and value in 
on itself, and in so doing elevate themselves as the 
new authorities or at least the new spokespersons of 
the prevailing truth. And these poets did indeed 
desire to assert themselves as poets--that is, as 
auctores— but their enterprise took the form of an 
evolved sense of eloquence that in part derived from, 
and could be tested by, a reader's (or listener's) 
commitment to the literary past.
These poets wished to express the thing understood 
as the literary tradition better than it had ever been 
done before and better than it ever would be. To say 
it best— or to sing it best, as in the case of the 
troubadours, who were the primary formulators of this 
poetic— was to say it truthfully. In this light we can 
understand the troubadours' preoccupation with judging 
both peers and forebears, with their praise or scorn; a 
variety of characterizations in poems allowed authors 
to set themselves up, dramatically, in either implied 
or outright contention with their others.
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Virgil and Dante in the C o m m e d i a . of course, 
constitute the example par excellence of this dynamic. 
Virgil is both lauded and subtly undermined in favor of 
the Dante persona in whom the tradition is not only 
alive but flourishing as never before, through the role 
of the witness. The witness "merely" reports a depth 
and grandeur that even Virgil, we are finally left to 
ponder, could not achieve. In fact it is through the 
praise of Virgil that we first come to appreciate both 
the enormity and grace of the Dantean project, which is 
most profoundly spoken in its inter- and especially 
intratextual undertones. Virgil is Dante's "author," 
first identified as such in Inferno I (85) by the 
approbations maestro and autore; "Tu se' lo mio maestro 
e '1 mio autore." The bounteous acknowledgement on the 
part of the Dante figure is still to be augmented; it 
is not long before Virgil, twice praised, will be 
referred to as Dante's guide. governor, master— "Or va, 
ch'un sol volere e d'ambedue; / tu duca, tu segnore e 
tu maestro" (Inf. 11.139-40). Here, notably, the 
machinery for praise and acknowledgement is to be found 
in the very fabric of the praiser's language, in his 
recurring cadence that in its reprise serves to 
increase the depth and volume of that praise, and 
therefore the language further ennobles its subject as 
well as itself.
The key to this ploy lies in what are otherwise the 
least significant parts of Dante's speech— the pronouns 
containing in themselves, by definition, no semantic 
power. Yet used here in the larger discourse of 
praise, they serve to convey the primal meaning of that 
praise in the rhythm of their speaker. In fact, they 
form Dante's voice in these cantos. In their 
repetitions they suggest the measured, utterly sober 
realization on the part of their speaker that the 
source of his very meaning lies in his "father poet," 
Virgil— who is his other. Analogically, Dante is the 
pronoun to the noun, V irgil— first in the twice 
proclaiming pronoun mio. and then a canto later in the 
thrice uttered tu (cf. above). The language theory of 
the time focuses on such semantic, and by extension 
ontological, distinctions. Dante's subtle augmentation 
serves to point up the effusive quality inherent in any 
act of praise, which is quite possibly what drives the 
perception of praise when it is considered to be 
beautiful.
In this manner Dante establishes his debt to the one 
being praised. Dante's tactics are not so far removed 
from, for instance, the French margerite genre or the 
later Chaucer's overly abundant lauding of Alceste in 
the "Prologue" to the Legend of Good Women. She is the 
goddess of love, who is the "flour of al floures." 
Chaucer's epithet is but one manifestation of what
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Peter Dronke has identified as the flos florum trope 
(Medieval Latin 181-82) that was common in both Dante's 
and Chaucer's time. Dante, however, had another 
purpose in his baldly and progressively grand 
enunciations of his debt to his "other" and great poet.
The problem for Dante is how to name himself as the 
poet and still acknowledge the literary past that has 
made his own poetry a possibility. Hence he must 
valorize Virgil while carefully laying the groundwork 
for the demonstration of his own poetic provenance. He 
initiates this strategy by praising Virgil, twice (Inf. 
1.85). Then a triadic configuration recalls the 
thematic structure of that praise (Inf. 11.140), to say 
nothing of its meter and cadence. As mentioned, of all 
numbers the number three orders the Commed i a . 
structurally and doctrinally: the three line stanzas of 
thirty-three syllables, thirty-three cantos in each 
canticle (Canto I of the Inferno serving as an 
introduction to the poem as a whole), the thirty-three 
years of Jesus Christ's life on earth, and so forth 
(see Freccero 258-71). In effect, the viator's praise 
of Virgil helps to create a resonance that will 
continue throughout the Commedia as an important 
subtext serving a number of poetic functions, not the 
least of which is to create the context for Dante's 
self-naming, which through the virtuosity of his poetic
24
demonstration will prove the truth of his claim for 
poetic mastery.
Again, it is what Dante sets between the two tropes 
of acknowledgement that fully marks him as the greater 
poet. As Allen Mandelbaum makes clear, a uniquely 
Dantesque maneuver originates in another (obviously 
related) trope of the time, that of autocitation— to be 
precise, Dante's use of it, a tour de force, in Inferno 
II 1 s "io sol uno" (3), which encapsulates the 
singularity of the pilgrim's circumstance and his 
destined envisioning of a celestial truth that must 
elude the grasp of language:
Lo giorno se n'andava, e l'aere bruno 
toglieva li animai che sono in terra 
da le fatiche loro; e io sol uno 
m'apparecchiava a sostener la guerra 
si del cammino e si de la pietate, [. . . .] (1-6)
The day was now departing; the dark air 
released the living beings of the earth 
from work and weariness; and I myself 
alone prepared to undergo the battle 
both of the journeying and of the pity [. . .].
Dante's use of the triad "io sol uno" is
unparallelled. At least one of its sources, however, 
is Arnaut Daniel's song "En cest sonet coind'e leri" 
where he writes, "leu sui Arnautz q'amas l'aura" (43). 
Arnaut's line quite possibly "[condenses] not only 
Romance origins but Vergil's Polvdorus ego (Aen. 3.45 
"I am Polydorus")" (Mandelbaum "Taken" 233). It should 
come as no surprise that Dante employs the trope to 
praise Arnaut.
2 5
Dante is a most adroit user, especially in the 
Purgatorio. of the styleme of "I am" followed by 
the proper name. Its chief incarnation is the 
Provenal .ieu sui A r n a u t . citation- steal from 
Arnaut Daniel (P u r q . 26.142), and its first
incarnations are the negative of Inf. 11.32, io non 
Enea. io non Paolo sono, and then the affirmative, 
I 1 son Beatrice (Inf. 27.70).
In this regard, Mandelbaum goes on to make a crucial 
observation, one that goes to the heart of Dante's 
poetic:
The proper name is one part of natural language 
that mimes— and engenders— poetic language. It is 
the emblem of poetry as nominalization [. . .] for
the proper name collapses class and membership in 
the class into one. Even the reading aloud of a 
catalogue list, with that most elementary of 
structures, the alphabet, to be found in a 
telephone book, or an unalphabetic random sampling 
of registered voters, gives us some poetic lift. 
(And the pairing of the un-pairable proper name 
with the common noun in a rhyme pair yields even 
more poetic surplus.) But in io. son. it is the 
coupling of that already-poetic proper name with 
the pronominal, indefinite, hovering shifter of "I 
am" that condenses the chiaroscuro of shadowed 
presence emerging into the light of particularity 
[. . . ].
Yet Dante can evoke Virgilian mystery by precisely not
naming; this "namelessness" is evinced
in the long wait between Dante's io, sol uno and 
Beatrice's utterance of his name, "Dante," and, 
more hauntingly, in Matilda's nameless appearance 
in the Earthly Paradise, where the donna soletta. 
the "solitary woman" (Purq. 28.40) waits for some 
six cantos to be named. (232-33)
Here we see the strategy for self-naming in the 
Commedia. This strategy, however, is set against the
background of the naming of the other (poet) at the 
beginning of the poem (i.e., Virgil's introduction into 
the story of the poem as the pilgrim's guide), an 
activity that includes the namer's self-assertion in 
finely managed, subversive maneuvers such as we have 
noted in the use of the pronouns mio and tu. If Dante 
had wanted a literate reader to contemplate the 
philosophical implications of such language, 
specifically the play of its constituent parts, he 
could have done no better than to have placed the 
unique citation "io sol uno" midway between his first 
and second measured approbations of Virgil, who in 
effect becomes the source of Dante's poetry, his 
linguistic play; thus by implication Virgil becomes the 
origin of this pilgrim-poet's ego ("io"). Within the 
framework of what Auerbach calls the sermo humilis. 
Dante manages to elevate himself through a triad of 
self-reference while, ironically, he remains anonymous 
precisely by foregoing the use of a proper noun. The 
power of his trope comes from understatement through 
"humble" (humilis) pronouns, terms of number, and the 
like, which serve to elevate the poet above all others. 
This configuration exists within a tradition but is 
unprecedented in its virtuosity; in its agility and 
plenitude of self-signification it establishes its 
poet's preeminence. As Mandelbaum has observed,
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Dante the maker knew when to dismiss Vergil, but 
Vergil of all poets is the poet who knows when to 
disappear, and that knowledge is shared by Dante's 
Vergil and the author of the Aeneid. Yet as moving 
as Vergil's final disappearance in the Purqatorio 
is [see XXX.49-54], the most Vergilian moment of 
his absence is to be found in the opening of canto 
2 of the Inferno. There, with the three Virgilian 
night scenes behind him, Dante forgets the presence 
of Vergil and concentrates on Dante's own shadowed 
aloneness— in that aloneness remembering Vergil 
most [. . . .] (234)
Here is a presence that can be profoundly invoked 
through its opposite, absence. This understanding of 
complementaries pervades Dante's language, even to the 
use he makes of parts of speech such as the pronoun, in 
order to point up both the paradoxicality of presence 
within absence and to show what such a dynamic can 
suggest about all language in its attempt to comprehend 
e x p e r i e n c e .
For Dante it is finally the very music of his poem 
which establishes the proof of his superiority, 
particularly as he defines music in De Vulgari as the 
ordering of rhetoric (II.4). He arrays the evidence of 
his rhetorical mastery before his audience, from which 
it can judge claim. The claim is never baldly
asserted; to do would be to deny the very tradition
that makes such a claim possible in the first place. 
Virgil is the great one, but in establishing the 
conditions for this greatness, Dante reveals the 
greater magnitude of his own poetry.
28
III
It should also be noted that Dante has included within 
his strategy not only Virgil, his literary antecedent, 
but for the younger poet strictly historical 
antecedents in Aeneas and Paul ("io non Enea, io non 
Paolo sono," above). In itself this inclusion is a 
mark of the deep, ultimately inseparable connections 
between literature, theology and philosophy, and 
history, all of which are understood in Dante's time 
under the aegis of what we can call textualitv. In a 
general sense, the latter poet of the later Middle 
Ages, in this case Dante, was busy establishing himself 
through the articulation of a relationship with a 
predecessor poet or alternately with a received text, a 
text inherited from the older poet yet one whose 
conditions were determined by forces beyond the narrow 
field of the purely literary.
It is in such terms that an attempt should be made 
to understand the later medieval poets as authors 
writing both within and against the literary auctoritas 
whose hierarchy and very subject matter were beholden 
to a past that was understood through the supporting 
structure of Christianity. The poets strove to mark 
off an area of purely literary authority. This 
authority, however, would never be won at the expense 
of the tradition. All the same, the poets
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distinguished themselves from the received, 
"authorized" t e x t . in a fundamentally subliminal 
manner, which necessarily included and in fact was 
determined by an author's understanding of what text 
meant. Contained within their poetry, their basic 
question was: "how can there be a meaningful statement 
about the nature of truth when my text departs from the 
text that is as close to the truth as any language will 
allow?" This question embraces a poet's self­
conception in which he or she is in some sense to be 
self- described as a "textual being," or perhaps as a 
being who inhabits the language understood to be 
"textuality" per se.
The elucidation of such a rich and complex idea 
requires an examination of textuality as a force in the 
medieval Christian community. It cannot be otherwise, 
for as will become evident, the origins of the concepts 
of text and author are one and the same; they are both 
aspects of a particular cultural discourse, and what 
Christianity first nurtures and then undermines can be 
seen in terms of language philosophy, which describes 
in part the integral relationship between what is said 
and the person or persons who say it. Christian 
history very much parallels that of the concept of 
textuality in its time. How could it not, since the 
text was first and foremost a Christian text, and 
furthermore a text founded upon all of the assumptions
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of a world that derived from the Word made flesh?
As rationalism slowly emerges, the emphasis on 
grammar, as a force by which to order perception, 
wanes. In the eleventh century, the text and its 
author grow both distinct and distant from each other. 
Yet holding each to the other, despite the phenomenon 
of a new and ever increasing distance, is Christian and 
hence, eventually, literary auctoritas. Each author 
delineates and explores connections to a text that is 
the ground of that author's own definition, and which 
makes possible, ironically perhaps, a growing 
distinction from the very text of which the author is a 
part. In his examination of the origins of the sonnet 
form, Paul Oppenheimer has argued convincingly that the 
sonnet derives from a tradition other than that of the 
troubadours. In the earliest sonnets, such as those 
written by Giacomo da Lentino,
one is struck from the first by the absence of two 
elements essential to successful performed poetry 
and ubiquitous in troubadour poetry: the absence of 
any even implied address to a listening audience, 
and the absence of multiple or dual personae [such 
as] the persona who actually suffers the pains of 
unrequited love, and the "poet-persona,11 who makes 
the song. (Birth 182-83)
Indeed, especially in a poem like "Molti amadori la lor 
malatia"— whose brevity of form and meditative tone, it 
is suggested, alter poetry's rhetoric--the poetic 
discourse is addressed instead to the "poet himself"
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and may in fact address "the very form in which it is 
written" (183). The sonnet's brief and assymetrical 
octave-sestet structure, which derives from a 
developing literate rather than the older oral 
tradition, goes far in engendering the form's 
meditative quality. We can discover its metapoetical 
stance, however, in the work of someone like Marcabru. 
All the same, the sonnet can be set apart "from those 
treatments of love to be found in the songs of the 
troubadours" because of "its dialectical structure" 
(183). Here again, though, we find a similarity with 
the troubadours whose very posture towards either 
implied or explicit interlocutors depends on an 
understanding of dialectics that had been broadened and 
deepened with the spread of a revived Aristotelianism. 
While it may be true that as a form the sonnet does not 
stem directly from the troubadour impulse, we can say 
that it nevertheless partakes of a widespread and 
fundamental approach to any attempt at understanding 
the Western, Christian world of the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries.
St. Augustine extensively develops a basic textual 
metaphor that describes the crux of language and the 
reality that language seeks to portray— language and 
perception, language and experience, and so on. 
Indeed, the whole issue of auctoritas implicitly
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posits the fundamental issue of language's relationship 
to experience, a relationship that is explored and 
intensified in Augustine's thought, and, moreover, one 
which is compounded with an overt meditation on 
t e x t uality as the means of articulating that 
relationship. Within the framework of Augustine's 
thinking the notion of textuality is arranged in 
relation to the individual of the society, as a part of 
a hierarchical, neoplatonic and unified structure. In 
the later Middle Ages, as the balance between orality 
and literacy became altered by technological and other 
forces— and because of the wider dissemination of 
Aristotle's writings, in part as the result of 
increased literacy— the unity of the Augustinian world 
was vitiated. What remained, however, was the 
Augustinian textual metaphor. In Augustine's writings 
this metaphor had described the split between language 
and reality, the verbum mentis. With a renewed, more 
vigorous Aristotelianism, the metaphor came to describe 
the widening gap between the author and his language, 
and, too, between the author and experience or reality. 
More importantly, a self-referentiality had inhered in 
the Augustinian epistemological system, and this was 
later applied to a metapoetics in which poets 
increasingly tended to refer to and carry on 
discussions about themselves as poets, and about the 
possibility of making poetry that might reflect the
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true state of things in the world. Three related 
perceptions were the result of this transformation, of 
what Etienne Gilson called "the demise of 
Christianity." The poem took the form of the author. 
The poem was a text, while perhaps the intertextuality 
of its discourse increased, especially through the 
treatment of its own and other authors. Lastly, as a 
consequence, the author fully became his text. We see 
this final development in William Langland's Piers 
Plowman, whose persona is named Will. He is a poet, 
whose preoccupation is centrally concerned with the 
individual capacity for voluntas. In the testing of 
his will to be able to write the truth of what he sees 
and believes, we witness the dramatization of his 
effort to become his very poem, and so he becomes the 
mark of his larger textual tradition.
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Chapter One 
Augustine, Anselm, Abelard:
Text and Word, History and Fiction
I
The act of naming, as that broadest, basic impulse to 
describe experience, centrally defines the sensibility 
of poets in the later Middle Ages. The significance of 
naming, in its intent to comprehend the world, becomes 
immediately apparent when considering intellectual 
developments during the high Middle Ages, especially 
its division between theology and philosophy. The 
relationship of word to thing is already an issue in 
the Creation story of Genesis. and the epistemological 
significance of naming is treated in a number of 
classical texts, including, most notably, Plato's 
Cratvlus. To name a thing, in some fundamental manner, 
is to attempt to bring order to perception. Or perhaps 
it can be said than naming is the very substance of 
perception, and naming may even be— to push this notion 
to its logical extreme— perception per se. Through 
naming articulation becomes possible; and it can be 
argued that it is only through articulation that being 
itself, as it were, can be. Nomination is critical to 
any discursive if not conceptual human impulse.
The name, the medieval nomen. will define the thing 
named in the sense that the name can act in relation to
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the thing as a classifier: a name sets a thing named 
off from other things as being distinct (or, at least, 
the name must implicitly make such a claim) . 
Distinction can vary widely within the range of the 
name. We can distinguish, for example, if a thing or 
entity performs an action (e.g., grammatically, the 
thing as it exists in its nominative case), or if it is 
acted upon either directly or obliquely by another 
agent (genitive, accusative, dative, ablative cases, 
and so on). Such distinctions, furthermore, may 
include the recognition that a thing is not an agency 
of an action, as is embodied in language's verbal mode.
In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas exploits a 
basic ontological distinction between noun and verb. 
He wishes to establish a ground for recognizing the 
difference between the essence of a thing and that 
thing's actual existence. William of Ockham later 
undermines this difference by dint of what Aquinas 
would have viewed to be an overly determined logic— or 
rather a logic whose presumed purview comprehended 
areas previously reserved to metaphysics. For his 
part, Aquinas could justify his analysis of reality by 
positing existence as a verbal mode (esse); thus he 
could claim that existence was, as F. C. Copleston has 
paraphrased it,
an act, the created act of a created essence, the
two [i.e., existence and essence] being
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distinguishable but not separable. At the same 
time in the phrase "essence and existence" esse 
functions as a verbal noun, and the two words tend 
to suggest two entities. That is to say, there is 
a temptation to regard "essence" and "existence" as 
names which stand for distinct entities. (Medieval 
Philosophy 335-36 [vide De ente et essentia 5; De 
potentia 7.2. Reply 9; Summa contra Gentiles 11.54; 
Summa Theoloqica 1.75.1; in Copleston 185-87])
Ockham the nominalist will reject Aquinas' 
metaphysics. Importantly, however, he does so by 
adhering to his predecessor's epistemological 
procedure. Ockham saw no distinction between essence 
and existence, in that they signified the same thing 
(Copleston 249) , the one as a noun (nominaliter) and 
the other as a verb (verbaliter). In maintaining this 
linguistic analogy Ockham had to admit that, because 
the two words functioned differently in speech, they 
could not be viewed as being interchangeable. The 
principle underlying this recognition was what Ockham 
called propriety or (in speaking of this he uses the 
term "convenienter" [Summa totius loqicae III.2.27; in 
Copleston 249, 336]). Ockham's struggle to place
language in the larger perspective of his overall 
theology is an example of medieval logic's generally 
increasing reliance on such tools as
terms and propositions and the relations between 
them. That is to say, it became clear to the 
medieval logicians that they were dealing not with 
extramental substances, nor even with concepts as 
psychical realities, but with terms and 
propositions. (Copleston 268)
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The rejection of Aquinas could only have occurred in 
the aftermath of the twelfth century renaissance. A 
new emphasis on Aristotle, occasioned in part by the 
discovery of ancient texts in both Greek and 
translation, especially Aristotle's C a t e g o r i e s . 
profoundly altered the contemporary intellectual 
climate. At this point in the evolution of the Middle 
Ages a pivotal feature of overall Christian cosmology 
is developed. As reflected in the Categories. names 
may distinguish species from genus or one species from 
another. Concepts of this order are the domain of 
simple nouns, of course, rather than proper nouns. And 
the proper noun, by the very condition of its terms, 
the condition that brings it into being, must seek to 
make unique distinctions; one may wish to name the man 
Socrates as he who is neither Plato nor any other human 
being, which is to say that proper nomination, as 
Ma n d elbaum has observed ("Taken" 232; cf. 
"Introduction" above) "collapses class and membership 
in the class into one."
This s e m a n t i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c a l , or otherwise 
theological issue of class also necessarily involved 
questions of grammar. As is carefully documented by 
Marcia Colish, even before the renaissance the 
emergence of Aristotelianism created especially 
disturbing problems for later medieval intellectuals:
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The issue centered in the fact that the Categories 
forcibly and inescapably introduced eleventh- 
century grammarians to the concepts of substance 
and accident, genera and species. The idea that a 
given thing might be looked at in a variety of ways 
called into question the classical definition of 
the part of speech used to denote a thing, a noun 
[ . . . . ]  In [Boethius'] translation of the 
Categories it appears plainly that nouns do not all 
signify in the same way. If they signify with 
respect to accidents they cannot properly signify 
with respect to substance, and vice versa. 
[Boethius] further elaborates in his translation of 
De interpretations that a noun must signify one or 
the other, but not both.
(The Mirror of Language 99)
In the face of these revelations, grammarians 
nonetheless remained within the ideological boundaries 
of their received sense of the world. With a 
remarkable tenacity, they held to the traditional views 
of Donatus, Priscian, Remigius of Auxerre and Alcuin, 
who determined that nouns defined things in terms of 
substance and accident, in all cases, both general and 
specific. The traditional grammarians, as it were, had 
consolidated these two kinds of designation without 
furnishing any insight into possible changes nominal 
signification might undergo when moving from one to 
another act (100). This tendency to cling to the past 
remained alive and well beyond Scholasticism. In the 
eleventh century, although "the [contrary] testimony of 
Boethius" was embraced, simultaneously it was set 
beside the already-known; and so thinkers continued to 
accept the "massive authority of grammar" (101).
As for the poets of the twelfth to fourteenth
39
centuries, they too adhered to a received past. Their 
poetics were grounded in the contemporary, increasing 
separation of theology and philosophy. Their poetic 
sensibility had its roots, moreover, in the splitting 
off from Latin of the vernacular languages, as well as 
in, concomitantly, a widening gap between oral and 
written textual traditions. In the twelfth century 
these conditions gave rise to a poetry of 
"autocitation" (to reiterate Mandelbaum1s apt term— cf. 
"Introduction" a b o v e ) ; poets begin to speak of 
themselves in their poems. These "selves" were left to 
be ambiguously interpreted, as being neither wholly the 
poets' real selves nor their apparently fictional 
versions that nevertheless were to be referred to by 
the names of the actual poets. The troubadour 
Marcabru, for instance, scorns other rival poets who 
are to him merely i oglars incapable of either true love 
or poetry containing truth; these ~i oqlars bear the 
names of actual personages. In the Commedia Virgil 
acts as Dante's guide but he is also Dante's mentor, 
and his rival. By the fifteenth century, for the first 
time among medieval poets, Thomas Hoccleve writes verse 
that can qualify as being truly literary and 
autobiographical in the modern sense of that term, as 
opposed to a form of self-citation that falls within 
the purview of simple rhetorical coloration. Hoccleve 
employs what can conveniently be termed a poetics of
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self-referentiality. A dynamic that had already been 
operative for several hundred years before Hoccleve 
developed and came to be used in increasingly subtle 
forms. David Greetham links it to the issue of a 
poet's reliance on the past in order to establish his 
own poetic authority:
The "discipleship" topos (with its inevitable 
acceptance of humilitas before the master) is very 
common, and is supported by such ancillary topoi as 
the "Golden Age" and the "dwarves on the shoulders 
of giants" [see, e.g., Curtius 83-85, 252-55, 407- 
13]. But the evidence of such perennial debates as 
the moderni versus antiqui demonstrates that the 
topos can in fact be used as an ironic stick with 
which to beat one's predecessors (Bloom's tessera 
perhaps). The pose is all, for it provides the 
poet's invention with a respectable heredity, gives 
scurrility, obscenity, libel, or aesthetic 
deficiency a decent cover, and yet allows the work 
great freedom and independence through the apparent 
artlessness and objectivity of the narrator. 
("Self-Referential Artifacts" 244)
Greetham's description of "artlessness" brings 
Chaucer's narrator immediately to mind (who was clearly 
a model for Hoccleve in La Male Regie. the Reqement of 
Princes and other works). Contemporary with Chaucer's 
poignantly comical "Geffrey" is Langland's persona 
"Will" the dreamer, whose name includes a pun on the 
human capacity for volition--a concept that was 
intimately involved in the fourteenth century's heated 
controversy over the respective roles of human will and 
intellect, a dispute that inevitably drew to itself 
current ideas about language. Langland's Will is not
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unlike the earlier Chretien de Troyes' self-pun on the 
idea of what constitutes Christian truth; the prologue 
to Erec et Enide actually contains the boast, 
reminiscent of the troubadours, that its author's 
poetry will please readers until the end of time— "tant 
que durera chretiente" (in Zumthor "Autobiography in 
the Middle Ages" 31).
This kind of naming, which signifies either one's 
real or fictional self, is a poetic act that plays a 
role in a growing practice among poets of the later 
Middle Ages of asserting their individual poetic 
authority through names. More powerfully, though, we 
can say that they iterate themselves through their 
manipulations of inherited notions of language as it 
relates to that reality of which naming is an integral 
part. And it is within these very notions that we can 
discover the fundamental rhetorical gesture of these 
poets, who make nascent claims in their poetry for 
originality and individuality. The manner in which 
these poets have appropriated the philosophies of their 
times entails some discussion at length, for theirs is 
a complex procedure.
II
The underlying world view that supports the manner in 
which medieval poets depict both their personae and
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themselves, as well as their writing per se is, of 
course, fundamentally Christian. But therein lies a 
central paradox. In defining themselves as 
individuals, the poets remained within the Christian 
community. Poetic auctoritas had been a rigidly 
determinative force, one which commanded the poet's 
awe. Christian auctoritas defined poetry as well as 
other intellectual disciplines, yet out of its 
hierarchical system poets could devise a new dynamic in 
their poems, which illustrated poetry's unique value in 
relation to its inheritance. The context for this 
assertion was the inherent play in language that the 
Christian establishment had long ago relegated to 
itself as being that which could most powerfully and 
authentically demonstrate Christian tenets; this 
appropriation of language's potential was particularly 
articulated by Augustine, whose metaphors for Christian 
truth, moreover, preeminently invoked issues of 
textuality. Yet medieval poets' self-naming, as well 
as the naming of other poets who were at times either 
or both revered ancestors and competitors, was the 
symptom of a new poetic that had its sources in the 
currently transforming epistemology of scholars in both 
monasteries and universities; as well, poetic naming 
was one of the poets' several strategies that gestured 
towards true self-definition within the courts of the 
aristocracy. The individual poet most profoundly
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discovered himself by defining his poem in terms that 
often deliberately reflected the theological and 
philosophical movements of his time.
Dating from Anselm in the eleventh century, 
intellectual emphasis, which at the time of Augustine 
had been on rhetoric, was now slowly, fundamentally 
shifting from grammar to logic. The passage paralleled 
a transition from a collective society to one that 
contained individuals at its center; this transition 
came about largely as a consequence of a societal shift 
from orality to literacy. Taken together, such a 
massive transformation demanded a change in the 
literature of’ the society— more precisely, in literary 
narrative structure (cf. Godzich "Foreword" xiv) . 
Older forms of narrative, employed by an orally based 
culture, had primarily served a commemorative function, 
and existed as a counterpart to a theology grounded in 
the Augustinian epistemology of memory.
Christianity, especially Augustinian neoplatonism, 
is founded on a theology of memory and on 
commemorative rituals of the purest sort. Its 
Eucharist is centered upon the gestures of a Son 
recalling men to his Father on the eve of his 
crucifixion by breaking his bread and exhorting his 
apostles thus: "This is my body, which is given for 
you; do this in remembrance of me" (in meam 
commemorationem; Luke 22:19). In the story of 
Christ's return to men after his resurrection, his 
disciples will be unable to know Christ until they 
remember him as he breaks bread and eats fishes 
among them (Luke 24). (Vance Mervelous 52)
In De magistro (x, xiv) Augustine writes that "teachers
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cannot teach true things, but can only remind their 
pupils of what they already know." Augustine's De 
trinitate (XV.xxii.42) holds that "man can truly know 
intelligible things [i.e., timeless spiritual things] 
in his own mind through divine illumination, which 
transpires in the memory, in concert with the actions 
of intellect and will." All that occurs, therefore, 
will be colored by a sense of the past. Hence it is 
not coincidental that the "performance or the telling 
of stories in oral societies is essentially 
commemorative" (Godzich xiv), and that, concomitant 
with the spread of both Aristotelianism and Averroism 
in the early twelfth century, and with the emergence of 
new secular forms of literature, a new literary impulse 
is defined by the esthetics and cognitive demands of a 
now written textuality. This new impulse embraced the 
distinction between an emerging sense of literary 
fiction and that of historiography.
With the spread of literacy, however, and the 
emergence of what Brian Stock has fittingly called 
"textual communities," persons of the older 
commemorative communities came to be defined within 
their societies ontologically rather than discursively. 
In the orally based group of memoria. individuals could 
not "choose their roles but [had] them thrust upon 
them"; they experienced these roles as "fate." As Wlad
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Godzich has asserted, these persons were in fact "the 
loci in which discourses intersect[ed] and produce[d] 
subject positions," for "memoria" was the "treasure 
trove of discourses" that comprised the community's 
hvstoria (xvi).
Gradually, Western society becomes dependent on 
written texts—  the older culture having relied on the 
collective consciousness, the newer increasingly 
influenced by individuals, and as an intellectual 
community dependent on cognitive paradigms that 
ultimately came to be logical instead of grammatical. 
Yet as we have noted briefly in connection with Aquinas 
and Ockham, descriptions and proofs of the real as well 
as the metaphysical increasingly turned to linguistic 
models both in order to derive a viable descriptive 
vocabulary and to establish a ground for measuring 
truth. Abbo of Fleury, in the tenth century, is an 
extreme case of someone who used received assumptions 
about language and its relationship to reality to 
constitute a rationale for a perceived truth. He 
attempted to reconcile one of a number of what had 
become conundrums surrounding the holy trinity. His 
problem arose from the acknowledgement that, even as he 
might choose to think of Christ as the begotten son of 
an unbegotten Father, he could not posit the Holy 
Spirit in either of these ways. Abbo approached this 
dilemma through grammar and the question of negation,
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noting that some forms of negation are relative. The 
grammatical principle, then, supported the conclusion 
"that the Holy Spirit, although absolutely unbegotten, 
is also begotten in a relative sense, since He proceeds 
eternally from the Father and the Son" (Colish Mirror 
97). A more radical analogy with the structure of 
Grammar-one which, notably, reveals the tyranny of 
Scriptural tradition in all areas of contemporary 
intellectual endeavor— occurs in the eleventh century. 
This thinking by analogy went to the heart of Christian 
doctrine when Berengarius felt compelled to argue 
against the actuality of Christ's presence in the 
Eucharist. His querying of the formula, "Hoc est enim 
corpus meum." led him to construct a dichotomy; on the 
one hand there was a spiritual truth, and on the other 
a physical one. Yet interestingly, Berengarius cites 
the crucial difference here between noun and pronoun in 
order to arrive at his "objective" position, for
"hoc" in this sentence [Hoc est enim corpus meum] 
is a pronoun, and its grammatical function is to 
signify the Eucharistic bread on the altar. 
"Corpus," signifying Christ's body, is, to be sure, 
a noun. However, it functions as predicate 
nominative in the sentence, and, as such, is 
controlled by "hoc," the subject of the sentence, 
with which it must agree. Since the pronoun "hoc" 
has limited significative possibilities, good 
grammar dictates that these limitations must also 
extend to "corpus" in the context of the sentence. 
If [. . .] the substance of the bread were actually 
changed into Christ's body during the consecration, 
the subject of the sentence would be annulled and 
destroyed by its own predicative nominative, a 
manifest grammatical impossibility.
(Colish Mirror 105)
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Both Abbo and Berengarius have elevated pronoun and 
noun to the status of arbiter of perception. Their 
intellectual procedures pave the way for the 
speculative grammarians, who even more radically assert 
the primacy of grammar as the measurement of truth. In 
discussing the background of Roger Bacon's thinking, 
Thomas Maloney observes that more than any other 
ancient text, Aristotle's Sophistici e l e n c h i . 
discovered in the early twelfth century, "forced 
logicians to draw help from the grammarians and develop 
semantic theories capable of the resolution of the 
linguistic problems rooted in the [Aristotelian] 
fallacies [of division and composition in statements]" 
(187) . Speculative grammarians, in recognizing the 
importance of grammar vis-a-vis logic, applied the 
tools of logic as well as categorical thinking to the 
seeming differences between Latin and all other 
languages, and concluded that there was a basic 
linguistic— that is, grammatical— structure common to 
any and all languages. In fact, grammar was thought to 
be able to fit the Aristotelian concept of a science, 
and the speculative grammarians— Peter of Elia, a 
University of Paris professor of grammar, Siger of 
Courtrai, and, prominent among them, Thomas of 
Erfurt— set out to prove that it was.
The characteristic feature of speculative grammar
was its attempt to deduce the parts of speech from
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the forms of thought, from basic concepts, that is 
to say, which were themselves expressions of the 
ontological studies of reality. For example, the 
noun was thought to express the concept of that 
which is stable, of substance, while the verb 
expressed the concept of becoming and, in the 
infinitive at least, the concept of "matter." A 
word becomes a definitive part of speech through 
its "mode of signifying" (modus significandi), 
these modes being concepts of the understanding 
which bind the word, as it were, to some mode of 
being. (Copleston 269-70)
These grammarians, then, emphasized the machinery of 
signification, and so privileged grammar over 
metaphysics and logic.
It is not too difficult to appreciate what a poet 
like Dante could do in the context of such thinking. 
His use of the pronouns mio and tu (cf. the 
"Introduction" above) , in counterpoint with 
substantives (e.g., "Tu s e 1 lo mio maestro e '1 mio 
autore" Inf. 1.85) and with the proper names of himself 
and others, all indicate intellectual struggles of his 
contemporaries and forebears. Likely enough, Dante 
helped to increase the importance of pronouns in the 
minds of thinkers who came after him, whether or not 
they actually knew of or even read his work. After 
Dante, the nominalist-realist controversy reached its 
height. Yet it begins with Abbo, Berengarius and 
others, not least of whom is Anselm and his search for 
the proper name of the deity. Under the influence of 
Aristotle's Categories with its concepts of substance 
and accident, genera and species, Anselm and
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others— who were not clearly either practitioners of 
logic or grammar, since there were as yet no such 
explicitly defined disciplines--could now grasp the 
"idea that a given thing might be looked at in a 
variety of ways [which] called into question the 
classical definition of the part of speech used to 
denote a thing, the noun" (Colish 99). This 
recognition, in turn, instigates a great enterprise of 
redefinition, and the postulating by Anselm of a 
"rectitude" rpropaliter1 or fittingness that any true 
noun, or more specifically any true name, might enjoy 
in its attempt at signification. In distinguishing 
between God and all other possibilities in the 
universe, Anselm observes that the language used to 
denote anything else in the world will not suffice in 
the struggle to evoke the Supreme Being; normal 
attributes are not of the same kind as that which a 
divine attribute should be. Moreover, the name for the 
thing, Divine or otherwise, must be proper, must 
possess rectitude. For Anselm, "the beauty of the name 
lies in the fact that it is a self-evident definition; 
it virtually proves itself" (147).
Anselm observed that the proper name of a thing has 
its virtue in its self-evidence. It is also fair to 
characterize contemporary epistemological systems as 
being inevitably self- involved in the ways in which
they reverted to their own self- descriptions— their 
own languages--so to arrive at self- validation. 
Poetry, too, directly addressed the issue of poetry; 
and beyond the question of the poem— being asked from 
within the poem— the poetry of this period engaged in 
philosophical speculation about the nature of reality 
and the efficacy of comprehending that reality within a 
net of language. Poetry began quite consciously to 
manipulate the language of the new intellectual ideas. 
Sensitivity to contemporary intellectual milieux 
produced the language that poets had at their disposal. 
To put it more broadly, the poems of this period 
derived from a society that was profoundly aware of its 
linguistic underpinnings. The concept of signs, which 
were held to be of divine origin, informed the 
consciousness of the late medieval intellectual. And 
in fact the Augustinian understanding of signs was 
compounded by a new, specifically intellectual 
apprehension of them, as a consequence of the movement 
away from orality and towards literacy. Inasmuch as 
the spread of written communication distanced authors 
from both their texts and audiences and, too, 
implicitly demanded that there take place a visual 
activity of reading--which meant mental reflection 
instigated by a visual engagement of a document, and, 
moreover, engagement by a s o m e o n e — relatively 
widespread literacy gave rise to abstract thought
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processes, and replaced the orally based listener's 
awareness of "true" internal signs, founded in the 
epistemology of memory, with external signs of 
monumentality and a new social and political order.
Janet Coleman shrewdly parallels the transformation 
in Europe with what had occurred in sixth century 
Greece, when literacy became widespread. The change 
was profound. When once it became generally possible 
to read laws and history, the Greek language underwent 
a transformation in order that it could express "for 
the first time metaphysical and political ideas, and 
abstract ideas. . . . "  So, too, in the high Middle 
Ages there occurred a
shift from what is called the mythical to the 
logico-empirical mode of thought. . . . [For
writing] appears to establish a different kind of 
relationship between the word and its referent 
which is a more general and abstract one, less 
closely connected with a particular person, place 
or time, than obtains in oral communication. This 
[happens because] certain mental potentials are 
activated by communication when it is frozen in the 
written text, and memory becomes akin to a 
vestigial organ. (Literacy in England 158)
Literacy, furthermore, meant seeing the past in terms 
of objectivity, and therefore meant separating myth out 
from history. And as in ancient Greece,
when a widespread alphabetic culture was becoming a 
reality, the very idea of logic as an unchanging 
and impersonal mode of discourse could and did 
develop. Such a new methodology for the learning 
and analysis of language led to fourteenth- century 
universities basing their curricula on logic as an
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abstract methodology that could investigate 
questions of how the mind perceived, learned and 
responded to the natural and the supernatural 
(159) .
Reading generally fostered a new critical attitude 
that had its impact on all walks of life and otherwise 
engendered in readers a psychological detachment from 
the larger community, which contributed to a nascent 
sense that a person could be a unique individual. This 
was a fatal point of view for feudal society, since 
literacy "encouraged the mobility of men and their 
ability to conceive of themselves as having a function 
apart from the land." In England, for instance, people 
"came to distinguish themselves either as 'lewed' or 
‘lered' far more frequently than as free or unfree" 
(160) .
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Perhaps more than at any other time, a semiotically 
based world view now affected all human endeavor, 
whether as narrowly linguistic provisions or within a 
more broadly conceived linguisis as can be found in the 
contemporary architecture, art, music— in short, in all 
walks of life. At the heart of all these "semiotic 
systems," however, was the general system of grammar, 
one that Scholastics eventually argued for as being, 
vis-a-vis Aristotelian standards, a true, science. 
Aristotle's thinking had instigated new struggles,
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owing to its skepticism regarding the possibilities for 
linguistic meaning. Originating with the mistaken 
belief, derived from Boethius' translation of the 
Perihermenias, that Aristotle had defined names as the 
direct or indirect signs of the things they named, 
medieval semantics evolved along "a long and tortuous" 
path (Maloney 187 and n. 1). Yet semantics, as we have 
observed, really begins in the early twelfth century 
with the discovery of the logica nova. particularly 
with the Sophistici e 1 e n c h i . It was then that 
logicians felt compelled to turn to contemporary 
theories of grammar for a paradigm that would foster a 
resolution of the problem of language versus logic (cf. 
above and Maloney 187 ff.).
It is in England, ironically, where Latin had never 
been the native tongue, that grammar becomes for 
intellectuals the paradigm par excellence. the model of 
truth. All assertions of the real were then measured, 
analogically, against grammar's inherent wisdom. In 
the eighth century Western textual repositories and 
centers of learning had to be shifted from the south of 
Europe to the north, and mostly to England, in the face 
of Muslim threats. This shift needs to be considered 
in the context of the vernacular literature's emergence 
in the ninth century (Dronke Poetic 2). By then we 
f ind
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evidence of an ultra-realism which was the 
expression of the unwarranted assumption that there 
must be some real entity corresponding to every 
noun. For example, Fredegisius of Tours (d. 834), 
a pupil of Alcuin, wrote a Letter on Nothing and 
Darkness. in which he maintained, among other 
things, that there must be something corresponding 
to the word "nothing," and as every noun must refer 
to a corresponding reality, God must have created 
the world out of a pre-existing undifferentiated 
material or stuff. (Copleston 69)
Although the Latin tradition had to be continued, it 
became necessary to simplify Latin for the less 
sophisticated northern Europeans. This artificially 
emphasized grammar came to enjoy a privilege beyond its 
intrinsic merit, until by the time of Anselm it was 
being used to define both sensible and divine truths. 
This was a grammar, however, that was slowly coming to 
be infused with Aristotelian reason.
IV
It was inevitable that grammar should have come to 
occupy such a central position in the perceptual 
framework of the mid to late Middle Ages. An 
expression of a cognito-linguistic inheritance from 
earliest times, it was most abundantly elaborated in 
the writings of Augustine. The Confessions. for 
example, presupposes an essential alignment between 
language and experience--indeed, a more intimate 
relationship between the two than is to be found in 
either the Presocratics or in Plato's conception of the
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logos. And the Confessions draws this relationship in
more copious fashion than previously. Augustine's 
sense of the eternal is articulated as the "sky of 
skies," with the created world "[s ]tretched out 
beneath [it as a] scroll of the firmament, a layer of 
'skin' where the primal dictation of creation is 
dispensed as a written text, as Scripture" (XIII.xv.16; 
in Vance "Augustine's Confessions" 8). Mortals must 
read the word of God, Augustine continues, unlike the 
angels, who as more refined beings read the eternal 
will without the aid of the syllables of time (cf. 
Gellrich 29 ff.). Experience, whether metaphysically 
Christian (or, for that matter, the formally Real of 
Plato) or that of the sensible, the material, must 
ultimately take the form of an expression that will 
have to be embodied in linguistic terms. All forms, 
whether Platonically Ideal or fallen in the Christian 
sense, obtain to metaphoric or catachretic expression 
that employs the terms of language per se. The very 
idea of the Christian Word incarnate must by definition 
embrace such a parameter. Perhaps this observation 
merely states the obvious, that the "dilemma" of an 
ineluctable language is an eventuality, or, rather, 
that language is a given. The attempt had been made, 
of course, to separate oral from written language, and 
thereby to account for the "distancing effect" that the 
naming of the thing has on that thing's very
56
comprehension. In the Phaedrus. according to Socrates, 
"King Thamus repudiates Thoth's invention of writing 
because it is merely a 'semblance' of truth that would 
impede the capacity to know and recall"; writing will 
cause a rupture in memory (Gellrich 33; cf. Derrida De 
la grammatoloctie 27, trans. 15). Augustine and later 
medieval thinkers, nevertheless, go to great lengths to 
distinguish between a word and the idea that may or 
may not be the cause of the word's inception. On the 
one hand the alignment of word and idea includes 
discourse, and on the other, experience or rather 
reality. Augustine's view of the efficacy of language 
was a consequence
of his conversion from pagan rhetoric to Christian 
eloquence [ . . . . ]  On the level of rhetoric, the 
immediate application that Augustine perceives in 
the Word made flesh is the redemption of human 
speech. Since he is a rhetorician after his 
conversion as well as before it, he therefore 
interprets the theologian's role as a participation 
in the Incarnational task of expressing the Word to 
the world. (Colish Mirror 345)
For Augustine, discourse comprehends both the oral 
and the written, the sacred and the secular, the 
historical and the exegetical. Indeed, discourse 
transcends language, even though it is grounded in the 
linguistic expression of the truth as it is contained 
within any particular language. Such thinking about 
the possibilities of any finite expression is much in 
keeping with Jerome, whose ideas regarding translation
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stem from the understanding that there is a sensum or 
perhaps a "spirit” of any given thought, one which 
needs to be "extorted" [exprimere] from the actualized 
thought by translators when making linguistic 
transpositions (cf. the "Introduction" above). Yet it 
is Augustine who for the Middle Ages establishes the 
authority under which notions of text and reality are 
to be ontologically, inextricably woven together, so 
that textuality and experience each come to define the 
other. As Eugene Vance observes, the written
scroll of the firmament [. . . ] is impelled and
sustained by force of the creative--and 
recreative— oral performance. Enunciation, then, is 
the mode of moral and prophetic truth, of 
auctoritas; the "writing" of the Scriptures is only 
ulterior mediation, merely a supplement. The skin 
of the scroll [as adumbrated in the Confessions 1 
once covered man, who was as a hieroglyph of 
authority. When Adam and Eve sinned, however, they 
covered the true text of their skin with the 
garments of an alien world. Martyrs, by contrast, 
are men who refuse to cover themselves with the 
skins of this world and with the fig-leaves of 
false eloquence, and who continue to articulate 
God's authority to sinners in the "infirmity" 
below. (8-9; cf. Confessions XIII.xv.16, and 
Enarratio in Psalmo CIII.I.8)
Vance clearly evinces the debt Augustine owes to the 
language per s e that is employed in the very 
elaboration of his cosmology. And in this enterprise 
Augustine establishes a long lived tradition, one which 
the later Middle Ages struggles to supersede although 
the struggle must be lost. As Jesse Gellrich writes,
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While medieval instructors surely appreciated the 
distinction between "reality" and
"semblance"— between Augustine's eternal text and 
temporal writing— they nonetheless tried rigorously 
to locate divine wisdom within the letters of the 
sacra paqina. Instead of a stumbling block to 
truth, the "semblance" was its "revelation" in the 
Bible, the "veil" ( integumentum) or "mirror" 
(speculum) in which divine wisdom was present, if 
only readers had "eyes to see." (33)
Augustine's cosmology, indeed his etymology, still 
hold sway as late as the Renaissance, and in the 
twelfth century can be perceived, for instance, in the 
use made of a ceremonial Gospel book that was kept in 
the wardrobe of Edward I of England: "a book which
[was] called textus. upon which the magnates were 
accustomed to swear" (Chaplais Docs 50, n2; in Clanchy 
2 05). In the eleventh century's association of textus 
with the Bible, we can trace the evolution of the 
English noun text from the Latin verb texo meaning "to 
weave, plait or interlace." First rightly pointing out 
the additional meaning of texo. "to compose," Brian 
Stock initially establishes a relationship between, 
alternately, text or weaving, and discourse, for text 
implies composition, which could include rhetoric:
The notion of a series verborum survives as late as 
the Oxford Dictionary, which gives as the first 
meaning of text, "the wording of anything written 
or printed; the structure formed by the words in 
their order," a notion whose medieval roots were 
neatly summed up by the lexicographer Calepino when 
he wrote that textus equals complicatio. and that 
textum can be defined as "quicquid contexitur aut 
componitur" rDictionarii Octolinquis (Lyon, 1663) 
703]. ("Medieval Literacy" 21)
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Gradually, text increasingly signified written instead 
of oral composition, and "[f]rom the eleventh century, 
textus began to refer more and more exclusively to the 
Bible" (21). In the later Middle Ages the Bible could 
be seen as the central text of the world, that first 
and ultimate description of experience. The mystical 
idea of a text as being the world itself was never far 
from this revelation, and, as Derrida has said, this 
text indicated the world through its significative 
capacity to totalize, to portray meaning as ever 
present and homogenous (3 0- 31; in Gellrich 31). Such 
mysticism influences both metaphysics and an emerging 
physics. Language's relationship to reality, 
particularly language's tendency to rely on imagery of 
itself in order to describe the manner in which it 
might signify the real, originates at least as early as 
Plato.
Always on intimate terms with the possible world it 
purports to signify and otherwise describe, language 
nevertheless has at times been viewed as insisting upon 
a separate existence from the world it appears to 
gesture towards, while at other times it has been 
actually identified with its world, as in the status of 
the Bible during the Middle Ages. The roots of this 
perception can be found in ancient stoicism. The 
Stoics, who indirectly but profoundly influenced many
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medieval thinkers, as Colish has shown, proposed such a 
unified world:
Plato's main concern in the Cratvlus is not so much 
to forge a compromise between the natural and 
conventional theories of verbal signification as it 
is to delineate the limitations of language itself, 
as a transient, sensory form, in communicating a 
knowledge of abstract and transcendent objects of 
knowledge. The Stoics, [however,] while they were 
vigorous supporters of the theory of natural 
signification, rooted it in a decidedly non- 
Platonic metaphysics. ("Stoic Theory" 20)
Just as "[h]uman speech, whether spoken or written, is 
the verbal logos. the expressive side of the rational 
logos in man," the "human logos" according to Stoic 
theory, "is consubstantial with God, the logos of 
nature." Colish concludes that
Stoic physics sees the world in monistic terms; God 
is identified with the natural world and with the 
human mind. Words, thus, are intrinsically real, 
in a physical sense. Speech is a natural 
phenomenon. Both the denotations of words, their 
etymological derivations, and the grammatical 
structure of language are hence natural. (19-20)
The Stoics' alignment of semansis, and particularly 
grammar, with what is held to be natural and thus 
intrinsic to the universe, presents a rough parallel to 
the elevation of grammar in the tenth century as an 
unsurpassed e p i s t e m o 1o g i c a 1 t o o l — even as the 
discipline of logic was coming into its own. Logic was 
recognized as a distinct entity as it was being 
enormously developed and applied to theological and/or 
epistemological problems. For their part, the Stoics
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extended their belief in the intrinsic 
correspondence between words and things from 
linguistics and the science of grammatical 
declination to a pedagogical emphasis on grammar as 
the basis of the liberal arts and to a didactic and 
rationalistic theory of poetics and rhetorical 
style. (21)
As for perhaps the more sophisticated notion of a 
text as being the metonymic, metaphoric or in some 
manner consubstantial representation of a perceived 
world, as regards a text's function of composing or 
weaving, we can find a significant use of text. one 
which fits such a definition, as early as the Gorqias. 
While set in a contrast to dialectic, the notion of 
weaving here is associated with rhetoric (i.e., 
rhetoric conceived of as spoken, though it affects the 
listener's judgments):
Socrates: [. . .] as you [Gorgias] profess to be a
rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me 
ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might 
ask with what is weaving concerned [. . .]. (Loeb
edition p. 507)
Out of the Latin term texo English, German and the
Romance languages eventually derive their respective
words for text that, as we have seen, came to be
identified with Scripture. Yet text was too
semantically rich to remain within the province of a
narrowly defined, religious discourse. While the
conception of a text had held out to Augustine and
others the opportunity to fully realize religious
truths,
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[. . .] the more sophisticated notion of tissue,
texture, or style of composition, which may have 
originated with Quintilian, also survived 
throughout the Middle Ages, and, to add to the many 
layers in the idea of a text, never lost touch with 
its original, tangible associations. Cicero, for 
instance, in a phrase known to medieval authors, 
speaks of "tegumenta [. . .] corporum vel texta vel 
suta" [De Natura Deorum 2.150] ("the coverings of 
bodies or weavings or sowings"), and a glossary of 
late Latin, preserving usages between the second 
and the sixth century, refers to texta as 
connections or chains [Souter s.v. texta1.
(Stock "Medieval Literacy" 21)
By the time of the high Middle Ages derivations from 
texo had more to do with cloth than parchment. All the 
same, Augustine's felicitous conceptualization of 
martyrdom in the Confessions (cf. above), to say 
nothing of his version of Adam and Eve both within and 
without the Garden of Eden, influences the eventual 
emphasis of Scripture as the text while bridging the 
related notions of skin, parchment and cloth as 
integral within the religious sensibility that informed 
the idea of a decidedly Christian biblical text. And 
in fact, by the twelfth century, integumentum (like 
textus and texo. rooted in the Latin verb tegere) had 
come to signify "the 'allegorical covering1 of a 
secular fable or myth" (Stock Myth and Science 52).
V
The concepts text and realitv. then, are virtually 
inseparable in Augustine's thought. In the high
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Middle Ages they evolve into components of a central
dialectical construct. Inherent in the idea of
textuality is the presumption of interpretive
strategies that must result in two meanings, inner and
outer, the familiar husk and seed metaphor (outer skin
and inner truth), and so forth, such as we find in an
allegory like Bernard Silvester's Cosmographia. In
this sense, allegory may be understood to be an overly
determined text, an assumption that might have derived
from any number of ancient writers. For example,
Cicero associates the terms integumentum (skin or
covering) and involucrum (wrap or covering). They are
used virtually interchangeably, a use which foreshadows
a later medieval understanding of the close
relationships among myth, truth and allegory. In De
Oratione Cicero has Cotta say,
modo in oratione Crassi divitias atque ornamenta 
eius ingenii perquaedam involucra et integumenta 
perspexi. (1.35.161; cf. Jeauneau, AHDLMA 24 
[1958], 38 n. 3)
I sensed just now during Crassus1 speech the riches 
and embellishments of his inventive power as 
through some wrappings and coverings, (trans. Stock 
Myth 49-50)
Both terms mean physical covering. But C i c e r o 1s 
juxtaposition of them creates a platonic metaphor 
suggesting that Crassus' wrapping of his meaning in the 
sheer veils of rhetoric "[parallels] the concealment of 
formal reality from the senses of man by the 
phenomenal appearance of things" (Stock 49-50).
64
As Coleman asserts, in the later Middle Ages 
allegory finds its proper context in a world of 
readers, not listeners. Ever more "fixed modes of 
discourse and a fixed logic to analyse discourse," the 
conditions of literacy, in turn instigated
the development of the use of allegory and figural 
interpretation as an attempt to "read" and 
reinterpret aspects of the fixed, cultural 
tradition, not least the Bible. This had already 
been developed by the literate minority in 
monasteries and cathedral schools of the earlier 
Middle Ages. Allegorization, in general, seems to 
develop only in literate ages, when the complex 
traditions of a society, which are previously 
expressed in myths and disseminated orally, are now 
fixed in a text for all to read. Any evolution of 
the myth previously effected by a minstrel or 
singer's oral adaptation to the needs of his 
audience, is replaced by allegorical interpretation 
of the traditional story, explaining away the 
inconsistencies that an oral tradition, not based 
on fixed texts, would have been able to subsume. 
(159)
Within this literate community, moreover, allegory came 
to function as a means of equating one body of 
knowledge with another. For Bernard Silvester, 
allegorical poetry was the only adequate means of 
scientific description (Stock Myth 230). In his poem 
Cosmographia. allegory allows Bernard to synthesize an 
"empirically definable world" and the "inherited 
authority of ideal moral law" by setting the one 
standard, empiricism, beside Platonic-Christian 
auctoritas ( 280-8 1) . In part, the inherent 
contradiction of the two world views is dissipated in
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their subsumption within the Cosmographia 1 s 
encyclopedic "comprehensiveness" that allows each view 
its own ground within the larger structure of the 
poem's vision, and provides a co- equal justification 
of both views in the poem's "playful ambiguity" (128- 
30)— an ambiguity, we might add, which primarily rested 
on double entendres of a complexity only possible for 
the literate reader who has the leisure to entertain 
simultaneous and multiple significations and 
associations within a single utterance. A typical 
example of Bernard's subtle poetic play occurs early in 
the Cosmographia, as Stock explains:
In Bernard's [. . .] description of the universe,
myth, history, and geography are thrown together 
yet arranged in a delicate architectural model, 
continuing the [poem's] initial image of a visual 
structure unfolding before the creator.
The poem equally arrays the Christian and the pagan. 
Christ and the Pope, for instance, are "ranged among 
the heroes of antiquity" (132):
Exemplar specimenque Dei virguncula Christum 
parturit et verum secula numen habent.
Munificens deitas Eugenum commodat orbi, 
donat et in solo munere cuncta semel.
(Cos. 1.3.53-56; in Stock 132)
A young maid gives birth to Christ, the exemplar 
and specimen of god, and history has its true 
guide. Beneficent deity provides Eugenius [III] 
for the world, giving everything at once in a 
single gift. (trans. Stock 133)
Here Bernard is punning on virgo ("virguncula"; i.e.,
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the virgin birth and the astrological sign anticipating 
it) , and he "employs the overtly pagan [term] numen to 
describe Christ's role in history" (133). It is the 
depth and richness of the ambiguity here that most 
suggest the literate quality of this text, which would 
not have been possible, in fact, in a world devoid of 
the new forces of both writing and rationalism.
Puns, symbols, and so on, will inevitably raise more 
questions than such language originally hoped (let us 
presume) to put to rest. Stock writes that Bernard's 
"individuality," in comparison with other twelfth- 
century Platonists, "is best understood within a 
framework for cosmogenesis utilized in particular by 
Thierry and William of Conches [. . .]" (124).
However, Bernard stands apart from these men and all 
other contemporary Platonists.
While all adhered to the twelfth-century ideal of 
uniting rhetoric and philosophy, and while all, in 
theory, may have possessed a poetic vision of the 
cosmos, none translated it into poetic practice. 
[Bernard imposed] a new symbolic view of the 
cosmos.
Indeed, unlike all the others, Bernard constructed "a 
new myth of creation" (274). Peter Dronke, therefore, 
includes the Cosmographia in his claim for the 
individuality of the medieval poet, in the use made of 
such linguistic strategies that produce both rich 
perception and deep mystery. Dronke believes in the
67
poet's conscious intentions, which result in the 
presentation of "something deliberately enigmatic." It 
is as if the rich, albeit equivocal, texture of the 
poet's t e x t — the product of the poet's "inner 
vision"— is to be the mark of that poet's unique self- 
assertion. Finally, we must regard the
inexplicable— Titurel1s Sigune, who sends her beloved 
Schionatulander on the quest for the hound's leash, or 
Piers the Plowman's tearing up of the Pardon— as an 
author's insistence upon an audience's embrace of what 
is "intrinsically" intransigent:
The problems of inner vision, finally, can touch 
every kind of attempt at embodying in images some 
aspect of the intelligible, immaterial world. Thus 
in the twelfth century alone the inquiry could 
extend to visions of very different kinds: in
Hildegard's own mystical prose writings, we should 
have to ask, how and why do the visions she relates 
nearly always suggest so much more than her own 
allegoresis of them can express? So, too, with the 
prophetic visions of Joachim of Flora: in what ways 
are his images— such as those in the Liber 
Figurarum— able to reach beyond abstract concepts? 
And with the allegorical visions of the twelfth- 
century Platonists: what can be expressed by
allegory can also in principle be expressed 
conceptually, yet do these visions at moments reach 
the limits of allegorical statement? Where Bernard 
Silvestris, for instance, requires three goddesses, 
each with her own equipment, for the fabrication of 
man [Cos. 11.11-12], or Alan of Lille conjures up 
four spheres, each showing the relation between 
matter and form in a different light rSermo de 
sphaera intel1 igibi1i 1, is this merely the 
allegorist's playfulness, multiplying entities 
beyond necessity, or are these, too, attempts at 
saying what could not be said any other way, at 
using allegorical constructs as if they were myths, 
to extend the range of conceptual statement? 
(Poetic Individuality 200-1)
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Indeed, allegory is but one instance of medieval 
bifurcated conceptualization and expression, for the 
dyadic structure existed socially, politically and 
philosophically. These systems of thought and 
expression informed and nurtured one another. 
Abelard's "division of langue and parole.11 as Stock 
puts it ("History, Literature" 10; cf. Implications 
528), which was achieved through a more fully 
rationalized intellectual system that was capable of 
articulating a relationship between language and 
experience, anticipates a subtle parodying of allegory, 
in the fourteenth century in Langland's Piers Plowman. 
In line with an emerging rationalism, Abelard was able 
to construct a more elaborate model of what we might 
think of as abstract mental processes, and in doing so 
he distanced himself from the logical procedures of his 
time which were predicated on the grammatical example 
established by Priscian. Abelard saw no reason why, 
for instance, Plato and Socrates should share an 
identity merely because two sentences— "Socrates is a 
man" and "Plato is a ma n " —  share an identical 
predicate.
Yet there was for Abelard a belief in universals, if 
not a somewhat qualified belief. In the Ingredientibus 
Abelard proposed the notion of an "intellectus 
universalium." When considering the question of nouns,
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however, he could eventually distinguish between "two 
directions of designation" (Fumagalli 62) : "circa ad
inferiora" and "ad speciem." "Taken as a noun of 
species" ("ad speciem"). the noun "refers to a 'fictio1 
obtained by 'abstractionem1" (Fumagalli 62). For 
Abelard, "things" would always be individuals, yet "a 
universal did name things which really existed [. . .]" 
(Gilby 6). Such naming was not a "flatus vocis"— that 
is, "a sound made from letters and syllables"— but a 
meaningful expression, a "'vox siqnificativa1 which he 
called a 'nomen1 and, in a revised edition of his 
logic, a 'sermo1." which indicated a "common likeness" 
though one that did not require the ascription to it of 
universality (Gilby 6). Abelard would conclude that 
universals are not things but they do denominate 
things; moreover, such common conceptions reside in 
consciousness (6). All the same, a "universal term 
such as "man1 is not of course a proper name like 
'Socrates'," while it does name the individual even if 
it is a universal that, inasmuch as it is predicable of 
all men, does after all, in some measure, signify the 
individual Socrates. This universality was ascribed by 
Abelard "to common nouns in virtue of their function of 
naming [. . .] indeterminately" (Copleston 82).
Finally, Abelard is to be seen as struggling to be 
free of--and only somewhat succeeding in this 
endeavor— the linguistic paradigm that provoked his
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grappling with the concept of universals and his 
striving to derive a purely logical model out of that 
struggle. Ultimately he turned away "from the notion 
of logic as treating of entities, including mental 
entities, to the idea of it as treating of terms and 
propositions" (Copleston 83). If Abelard's position 
appears equivocal, it may nonetheless be fairly viewed 
in the larger tension between grammatically and 
logically based world views. Hence Abelard could 
distinguish between an inner linguistic model, based on 
Latin's explicit grammar that was common, at least in 
theory, to many members of a group, and an outer 
speaking-capacity, chiefly associated with the 
vernaculars, which demanded undivided performance and 
flexible social allegiances (Stock Implications 528).
The tensions and rebalancing of grammar and logic, 
orality and literacy, the feudal society of memoria and 
that in which there are individuals who are no longer 
primarily bound to a single place— the common condition 
under feudalism— provide the background for a poem such 
as Piers Plowman. Langland raises the question of an 
inherent dichotomy in human experience between speech 
and action. That conflict, "raised at the banquet by 
Will's challenge to the Doctor to practice his 
precepts," according to Anne Middleton, is reconciled 
when "Clergy offers more than a bizarre analogy to
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explain what the Three Lives [i.e., Dowel, 
Dobet, Dobest] mean" ("Two Infinities" 170):
'Now thow, Clergie,' quod Conscience,
'carpe us what is Dowel.1 
'I have sevene sones,1 he seide, serven in a castel 
Ther the lord of lif wonyeth, 
to leren hem what is Dowel.
Til I se tho sevene and myself acorde 
I am unhardy,1 quod he, 'to any wight to preven it. 
For oon Piers the Plowman hath impugned us alle,
And set alle sciences at a sop save love one;
And no text ne taketh to mayntene his cause 
But Dilige Deum and Domine guis habitabit;
And seith that Dowel and Dobet arn two infinites, 
Whiche infinites with a feith fynden out Dobest, 
Which shal save mannes soule—
thus seith Piers the Plowman.'
(B XIII.118-29)
The argument he will advance here, however, is 
essentially one of grammar. In doing so, we may 
observe how Langland has departed from standard 
allegorical procedure by personifying "coined terms 
using several parts of speech." Their meaning lies in 
their strictly formal properties (171). In Langland's 
hands, allegory can function as a result of the 
"syntactic impossibility" of these terms (Mills 195; 
cf. Middleton 170 n.). This understanding of the 
possibilities for allegory is reminiscent of the 
argument advanced by Abbo, Berengarius, and later the 
speculative grammarians, who held that reality is 
literally defined (perhaps it can be said to be 
invoked) by the language used to describe it. For 
Langland, the ultimate attempt at expressing the truth 
must come enigmatically, in a coded form, in language
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not merely imitating life but rather creating it. In 
the banquet scene Langland's "grammatical 
argument"--whether we consider it the text of his 
narrative, his narrative text, the text of his intent, 
or the narrative’s subtext—
is crucial to the entire poem in showing how these 
terms have significance. Clergy shows that their 
meaning lies in the forms of the words themselves, 
and his account illustrates the way allegorical 
language works throughout the poem to order the 
search for perfection. (Middleton 170)
As will be discussed at length, Langland purposely 
obscures his allegorical framework as a way of 
commenting on both the nature of allegory and what he 
believes is its sustaining structure—  that of grammar. 
In this manner, moreover, he has taken a step beyond 
the Augustinian allegorical expectation, where there is 
the surety of a one to one correspondence between 
outer and inner meaning (that is, if the reader can 
only apply the proper interpretive method). Langland, 
rather, "repeatedly calls attention to the heuristic 
shortcomings of [allegorical] personifications by 
exploding their narrative and dramatic consistency in 
mid-scene." Likewise, he questions "the very notion 
of linear narrative as adequate to the task of 
explanation" (185). The question we must ask at this 
juncture-- one which was intensely pursued during 
Langland's day and for some time before that--is
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whether truly linear narrative, the discourse of the 
historian, is a poet's viable alternative.
V I
Piers Plowman is one of many examples of inter- and 
intratextual strategies that evolved in the later 
Middle Ages. Always residing at the center of the 
Christian imaginative experience, particularly after 
Jerome and Augustine, throughout the exegetical 
tradition textuality gives rise to the kinds of 
strategies within the church; eventually, in the 
eleventh century, textuality provides the basis for a 
peculiar, new form of itself in secular literature. 
Although interpretation was always a component of 
Augustinian cosmology, the later spread of 
literacy created a second order interpretive activity. 
The written text1s temporal and spatial remove from its 
author meant that its audience could, at leisure, 
engage in reflective reading. Leisure, and reflection, 
"[promote] the ability to conceive more complicated 
structures" (Coleman 157) than is possible in the 
reception afforded oral discourse; in turn reflection 
allows for a reader's greater discernment of the issues 
a given text sets forth. Moreover, increased abstract 
and critical thinking help to form an individual 
consciousness, a self-consciousness distinct from that
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of the group. As Godzich puts it, members of an oral 
community are defined "discursively" within that 
community, for these are persons who are individuals 
merely "in the etymological sense of the term, that is, 
[they are] material purports of roles which they do not 
write but accept, in the form of fate, from the power 
that resides in memoria." Within the community of 
readers, however, the individual will come to be 
defined as inherently and fundamentally human in the 
sense that such an individual can play a role in 
forging his or her destiny; in other words, such an 
individual will come to be defined "ontologically" 
(xv-xvi). One social outgrowth of this transformation 
from oral to written discourse is that, in the latter 
circumstance, the individual as a reader will come to 
be defined as separate from the overall societal 
discourse that would have otherwise sought to subsume 
him. Writing, and particularly reading, give rise to 
abstractive logic, which in turn engenders and sustains 
reflection on the part of the individual and defines a 
new kind of discourse that will ultimately change all 
social and political structures. And it is logic, 
unique among all possible discourses, which comes to 
dominate all other epistemological systems. As a 
discourse,
logic differs from all other discourses by the fact 
that it does not intersect with any other 
discourses and, as a result, it comprehends them
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all. It makes them all answerable to itself. The 
advantages are immediately obvious. Instead of a 
belief in the ultimate coherence of the universe of 
discourses, logic provides a verifiable methodology 
for the determination of such a coherence. Since 
it appeals to universals of reason, it is 
inherently more egalitarian as long as one is 
willing to consider all human beings as rational 
beings. (xvii)
Literacy and logic, then, establish a new importance 
for a society that could now be defined by its 
attachment to that aspect of the world which existed 
for the individual between his or her birth and death. 
Logical discourse undermined the premise of Christian 
eternality that served as a cement to bind individuals 
to a common and dominant societal discourse. This was 
a community that gradually was perceived as being an 
entity apart from such an individual. Furthermore, the 
separation occurred in both secular and clerical 
worlds. In short, the new rationalism pervaded all 
aspects of late medieval society; in this society 
persons played astonishingly new roles as both members 
and autonomous individuals, for logic "opens the door 
to the emergence of the individual as someone endowed 
with rights" (xvii).
Likewise, the question of poetic auctoritas is 
paralleled by exegetical activity that in the high 
Middle Ages began to be concerned with the human aspect 
of Scripture. Later commentators were brought 
"considerably closer to their auctores" as the newly
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popular Aristotelian system of the four causes that 
"governed all activity and change in the universe" 
(ef fic i e n t . m a t e r i a 1 . f o r m a l . final) came to be 
"applied in literary analysis." The revered "auctor." 
as demonstrated by A. J. Minnis,
remained an authority, someone to be believed and 
imitated, but his human qualities began to receive 
more attention. This crucial development is writ 
large in the prologues to commentaries on the 
Bible. In twelfth-century exegesis, the primacy of 
allegorical interpretation had hindered the 
emergence of viable literary theory: God was
believed to have inspired the human writers of 
Scripture in a way which defied literary 
description. Twelfth-century exegetes were 
interested in the auctor mainly as a source of 
authority. But in the thirteenth century, a new 
type of exegesis emerged, in which the focus had 
shifted from the divine auctor to the human auctor 
of Scripture. It became fashionable to emphasize 
the literal sense of the Bible, and the intention 
of the human auctor was believed to be expressed by 
the literal sense. As a result, the exegetes1 
interest in their texts became more literary. (5)
M i n n i s 1 particular focus on this one aspect of a 
changing intellectual climate discloses a development 
that reached into virtually all walks of life. The 
individual, standing apart from the community, is a 
member of the larger Christian fold; yet within this 
Christian society there is an ever growing appreciation 
of each member's mortal, sensible life. The new 
emphasis on the individual, moreover, altered society's 
literary sense and brought about the construction of 
definitions for fiction, and history.
From our modern standpoint, we must view the
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distinction between history and fiction as remaining
r
blurred in the twelfth century, yet it is from then 
that we can trace the start of a separation into two 
unique entities. At this time, simultaneously, there 
arose an increasing interest in literature that can 
conveniently be called historically conscious. The 
very fact that John of Salisbury in the Metaloqicon 
(III.4) cites Bernard of Chartres' remark, that twelfth 
century thinkers are but "dwarfs perched on the 
shoulders of [the classical] giants" ("nos esse quasi 
nanos gigantium humeris insidentes"), suggests the 
spirited debate that took place during John's life over 
the significance of what was deemed a renaissance and 
its debt to the rich, newly rediscovered antique past 
(Miller 9 ff.). It is important to note that Bernard's 
observation was double edged. In his own time Bernard 
saw "a continuation of the classical world" in later, 
faithful reproductions of antiquity's concepts, styles, 
and cultural ideals"; yet, too, he "was prepared to 
grant that in other respects" the renaissance he was a 
witness of, and a part of, had perhaps surpassed even 
the ancients' reach (Stock Myth 6; cf. Miller 10).
Such doubleness of perception permitted the 
licensing of individual interpretation vis-a-vis what 
was held to be the revered, awe inspiring past. The 
individual of the twelfth century saw himself as part
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of a continuum from ancient times. However, he also 
represented a distinct turn in that literary- 
historical flow of events. This looking backwards in 
time from a new vantage point, and with a decidedly 
altered attitude towards both the past and, 
secondarily, what constituted knowledge, inevitably 
raised questions about the nature of historiography 
itself. Such a development particularly obtained to 
the twelfth century's view of Virgil, who himself in 
the Aeneid— a crucial text in the medieval litero- 
historical imagination--had to synthesize past and 
present, myth and fact, under the auspices of the 
ethics, politics and esthetics of his own time. 
Virgil's amalgam of myth and history, then, could 
readily serve as a model for medieval counterparts like 
Chretien de Troyes.
Indeed, the extent to which Virgil exercised 
literary license was to be theoretically justified in 
the twelfth century. Averroes, for example, allows 
that at times there occurs the need to depart from a 
literary standard. Of course, he finds sanction in the 
authority of Aristotle; his commentary on the Poetics 
asserts that "variation from proper and standard 
speech" is one aspect that defines poetry (ch. XXII; 
trans. in Hardison 378 ; cf. in Miller 26). 
Quintillian, Cicero and other antigui— the "shoulders" 
of their counterparts of the renaissance, the
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moderni— were also often invoked, by Donatus, Isidore 
and others. Eventually, John of Salisbury develops the 
notion of poetic license to such a degree he can 
declare that
License to use figures is reserved for authors and 
for those like them, namely the very learned. Such 
have understood why [and how] to use certain 
expressions and not use others. According to 
Cicero, "by their great and divine good writings 
they have merited this privilege," which they still 
enjoy. The authority of such persons is by no 
means slight, and if they have said or done 
something, this suffices to win praise for it, or 
[at least] to absolve it from stigma.
fMetalogicon 1.18; in Miller 27)
Here John speaks of the use of less than transparent, 
figurative language, but what needs to be noticed is 
his great investiture in certain persons, "authors and 
for those like them," those his contemporaries who 
might choose such language as an option in their own 
work.
VII
John's rather quixotic definition of poetic license 
amounts to a rationalization (the word is used here 
advisedly) of an otherwise rigidly determined hierarchy 
of specifically literary authority. He and others 
created sets of double standards, each standard held in 
tension by the other, which were instigated by the 
emergence of a more fully articulated logic and the
consequent need to resolve the very dichotomies 
established by such dialectical discourse that logic 
engenders. The question of history, as posed by these 
dual standards, each related to the other of the set, 
presents a clear picture of the struggles intellectuals 
underwent in their various attempts to reconcile, 
within a wide array of circumstances, faith and 
empiricism. What is particularly remarkable in this 
regard is that the attempts at resolving dichotomies 
never fully succeeded, and that out of these "failures" 
an abundantly rich, unique culture was established.
In the later Middle ages there was to be nothing 
like the clarity, for instance, of Erasmus1 "accusation 
made against St. Jerome [. . .]: 'Ciceronianus es, non
es Christianus1." Erasmus felt, according to K. 
Lloyd-Jones, that because Jerome had appropriated pagan 
linguistic forms such as style and, more precisely, 
"the very syntax and vocabulary of those to whom, no 
matter how great their value and merit, God has in His 
infinite wisdom denied the revelation of His truth," 
the wisdom proffered by him was tainted; in fact, it 
could not be wisdom. Language and thought were simply 
not separable; to use the language of the pagan was 
"unavoidably to think and speak as one" (351). In 
contrast, as Jeanette Beer writes, the Middle Ages held 
the "' auctoritas1 of Scripture [to be] absolute, its 
source obviously being beyond all reproach." However,
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"the status of other literary works in the inherited 
corpus was variable and varying" (4). Authors like 
Isidore of Seville and Boethius enjoyed near canonical 
status, of course. An author such as Virgil was 
revered and copied, not only in an attempt to 
resuscitate his wisdom but to maintain a vital 
continuity with a traditional past, so to invoke the 
authority of that tradition. And, as has already been 
suggested, it is particularly in the case of Virgil 
that the intimate connection between the medieval 
historical sense and the tension between faith and 
empiricism (i.e., logic) can be understood. This 
tension, moreover, finds its clearest focus in the 
issue of medieval translation practices. The medieval 
translator, as a rule, "abrogated" to himself "the 
right to act magisterially" with his auctors.
Explicit intervention through commentary was one 
possible technique in the [medieval translation] 
process, but the translator's magisterial role 
often extended far beyond such superficialities. 
If his responsibility was to his public, not to his 
source, the authority of that text qua text was 
correspondingly minimized. No period (pace Ezra 
Pound!) has been less servile to the literalities 
of a text, because the authority of that text was 
not recognized as absolute. (Beer 4)
In part, what John of Salisbury and others were doing 
in their theorization of and therefore their attempt to 
legitimize an individual author's poetic license was to 
sanction the translator's, indeed the poet's,
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interpretive activity in relation to texts poet and 
translator regarded as an inheritance from the past. 
For considering the Christian textual tradition, 
especially after Augustine, the very idea of a text as 
well as the actual texts that were the manifestations 
of that idea were revered; hence it is possible to see 
these texts as possessing something approaching the 
power of a talisman, and there could have arisen the 
need to undo their absolute authority through various 
formulated theories of translation (such as Jerome's, 
perhaps) and poetic license (such as John's), which 
offered potent alternative forms of authority. And, in 
great part, the instigation to sanction contemporaries 
came from the very sense of "pastness" in the texts 
that were to be altered.
Rather than Scripture or even the writings of the 
Church fathers, it was in Virgil's work that there 
occurred the greatest tension between what in later 
times could be clearly designated as historical 
factuality, and the myth(s) of the past that was also 
pressed into the service of esthetic and political 
concerns in order to perpetuate the institutions of 
Virgil's day. Yet if in some broad sense Virgil's work 
was seen to be in itself a translation, such a 
definition of it, in the Middle Ages, could not help 
but establish its greater jurisdiction. Could it have
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been viewed as a conflation of the mythical and the 
empirical, and thus a work of
interpretation— considering the role of translation as 
the primary form of an interpretive act? Lee Patterson 
examines
[t]he problematic that governs the [medieval] 
reception of the Aeneid, [which] conditions as well 
[. . .] the nature of the central documents of the 
legendary historiography by which the Middle Ages 
imagined its origins. It is a problematic that is 
at the heart of historical consciousness per se 
[• • •]•
Ironically, perhaps, the Aeneid. established as the 
central text of the medieval writer's sense of the past 
and/or historicity, and couched in the language and 
cognitive structures of both myth and faith, prepares 
the way for an empirically grounded historicism.
It was, after all, by means of the Virgilian model, 
transmitted through the topoi of Trojan foundation 
and translatio imperii. that the notion of a 
secular, purposive, linear historicity was made 
available to the Middle Ages. To be sure, 
Virgilianism was never able to achieve an 
unambiguous authority within medieval thought 
because it was subject to pressure from a variety 
of sources, including the Augustinian and Boethian 
dismissals of historicity per se, the tenacious 
dream of a prophetic Geschichteestheologie. and the 
dubious historiographical status of many of its 
crucial legitimizing texts (Geoffrey of Monmouth, 
the Arthurian romances, and the Trojan legendary). 
But it also contained, as an inheritance from 
Virgil himself, an inherent instability that 
rendered its project uncertain. Put simply, the 
tension that at once animates and inhibits the 
Aeneid is a struggle between, on the one hand, a 
linear purposiveness that sees the past as a moment 
of failure to be redeemed by a magnificent future 
and, on the other, a commemorative idealism that 
sees it as instead a heroic origin to be emulated,
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a period of gigantic achievement that a belated
future can never hope to replicate. (160)
Patterson concludes that "the past is endowed with a 
double, contradictory value." The potency of this past, 
pagan though it was, ultimately could not be denied; it 
forms the basis for the medieval elaboration of an 
heroic vision. It is thus "reinvoked and reenacted." 
And so, most notably in Erec et Enide, it is the "site 
of both emulation and exorcism, of slavish imitation 
coupled with decisive rejection" (160). What should not 
be overlooked in connection with this new 
historiography is that in the period between Virgil and 
Chretien societal structures had come to be based on 
discourses that were primarily oral; as we have seen, 
all social and political— indeed, often enough, 
religious— functions of European society, during this 
hiatus between literate antiquity and the literate 
Middle Ages, were structured by orality. The 
subsequent rebalancing of the oral and the literal in 
the high Middle Ages contributed to "the recuperation 
of historicity itself," as Chenu writes, "a prise de 
conscience that, for all its qualifications, stands as 
a decisive moment in the development of the West" (in 
"Theology" 162; paraphrased in Patterson 157).
Consider the Chanson de R o l a n d . temporally, 
philosophically and esthetically a pivotal poem, whose 
poetic displays the shifting balance between orality
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and literacy; its first half is indebted to the idiom 
of oral epic, while the second half is deeply affected 
by a new societal emphasis on writing and reading. The 
"tragedy" of Roland. Vance writes,
is inseparable from the disclosure that. not only 
words, but even things and events to which words 
refer, are equivocal. The Roland inaugurated in 
the most hallowed legends of vernacular culture a 
new but troubled consciousness of the radical 
difference between the knower and the known, 
between unquestioning memory and exercised 
judgment, between the claims of blind loyalty and 
of assumed responsibility, and between past or 
present actions and their future historical 
consequences. The Roland made its culture glimpse 
a terrifying centrifugality, not only in the 
institutions of political power, but also in the 
very discourse by whose conventional formulas that 
power had been celebrated. The tragedy was all the 
more brutal because of the poem's failure to invent 
and utter new, compensatory values upon which to 
base the hero's quest for unequivocal honor in this 
world— and for salvation in the next.
(From Topic xxi)
There is a cause and effect relationship between the 
emergence of literacy as the dominant mode of the 
contemporary society's discourse and the transformation 
of that society's institutions of political power— a 
power, we might add, that began to see itself in new 
historical terms;
If the Roland does indeed testify to a crisis in 
the discourse of power, surely this crisis stemmed 
in part from the impact of writing as it brought 
new constraints to vernacular language which 
disrupted the economy and latent episteme of 
traditional discourse. Indeed, a shift from epic 
mouvance toward a culture of qrammatica and 
monumentality is already indicated in the body of 
the Roland itself, for Charlemagne plans to
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perpetuate the memories of Roland and the twelve 
peers not by the invention of songs (cantilenes), 
but by the construction of white marble tombs that 
will presumably bear written inscriptions. To 
suggest that literacy was crucial to the disruption 
of the semantic processes of Old French epic is 
also to point to a broader relationship between 
writing and political power that was transforming 
the modalities of twelfth-century culture as a 
whole. (xxi-xxii)
What Patterson has to say provides an important 
addendum to Vance's discussion. Patterson points to 
the struggle for dominance of various mythical, quasi- 
historical and historically grounded discourses, which 
took place within the initiating framework of a more 
fundamental contest between orally based and literally 
based societal dynamics. One possible esthetic 
response to this struggle was the construction of 
historiographically framed narrative. Such narrative 
represented
the fundamental definition of present legitimacy in 
terms of descent from an omnipotent past. Verum 
quia vetus is a medieval proverb that expresses a 
ubiquitous theology of origins in force across the 
whole range of medieval culture, and nowhere more 
visibly than in the political world. The 
disruptions of medieval political history were 
typically healed with the soothing continuities of 
a founding legend, and insecure rulers bolstered 
their regimes by invoking honorific if legendary 
precedents. The degree to which these political 
imperatives determined the kind of literature that 
was produced in the Middle Ages is not sufficiently 
appreciated; nor is the even more important fact 
that this literature continued throughout its 
medieval life to concern itself with essentially 
historiographical issues, issues such as the 
relation of individual action to historical 
process, or the use and abuse of historical 
precedent itself. (Patterson 198-99)
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The emergence of the secularized individual, who 
stood apart from the community, was necessary to the 
development of secular governmental and other political 
institutions that could rival Feudal and Church 
authority. As the individual emerged, writers of the 
period were capable of using the past "to delineate an 
instructive chronology of secular empire, more commonly 
to apprehend the plan of providential dispensation 
[ . . . ] • " It is precisely the wide variety of
specifically literary discourses which impels Patterson 
to assent to what Chenu eloquently termed the 
historical "prise de conscience" of the later Middle 
Ages. For this era did not
lack a historical sense. Rather, we would do 
better to see the medieval historical consciousness 
as always at issue, at times emerging toward an 
authentic apprehension of temporality and 
periodization, at other times retreating under the 
pressure of various ideologies toward reification 
and idolization. (198-99)
Patterson resolves this mytho-historical dichotomy in 
his analysis of Romance, although what he has to say 
pertains to the entire range of twelfth century 
literary enterprise. Yet it is particularly in Romance 
that he discovers a "self-reflexiveness," that is, 
"fictions largely unconcerned with historical reality," 
which in their writing "meditate both upon the paradox 
of their own production--as historical fabrications 
designed to legitimize political power— and upon the
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problematic enterprise of reconstituting, from within 
history, a prehistorical origin" (198-99; my emphasis).
As the result of technological invention, which 
produced widespread literacy, and the concomitant 
renewed interest in Aristotle, Romance contended with 
Scripture for the twelfth century reading audience; as 
such this literature was a function of the new world of
the 1 iteratus specifically, in Stock's textual
community, the "interpres" ("History, Literature" 12; 
Implications 105, 157)— -that member of the community
who could render explication and interpretation of its 
central texts. The emergence of the interpres created 
a social structure that revolved around this literate 
interpreter. This structure indicates the depth of 
transformation from the older orality. The orally 
based community could not afford an individuality that 
ran counter to the group need to sustain an ethical 
memory and hence a social cohesion. The shift to an 
emphasis on literacy entailed a restructuring that 
meant the creation of a new hierarchy, according to 
Godzich:
The most curious, and ultimately the weakest, 
feature of the economy of memoria is the strange 
coexistence of the acknowledgement of a discursive 
multiplicity and even heterogeneity with the belief 
in their ultimate, and unverifiable, coherence. 
One could readily view this admixture of 
experiential fact and belief as an ideological 
strategy for the suspension of societal antagonisms 
in view of real differences between groups and
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individuals. These antagonisms can be held in 
check as long as no one identifies with a given 
subject position, that is as long as there prevails 
a realm of persons in which no one seeks to erase 
the difference between a subject position and the 
material purport that assumes it. For as soon as 
this difference, and the arbitrariness that 
presides over its assignment, are effaced, roles 
are taken to be entitlements and specific 
discourses are felt to be somehow natural to those 
who wield them, and they may not easily shed them 
in order to assume others. Furthermore, the entire 
universe of discourses is no longer conceivable as 
a general flux whose sense resides in its specific, 
yet unfathomable, economy, but must be 
hierarchized, that is, must be brought under the 
control of a discourse that can account for the 
operations, and especially the localization, of 
other discourses, (xvi-xvii)
The ruling discourse in the new, literate society, will 
be that of logic. Logic will in turn impart its 
peculiar form of order to an emerging historiography 
that seeks a ground in empiricism and thus rivals the 
older literature of geste and memor ia in its 
privileging of the particular and the individual. The 
evolving logic, in other words, which offered a new 
framework for literature— even as that literature was 
driven by the cognitive demands that grammar continued 
to put upon it for quite some time— ultimately came to 
define modern consciousness.
VIII
Patterson equates the grounding of Romance in a modern, 
historical consciousness; for him the most salient 
feature of this literature is a historiographical
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self-reflexivity within its narrative mode of 
discourse. Yet historicity is not the most profound 
manifestation of its literature's self-meditation. We 
have noted how in the secularized literary texts 
authors were quite literally engaged in s e l f ­
acknowledgement and self- interpretation, in discussing 
the very question of interpretation of their own and 
others' texts. Langland's satire includes grammar as 
its subject; even in the choosing of grammar as a 
subject for poetry, we can see this literary work's 
self- meditative dynamic in play. Grammar still 
exercised a broad authority in Langland's time, and 
traditionally it included "not merely the knowledge of 
the Latin language but also the techniques of the 
gloss, the concordance, and the allegorical 
method"— all of which comprised "the necessary 
introduction to the science of Holy Scripture" (Colish 
Mirror 95). In the sense that we may speak of a text 
as a woven pattern, that by extension connotes the 
process by which discourse itself is generated (perhaps 
even the scene where discourse takes place), word and 
concept can thus be understood as linked to an auctor. 
If language can be said to be the matrix out of which 
ideas emerge, it follows that words sharing similar or 
common etymologies may in turn be the result of efforts 
to articulate a common experience or perception, a 
common idea. And therefore just as discourse can be
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understood in various, similar aspects like rhetoric, 
dialectic, and so on, interpretation can be considered 
to play an integral role in any ongoing discourse or 
dialogue. By nature, any text will of course contain a 
measure of ambiguity, yet the duplicity of any posited, 
intended, meaning of a text is also a function of 
reading that in itself can perhaps be viewed as a 
paradoxical attempt to clarify what is held to have 
been ambiguous. Reading, for example, lies at the 
heart of the decision in the Roland to construct 
monuments to the dead heroes who will be understood by 
individuals in various, albeit related, ways. 
Patterson details how reading, although purportedly a 
"[d]isambiguating" strategy, nevertheless involves
a process of deciding not what a text means but 
what we want it to mean. We do this, basically, by 
locating the text in an interpretive context, such 
as an authorial intention or a genre (e.g., 
Christian instruction, courtly lyric), that 
organizes meanings into primary and secondary. Put 
simply, by privileging one context at the expense 
of others we decide how the text's ironies should 
be read, whence they derive their authority, and 
against whom they are directed.
In the Middle Ages reading is of course, first and 
foremost, a process understood in terms of Augustine's 
overall epistemology that foregrounds the interpretive 
act.
One of the great achievements of Augustinian 
hermeneutics is to make the preemptive nature of 
interpretation explicit. The Christian reader 
comes to the text (Scripture) already possessed of 
its message (the double law of charity), and his
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task is to understand not its meaning but its way 
of signifying that meaning
[cf. esp. De doctrina Christiana 1.36].
Of course, Augustinian hermeneutics serves a decidedly 
utilitarian end.
One purpose of this preemptive hermeneutic is to 
inoculate the reader against the sweetness of the 
letter by endowing him with the strength of moral 
interpretation— with, in effect, the spirit.
However, to read in this manner is to raise the issue 
of textualization as a possible (and possibly 
dangerous) purpose unto itself. "Reading with the 
oculus amoris," Patterson continues, the otherwise 
Christian reader
may entertain the solicitations of the text without 
anxiety. Possessing the authority of the sicmifie. 
he is able to enjoy the delectation of the 
signifant. "le plaisir du texte" as Roland Barthes 
calls it, "la valeur passee au rang somptueux de 
signifiant." (Renegotiating 150-51)
Even before Augustine, reading necessarily included 
what might be called a reader's selective attitude, 
which established a connection between author's and 
reader's intentions. And with Augustine— especially in 
the worth he finds in figurative language--reading 
could begin to enjoy a greater vigor and variety of 
activity.
By the time of the high Middle Ages, reading is 
allowed its greatest breadth. An intellectual 
revolution that first emerges in the tenth century
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led naturally to a consideration of language, 
texts, and reality at a more abstract level, as 
well, indirectly, to the polarization of attitudes 
towards textual methodologies in such writers as 
Abelard and Bernard. (Stock Implications 528)
Representing a self-meditation that was promoted by 
literary texts of the later Middle Ages, reading, as an 
act of interpretation ultimately of itself— that is, as 
its own text—  can undeniably be linked to the newly 
developed historical impulse. It can be argued, 
though, that this impulse evolved out of a textual 
consciousness of the time, a fascination with and a 
deep awareness of textuality per se. Textuality was 
rooted in the beginnings of Western culture and 
particularly in Augustine, but it took new forms in the 
later Middle Ages; as it became more and more distinct 
from a reality thought to lie beyond it, it profoundly 
altered the growing dynamic of text and experience. We 
can see this in the new emphasis on reading. Reading 
occurred in an environment that was changing according 
to how the individual was perceived within larger 
societal and even cosmological structures.
Everywhere, the presence of texts forced the 
elements of culture embedded in oral discourse to 
redefine their boundaries with respect to a 
different type of human exchange. This invariably 
resulted in contrasts between the "popular" and the 
"learned" which were themselves the byproducts of 
literate sensibilities. Other opposites also 
became polarized: custom versus law, things versus 
linguistic ideas, synchrony versus diachrony, and 
sense versus interpreted experience. (529)
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In his discussion of the Fourth Lateran Council of 
1215, which mandated individual confession at least 
once a year, Jacques Le Goff observes that such a 
proclamation meant the employment of a language and 
context unique to confessers who were acting as 
individuals in their acts of confession and who engaged 
other individuals, those who heard these confessions. 
In fact, individual confession was but one of many by­
products of the contemporary society's heightened 
sensitivity to texts of all kinds, both spoken and 
written. Individual confession is a manifestation of a 
changing intellectual climate, which was based on what 
Le Goff terms "introspective self-examination" within 
"a whole culture of the memory that developed in the 
thirteenth century." Indeed, "confessors' manuals 
taught priests how to develop and shape that memory" by 
inculcating a
spiritual and moral conscience, which was 
associated with a new idea of sin linked to the 
intentions of the sinner as well as with the new 
practice of auricular confession, based on 
introspective self-examination. (Medieval 79, 80)
At first seemingly unrelated to these developments is 
the new use made of exempla, which was a vital 
principle in the emerging, ever more codified ars 
praedicandi. A new species of literary exemplum, used 
especially but not exclusively in preaching, owed its
existence to the Greeks and Romans who saw it as an apt 
vehicle for "historical anecdote[s] employed in the 
rhetoric of persuasion" (78). Now this classical 
exemplum had been transformed. In such fashion the 
encouragement of individual introspection was coupled 
with an implied emphasis on textuality in the acutely 
literary nature of the new sermonizing. In its new 
incarnation in sermons, moreover, the exemplum served 
as an effective link between oral and written cultures. 
Thus it is a telling symbol of the radical shift from 
the one to the other, which brought together the 
palpability of written and other transcendent truth.
In and of itself the exemplum did much, too, both to 
expand the possibilities of and to atomize 
conceptualized time:
The conception of time implicit in exempla can be 
inferred from a study of sermons, in which three 
kinds of proof were used in argument: auctoritates. 
rationes. and exempla. The diachronic, narrative 
time of the exemplum, in a sense that of secular 
history, was combined with the retrospective and 
eschatological time of the auctoritates and with 
the atemporality of the rationes. Exemplum time 
must therefore be understood within the context of 
the sermon in which the exemplum occurs. The 
auctoritates, for the most part biblical citations, 
exhibit the temporal multiplicity of the Bible 
itself: the words are old but remain valid in the 
present and for the future, until the end of time 
and for eternal salvation. The homiletic 
commentary of the authorities is in the present, 
the timeless present of eternal truths. The 
rationes, on the other hand, are in the didactic 
present. Between the eschatological time of the 
Bible, brought up to date and oriented by 
commentary, and the eternal time of rational 
truths, the exemplum insinuated a segment of 
narrative time— historical, linear, and divisible.
(78-79)
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All tenses, all forms of time including linear-time, 
and auctoritas. are conjoined under the aegis of 
Augustine's view of understanding as recollection. Yet 
in the new use made of exempla, ironically, Augustine's 
conception of time, which was a function of memory, 
yields to narrative's diachrony and hence to the time 
of historiography whose very principles of composition 
embrace rationalism and empiricism and therefore 
undermine the Augustinian project of reading; for 
Augustine held that, read "correctly,'' a text must 
yield its moral, its divine truth, no matter what its 
surface texture, its litera denoted. Stock's "textual 
communities" were groups whose attitudes and behavior 
became determined by an "agreed meaning of gospel 
passages" or other revered texts, an agreement "which 
we may call the text, as opposed to the translation, 
transcription, or verbalization" of the prior text. 
Such communities establish their own, as it were 
informed, "meaningful pattern[s] involving an already 
established inner code through which outer behavior can 
be interpreted." Thus these communities duplicate the 
Augustinian exegetical procedure of divining the inner 
meanings of scripture, as well as the later allegorical 
tradition of correspondence through separate 
signification. Nevertheless, at the very moment that 
this essentially Augustinian epistemology of reading is
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becoming rooted in the newly forming textual society, 
when its members "participated in the original textual 
experience," their "discourse acquired its historical 
dimension: for men and women not only presumed to
understand" the actions of the interpres. who provided 
a c onceptualized link between textuality and 
rationality, "but without consciously thinking about it 
modeled their own behavior on his" ("History, 
Literature" 12, 15, 16). There is an attendant human 
individuality that emerges out of such communities, 
which requires the living out of a dual role. The 
individual is
both [. . .] audience (a silent reader) and [. . .]
individual a uctor; for in the older culture, 
intellectually dominated by Augustine, oral 
literature exists to keep alive the memoria of its 
people. (Godzich xv-xvi)
Textuality, however, in the sense we have been speaking 
of it, meant that
the use and reuse of such familiar polarities as 
time and eternity, image and reality, and figura 
and veritas. whatever their particular sources, 
were justified by the belief that within the 
ontology of the written word lay an intimate 
reflection of reality [. . .].
(Stock Implications 530).
This reality could be revealed through "the study of 
grammar, syntax, and hermeneutics" (530). The 
rational procedures of the interpres. then, whose 
interpretive strategies could be brought to bear upon
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newer literary forms such as sermons and especially the 
exempla they contained, adapted the singular 
temporality of the Augustinian cosmos, in which the 
eternal finally subsumed all other time frames, to the 
time frame of the individual mortal's span of life, and 
as well to the larger frame of narrative that too 
easily lent itself to historical time; in turn, 
historical time gradually undermined the intellectual 
notion of the eternal.
This transformation of conceptualized time is 
vividly demonstrated in the dynamic of two pivotal and 
related terms, textus and auctoritas. Etymologically, 
textus shares primal associations with the concept of 
auctoritas whose oldest Indo- European root indicates 
force. increase. supply. augmentation. and so on; the 
Latin augere, besides these meanings, expresses the 
idea of f e r t i l i z a t i o n , the caus ing to t h r i v e . 
strengthening. making more numerous. and making richer 
(Gonda 744-75). We might also remind ourselves that 
the idea of glossing a text, which was of course a 
central tenet of the exegetical tradition, has its 
roots in the Greek word for tongue (Hanning "I Shal 
Finde It" 28).
Just as in a later evolutionary stage of the verb 
the classical Latin texo could mean to connect or to 
link (cf. above)— which might share to a degree the
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earlier Greek concept of rhetoric as a process of 
weaving (as defined in Plato's Gorg i a s [cf. 
above])— the medieval term auctor strikingly reveals an 
intimate association with the whole idea of discourse. 
It is no great surprise that in the "literary context" 
of the later Middle Ages,
the term auctor denoted someone who was at once a 
writer and an authority, someone not merely to be 
read but also to be respected and believed. 
According to medieval grammarians, the term derived 
its meaning form four main sources: auctor was 
supposed to be related to the Latin verbs agere "to 
act or perform," augere "to grow" and auieo "to 
tie," and to the Greek noun autentim "authority.1 
An auctor "performed" the act of writing. He 
brought something into being, caused it to "grow." 
In the more specialised sense related to auieo. 
poets like Virgil and Lucan were auctores in that 
they had "tied" together their verses with feet and 
metres. To the ideas of achievement and growth was 
easily assimilated the idea of authenticity or 
"authoritativeness." (Minnis Medieval Theory 10)
To tie verses together with meters is perhaps in small 
to tie together ideas— as in rhetoric. to weave them, 
indeed to weave them into a tapestry (i.e., into a text 
or textus, into a textile or textilis). In a more 
extended sense, either or both the auctor and interpres 
of a textual community, who speaks out or perhaps, 
intentionally or otherwise, "glosses" his auctor1s 
previously established text, "ties" together the 
members of the textual community. In fact the act of 
tying is that of forming the group into a cohesive 
whole. Furthermore, a secular author, like his or her 
religious counterpart, could act as the interpres of
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such a community or could even provide the text for 
interpretation. Such an author played a role, in other 
words, in the institutionalization of literacy.
IX
Unquestionably, the role of the author and interpreter 
in the textual community of the later Middle Ages is a 
consequence of the new balance in later medieval 
society between oral and written discourse. Yet the 
basis for this change in the medieval societal 
infrastructure can also be traced and is perhaps most 
dramatically revealed in various attacks on medieval 
language theory by contemporary logicians. New 
cognitive procedures, which comprise the intellectual 
matrix for the new roles of author and reader (or 
alternately author and interpreter) also arose, if 
indirectly, out of a renewed and intensified resultant 
bifurcation of the Word, which was accomplished by 
logicalist investigations of both grammar and the 
constituent that made up that grammar, the individual 
word.
What was the nature of that word? How might it have 
represented reality? The word is first of all seen to 
be both oral and written. Secondly, it can be viewed 
as being a reality in and of itself; or, as in the case 
of someone like William of Ockham, it can be viewed as
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being merely a signifier. It can enjoy as well an 
intermediary status, as in Aquinas' thought; Aquinas 
implies this status in his formulation of the concept 
of essence (cf., e.g., De ente et essentia II), and in 
his distinction between the Aristotelian terms of 
intellection, species impressa and species expressa 
(c f . De malo 16, 8 , ad 3 ; In. 1 ibrum Boethii de
Trinitate. 6, 2, ad 5; Summa theoloaica la, 16, 2; in 
F. C. Copleston Aquinas 90-91, 177-78). Questions
surrounding the possibility of universals. and the 
specific issue of real ism versus nominalism. could find 
a focus in the ever more acute perception on the part 
of theologians and philosophers of the later Middle 
Ages that the word was a written, physical form on the 
page. Under the influence of Boethianized Aristotelian 
logic, Anselm, for example, must employ an 
"increasingly rationalized" grammar in order to 
continue to sustain the inherited Augustine's 
"ineluctably verbal" conception of knowledge. This 
"quasi-logical grammar," in fact,
is Anselm's basic theological tool; its peculiar, 
and, as events were to prove, highly transitory 
methods and presuppositions dictate the operative 
conditions of his thought as a whole. Like 
Augustine [. . .] Anselm's major epistemological
concern is the theological problem of speaking 
about God. But, where Augustine sees the task of 
theology as the eloquent expression of the Word, 
Anselm sees it as the conscientious and faithful 
definition of the Word. (Colish Mirror 84-85)
Thus in Anselm's view the Word has been set at a
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distance from the one who partakes of it, first of all 
by the very attempt at formulating its definition. In 
effect the Word has been objectified, which is 
precisely what happens when words are set as spatial 
figures on a page and hence can be taken in, read or 
processed by a reader, rather than a listener, over an 
extended period of time. Such words, furthermore, have 
usually lost their proximity to their auctor, of which 
we are reminded in Chaucer's famous adieu, "goe litel 
boke." Not only has an integral connection between 
speaker and audience been severed, but so too have the 
speaker's— now the writer's— words been set apart from 
the knower, as independent of their author and 
ontologically grounded in the conception of their own 
essential aspects qua words. This objectivity 
inevitably raises questions of definition, since the 
word may be contemplated at a leisure afforded by both 
the new temporal and spatial distances, and therefore 
it enlists the services of a burgeoning new discourse 
of logic. In querying the nature of the Word, Anselm 
must seek a word with which to adequately signify the 
divine; yet he is only one of a series of philosophers, 
epistemologists--Augustine among them— who need to 
speak about reality, thought and language, and the 
connections among them, less in terms of the spoken 
word and more often in the terms allowed by ever 
increasingly abstractive procedures.
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Anselm's view is only a step away from that of the 
ancient Stoics, a view he derives, however, through his 
reading of Augustine's De dialectica and De doctrina 
Christiana. where Augustine further evolves and, in 
fully appropriating it, makes the Stoic theory of 
verbal signification uniquely his own as a theory that 
is now distinct and Christian. "Since the Cratylus." 
Colish observes,
thinkers had used the terms "natural" and 
"conventional" to mean the ways in which words 
acquire their denotations. However, Augustine 
applies these terms to signs in the light of their 
intentional or unintentional character. His natural 
signs are unintentional. A fire signifies its 
presence unintentionally through the smoke it 
produces; a man signifies his feelings 
unintentionally through his facial expression. 
These signs do indeed signify physical and 
psychological realities, but they do so 
involuntarily. Augustine's conventional signs also 
correspond truly with the things they signify. But 
they are signs used deliberately by animate or 
intelligent beings to express their ideas, 
intentions, and feelings to other beings [De 
doctrina 2.3.4-5]. ("Stoic Theory" 26-29).
Augustine presents a middle stage, indeed, between the 
notion of a universe of signs that are of equal 
stature, whether verbal or otherwise, and later 
medieval philosophers' positions specifically in 
relation to verbal signs, positions adopted under the 
aegis of the growing spread of literacy when the word 
acts not only as a verbal sign per se but more often 
than not as a written representation of that verbal
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sign, and in fact a representation that is gradually 
gathering to it its own ontological authority. 
Augustine's "natural" sign, on the other hand, can be 
non-verbal. Nevertheless, Augustine's peculiar 
interest is in the verbal, particularly in De doctrina. 
where he concerns himself with exegesis and preaching; 
words in these contexts are understood as being 
conventional and verbal (Colish 29).
The doctrine of intentionality, and the use made by 
the sign in this context, is an expansion of the Stoic 
theory of lekta. The Stoics believed in language as 
being inherently ambiguous. Chrysippus, for one, cited 
language's capacity to signify intentionality, even if 
an intended meaning was not identical with the 
language's objective reference. Furthermore, one's 
inner intentions did not need to enjoy a connection to 
reality (see Aulus Gellius Noctes atticae 11.12.1; in 
Colish "Stoic" 23):
For the Stoics, l e k t a . or intellectual 
intentions, are one member of a quartet of entities 
called incorporeals, along with space, time, and 
the void. The incorporeals are immaterial; thus, 
for the Stoics, they are not fully real. They do 
not exist but merely subsist. Time, space and the 
void have their assigned roles to play in physics. 
For their part, lekta are the foundation of logic. 
Lekta are the "stuff," if you will, out of which 
logical propositions are made. Logical 
propositions include predications, arguments, 
syllogisms, and fallacies. Such formulae have 
meaning; but, since they are not corporeal, they do 
not have full being. Unlike words, lekta and their 
logical by-products are not natural signs of 
natural objects. The relations between logical
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statements are governed by their own laws, which 
can and should be studied as a distinct and formal 
branch of philosophy. But logical statements and 
their relations, since they are composed of lekta, 
do not mirror the real, corporeal world. Lekta and 
logic have a purely intramental existence and 
validity [cf. Stoicorum veterum fracrmenta 11.93-95, 
132, 166, 170, 181, 183, 331, 335, 488, 501-2, 511, 
514]. (23-24)
On this basis, logic is elevated to the status of "an 
independent discipline," self-justifying according to 
"its own internal rules and criteria." Simultaneously, 
the Stoics would have avidly subscribed to "the later 
scholastic dictum, a. nosse ad esse non valet 
consequentia" (24). In the first century a.d., Aulus 
Gellius writes Attic Nights, in which he associates, 
after the Stoics, the guestion of intentionality with 
that of words existing as natural signs. Attic Nights 
was popular in the fourth century. And it is Augustine 
who adopts Gellius1 ideas and situates them in a 
broader context (Colish 24).
More than a millenium separates the Stoics and the 
medieval grammarians of Anselm's time. Yet much of 
what is believed later— such as is indicated by the 
oftentimes blind obedience to a language paradigm as a 
method for determining reality (as we have seen in the 
tenth century controversy over the eucharist; cf. 
above), which provided the basis for the speculative 
grammar movement— has its roots in ancient and 
hellenistic Greece. In this historical light,
106
moreover, we might better understand the nominalism of 
someone like Ockham as being a reaction to a deeply
entrenched realism. And, in this context we can locate 
the earlier Anselm's tireless search for the
transcendental signifier that might represent the
divine. All of these intellectual movements— whose
tensions are elaborated in contemporary imaginative 
literature as early as the songs of such troubadours as 
Guillem IX and Marcabru, for example, and later in a 
poem such as Langland's Piers Plowman— owe much to the 
Greeks and particularly to the Stoic conception of 
language as being first and foremost language that was 
understood to have been naturally engendered. 
According to the Stoic reasoning, words— "as natural 
signs," as "sounds" and hence "material" and
"corporeal"— enjoyed an "automatic correlation with the 
material and corporeal realities" for which they stood, 
which was in keeping with the Stoic belief in the
substantiality of "all real beings." But the Stoic
sense of a body included "agents, such as God and the 
human soul." The criterion that defined language was 
"the articulate human voice" rather than the 
"inarticulate sounds made by animals [SVF 1.74, 
11.140-41]." And both spoken and written human speech 
could but only include the perception that the "human 
logos [was] consubstantial with God, the logos of 
nature." In other words,
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Stoic physics sees the world in monistic terms; God 
is identified with the natural world and with the 
human mind [SVF 1.85, 87, 102, 153-54, 159-62, 493, 
495; 11.299-328, 526]. Words, thus, are
intrinsically real, in a physical sense. Speech is 
a natural phenomenon. Both the denotations of 
words, their etymological derivations, and the 
grammatical structure of language are hence 
natural. (Colish 19-20).
To put it another way, we might want to entertain
the notion that the Stoics had laid the foundation for
the undermining of the natural signification of
language in their unavoidable positing of a
relationship between language and logic (i.e., lekta). 
In this they anticipated the gradual dismantling of 
later Augustinian language theory in the later Middle 
Ages. De doctrina Christiana invoked "the doctrine of 
lekta or intentionality in relation to logic" in the 
explanation of the use an exegete should make of the 
classical liberal arts.
In his discussion of the discipline of dialectic 
[Augustine] seconds the Stoic idea that logical 
predications are lekta which operate according to 
their own internal rules and which have no 
necessary correlation with extramental realities. 
What makes a logical proposition true in its own 
terms, he notes, is its internal cogency or logical 
possibility, even though the premises on which it 
is based may be objectively false or physically 
impossible [2.35.53]. One still ought to "spoil 
the Egyptians" and study dialectic, he counsels, 
for it sharpens the mind and it can be applied just 
as easily to true propositions as to false ones.
(Colish "Stoic" 29-30)
Augustine departs from the Stoic line of thinking in 
his distinction between internally cogent logical
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statements and real being (2.37.53). Yet he sees 
rhetoric— "a neutral art, even though it may provide 
arguments for falsehood as well as truth and even 
though it may be a vehicle for lying"— as a device for 
finely tuning one's critical abilities "to detect and 
to reject these inappropriate uses of speech as one 
learns to apply the art of eloquence to the service of 
truth [4.2.3]" (Colish 29-30).
What we are seeing in Augustine's thinking is the 
gradual disintegration of the unified world comprised 
of language and reality that is essentially posited by 
him. The word may be the "verbum mentis," but read 
properly, and in the light of divine grace, it will 
lead its reader (its auditor, or seer) to the truth. 
Yet in proposing the question of lying (as opposed to 
falsehoods) as being contingent on intentionality— a 
contingency Augustine finds in the relationship of a 
logistic lekta, and the actuality of speech and 
language as understood first by the Stoics— he makes 
possible a further division between language and 
reality, beyond what is implied in his formulation of a 
"verbum mentis" in which language cannot directly lead 
the user to the truth. In reestablishing an ontology 
of language predicated on its proper internal rules and 
therefore self-governance, he also anticipates the 
further analysis of language by later medieval
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logicians who are— whether they are fully conscious of 
the implications of their work— busy at wresting 
themselves from the sure grip of grammar. However, in 
doing so they face a new tyranny, that of logic.
X
The thinking of Abelard, the preeminent logician of his 
time, presents us with a crossroads in the history of 
semantics. In him we also perceive the later Middle 
Ages' positioning as regards the authority of antiquity 
in relationship to the development of logic as it 
transformed the ways of looking at language per se. 
Logic's growing claim to be able to systematize reality 
implicitly presented its bid for coequal status with 
traditional metaphysics. Reality was linguistically 
grounded, moreover, insofar as the logic of the time 
was thought to be a science of language, called 
sermocinalism after Abelard's distinction between mere 
utterance (vox) and word (sermo). Around this 
distinction Abelard organized his theory of universals; 
as words— utterances and even inscriptions— are 
themselves things, so too in the strict sense of being 
the combination of vox plus significatio words are 
"products of human arrangements rather than being the 
products of natural effects" (Kretzman 3 69).
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Reality, in other words, was seen to be more socio­
centered than it had been in the past, more contingent 
upon ethical language. This emphasis on usage found its 
theoretical focus in speculations about the properties 
of terms and, significantly, in the syncategorematic 
aspect of language. In itself the syncategorematic 
classification, and the larger question it addressed 
regarding predication,
marked a break with Aristotelian-Boethian tradition 
in that it was precise where the tradition had been 
vague. The notion of predication was
unquestionably an essential part of the subject 
matter of logic, but Aristotle and Boethius had 
treated it in ways that often suggested that 
predicates might be extralinguistic and even 
extramental entities. (370)
Here the way was being paved for the elevation of logic 
to the status of a science. "This crucial vagueness," 
on the part of Aristotle and Boethius, became to a 
degree "the source of the medievals1 concern with 
universals," which "left open the possibility that 
logic might be essentially a science of reality, 
resembling or subsumed under metaphysics" (370). One of 
Abelard's contributions to this "science" was to 
replace the overly simple concept of utterance, which 
had held sway since Boethius and after him in the 
Dialectica of Garland the Computist of the late 
eleventh century, who held that predication can occur 
only in an utterance and therefore only utterances are 
predicable. That is, predication obtained to
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utterances that were the elements of logic. However, 
"recognizing that utterances are physical events which 
are, as such, of no interest to logicians," Abelard
replaced the overly simple utterance with what he 
called the sermo. defined as the utterance taken 
together with its signification. (370)
Thus logic became a product of mental utterance 
(sermo), and was divorced from the spoken word; that 
is, Abelard found it necessary to include in the notion 
of utterance its significative aspect. All the same, 
he refused to admit that mental entities were elemental 
within a system of logic. "He argued that a 
proposition true gratia terminorum could not be 
verified by an appeal to the status of mental 
entities." He emphasized the connection between a term 
and the definition of that term, for the term itself, 
categorically, had to be included in "the string of 
terms making up the definition of the term [. . .]."
Abelard's sermocinalism was "directed not only against 
the notion of logic as a science of reality fscientia 
realis) but evidently also against the notion of it as 
the science of reason (scientia rationalist" (371).
It is this distinction that provided Avicenna and 
others who followed after him, such as Albert the 
Great, with a locus of attack upon which a philosophy 
of logic could be erected--a philosophy, however,
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furthered in the later Middle Ages more by thinkers who 
involved themselves with metaphysics than with logic. 
As Norman Kretzman writes, in Avicenna's view, logic 
was the science of reason, for
"the relation of this doctrine [logic] to internal 
thought, which is called internal speech, is just 
like the relation of grammar to outward 
signification, which is called speech" (Locrica 
Prima f 3rA). Thus grammar, not logic, was the 
sermocinal science, according to Avicennianism, and 
the rise of speculative grammar that was to follow 
may in part be attributed to this point of view.
(371)
Taken together, the contributions of Abelard and 
Avicenna to the development of Western philosophy tell 
us of the tenacity with which grammar as an 
epistemological system held on, receded and then 
prevailed again, in the subsequent speculative grammar 
movement of the modistae, as a way of virtually
explaining experience. How did this occur? In these
two attempts (i.e., Avicenna's and Abelard's) to create 
a science of language we witness in their respective 
definitions of language the splitting off of
abstractive mental processes from the spoken utterance
and as well the semantic and syntactic linguistic 
functions. What becomes evident in the writings of 
both thinkers is the growing importance of mental 
abstraction as difference, which in turn is grounded in 
a dialectical split caused by the elevation of reason 
to a new, more privileged position.
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XI
Later medieval poets, as well, are engaged in a two­
fold struggle, first of all to envision a world beyond 
that which was sanctioned by Augustine, and secondly to 
develop a linguistic stance towards reality that 
transcended the contradictory nature of the grammatical 
and logical paradigms. Central in this struggle was an 
ontological assertion on the part of these poets, which 
manifested itself in two, contradictory forms. On the 
one hand they staked their claim as poets who were 
unique and preeminent within a literary tradition. On 
the other hand they virtually defined themselves within 
the fabric of that tradition and the all embracing 
structure of which the literature was a part— that of 
Christian auctoritas. The classical forebears could 
variously fall within one or the other category, either 
under the Scriptural-Augustinian dispensation that in a 
sense revised the pagan texts, putting them into 
Christian terms, or else within the category of 
literature that in any case remained subsumed in a 
larger theologico-philosophical world. Pilgrimage 
literature (the Divina Commedia. the Canterbury Tales. 
Piers Plowman), as Julia Holloway has shown, exhibited 
"the mirroring of God's writing in man's writing [as] 
the essence of pilgrimage imitatio Christi" through 
"two authorial, intertextual paradigms [. . .] the
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first of Luke at Exnmaus, the second, God himself, the 
subject of Luke's Gospel [. . . ]11 (209). Through topoi 
of modesty and/or ineffability, on the other hand, 
these poets like Dante, Chaucer and Langland propose a 
linguistic system that is totally divorced from the 
reality it purports to describe, and in doing so they 
create a gulf between themselves and the past of 
Scripture and antiquity that essentially posited a 
unified world. These poets' linguistic system, an 
outgrowth of the new textuality and logic, called 
attention to itself as being the only reality it could 
in fact ultimately describe. This philosophy of 
language, never clearly articulated except through the 
opacity of poetry, provided the subtext of self-naming 
that these poets adopt as a way of contemplating the 
question of language per se. a language that had its 
own being apart from the world and which, through 
contemplation of its self-referentiality, makes 
possible the self-realization and self-actualization of 
the poet who has named himself. For this autocitation 
exists in order to speak of the world of names, a world 
that is separate from experience yet a world that for 
the poet is the only possible vehicle with which he may 
coexist and commune with that experience.
Thus it is that both the logicians and the poets, in 
their respective fashions, commune with the
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experiential world; they commune with reality, 
ironically, by engaging and trying to resolve the 
increasingly vitiated theological and hence 
increasingly substantial philosophical investigation of 
a language that will never quite adhere to that which 
it claims to describe, and, in theological terms, as in 
the idea of the Word incarnate, a language that will 
never fully adhere to the world of reality which is 
perhaps in some sense the product of, is created by, 
language itself. "In the content, [. . .] even in the
forms of thought," Stock observes,
medievals appear to have consciously imitated their 
ancient predecessors. Yet, as their imprecisions, 
misinterpretations, and sources of anxiety 
demonstrate, they were unlike their forebears in 
fundamental ways. The roots of these differences 
are traceable to the conceptual vocabulary, if not 
to the process of conceptualization itself, which 
derived from a few linguistic models, [. . .].
(Implications 530)
The new textuality contributed to a deepening 
dichotomy between word and truth, just as it implicitly 
held out the possibility of a language that owed its 
being only to itself. Rather than merely through its 
use as a descriptor of the world, this language could 
provide the realization of the world through its self­
contemplation? as we have said, such self-reflection 
constituted a cognitive procedure that was provided by 
both logic and poetry. More and more, language had 
broken off from the world it could hopefully signify in
order to form another, coeval world of its own. It was 
in these terms that the poets of the high Middle Ages 
could define themselves in relation to the larger world 
beyond both themselves and the language with which they 
struggled for the prize of meaning— a meaning that had 
to be inextricably woven within language's apparently 
ineluctable self- meditation. And so the vehicle for 
meaning could but only have been self-naming, and more 
importantly the manipulation of the current 
understanding of the process of naming as a fundamental 
epistemological concern. All of this, ultimately, 
allowed later medieval poets to define themselves as 
individuals apart from literary, theological and 
philosophical traditions. In short, in the light of 
auctoritas poets like Marcabru, Dante, Chaucer and 
Langland were able to effect themselves in their poems 
as being their own auctors, and they were able to speak 
about their struggle to arrive at this precarious state 
of individuality, poised as they were between the 
anonymity afforded by the larger tradition that 
demanded their subsumption, and the fully realized 
individuality of the later Renaissance. This crisis, 
in which meaning could no longer be satisfactorily 
expressed in either theological (i.e., philosophical, 
quasi-scientific, quasi- empirical) terms or in the 
language of poetry (i.e., the neo- mythical and/or 
quasi-scientific, as in Bernard's Cosmographia). most
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vividly revealed itself in the changing attitude 
towards textuality as it increasingly came to be 
associated with writing and reading. "Texts," Stock 
writes, eventually
raised the possibility that reality could be 
understood as a series of relationships, such as 
outer versus inner, independent object as opposed 
to reflecting subject, or abstract sets of rules in 
contrast to a coherent texture of facts and 
meanings. Experience in other words became 
separable, if not always separated, from 
ratiocination about it; and the main field of 
investigation turned out to be, not the raw data of 
sense or the platonized ideal of pure knowledge, 
but rather the forms of meditation about them. 
This set of changes resulted in a rebirth of 
hermeneutics as a critical philosophy of meaning, 
in a renewed search for epistemological order, and 
in a widespread interest in diachrony, development, 
and processual evolution. Understanding as a 
consequence began to emerge from the accumulation 
of reiterated and reinterpreted experience, even 
though, as was recognized, the tools of 
methodological analysis were not given in each 
concrete set of events; and an understanding formed 
of similar elements links the contemporary reader 
to the past through the preservation of those very 
written artifacts which originated new patterns of 
thought and action themselves. (531)
As the physical representation of discourse it had come 
to mean, the notion of a text could have found 
justification in, before Aquinas, Abelard's rigorous 
elevation of words as being the only phenomena in which 
universals may reside; and, in consideration of this, 
Abelard concluded that words are themselves things in 
that only they may contain universality. Notably, he 
further distinguished between what words name
(nominare) and the way in which they signify (Kretzman
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7.369). To comprehend the epistemological crossroads 
we see exemplified in a thinker such as Abelard is to 
provide the key to reading the poets of the later 
Middle Ages, whose poetry— that is, whose
fictions— were instigated by the recognition that the 
process per se of signification provided the 
opportunity to write and to talk about in the writing 
the ramifications of a supreme language or rather an 
unparalleled style.
The insistence on the part of the poets to create an 
individual poetic authority could only have occurred 
within a more diverse, dialectically ordered social 
structure. The dialectic was integrally involved in 
the very poetics of these authors, and so poetic self- 
ref erentiality, inextricably woven into the fabric of 
the poetry as well as into the linguistic traditions 
the poetry modulated, acted as both theme and poetic 
strategy for these ultimately secular texts. 
Auctoritas is a function of intertextuality. To say 
that intertextuality lies at the heart of the late 
medieval poet's attempt at self-definition is quite 
possibly to state the very obvious, for medieval 
literature, like the larger medieval world of which it 
is a part> can only take place within the context of a 
hierarchized authorial tradition. This does not 
assume, however, that poets since the twelfth century 
are not capable of creating images of themselves, for
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these self-depictions depend for their insistence upon 
as well as distinction from the context of auctoritas 
that they consciously hold at a distance.
XII
The hierarchy of authority defining the medieval 
imagination, which in its time is considered to be 
immutable and rigidly determined, is not so much the 
consequence of Christianity's inviolable articles of 
faith as of the very language out of which the articles 
evolve. The metaphors of scripture and the exegetical 
tradition establish an unalterable field for poetic 
endeavor in their insistence on images of the word. the 
book. and so on; characterized by the field's 
intertextual nature, the metaphors are the central
descriptions of revelation and redemption. Once a
proportion is established between God and the word, it 
will be the word (i.e., the text, etc.) that will serve 
as a formal basis from which Christian epistemology 
will manifest itself and flourish.
Although no one event or even group of events might 
completely account for the emergence of a singular 
poetic voice in twelfth century Europe, what is clear 
is that poetry since then not only possesses such a
voice as the mark of a unique point of view, but is
virtually generated out of the impulse to establish an
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individualized poetic authority. This is not the voice 
of the Renaissance, when the aim of poets and thinkers 
alike is to make "a radical break with tradition" 
(Stock Myth and Science 6). Particularly in the 12th 
century, the medieval imagination turns back toward the 
ancient, pagan world, and sees itself as a part of a 
continuum; people of this period are the "dwarfs," as 
Bernard of Chartres was reported to have said, who 
stood "on the shoulders of giants" (Curtius 119; cf. 
above). What sets the twelfth century apart from the 
later Renaissance is the latter period's energetic 
repudiation of its more immediate, medieval past. 
Hence the 12th century initiates tensions, rather than 
precluding their possibility, between its near and 
distant past, its sense of validity resting on 
Scripture and particularly the thinking of Augustine, 
and on a newly revised Aristotelianism that had made 
its way into Europe. Twelfth century Europe was thus 
also a contrast to its immediate past; in comparison 
with it, the twelfth century was a hotbed of 
contradictory (as well as, often enough, complementary) 
ideas and discoveries. Instead of denying the past, 
the task became that of reconciling the new learning to 
the auctoritas of what was already known and could not 
be doubted.
This turning to the past in order to augment it by
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the assertion of a new present is not only the driving 
force among theologians and philosophers like Anselm 
and Abelard, Aquinas and Ockham, but, again, among
poets as well. Jesse Gellrich notes that while Dante,
and after him Chaucer,
look away from the medieval past, they also look 
back to the vital commitment of their past in the 
reading of the Bible, in the challenge to 
interpretation and change that it poses. (247)
Yet other poets more openly address their Scriptural 
roots, such as Marcabru and Langland, who effectively 
represent the near and far ends of a unique period in 
Western intellectual and esthetic development. As an 
early troubadour, Marcabru helped to inaugurate the new 
poetic. The troubadours go as far as to actually name
the individualized poetic voice as a poetic cause
celebre— as the emblem for, the aegis under which verse 
is to be made. Ironically, in order to break with 
their past poets had to name it too. In consequence, 
the poetic impulse included nascent, historically 
determined discourses.
What must be recognized is that this dynamic could 
never have been possible without the legacy of 
Augustine, particularly the Augustine of the 
Confessions. which was never to be fully supplanted by 
Scholasticism or its descendants. It is in the 
Confessions that we find the most profound expression
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of a primal link between a text that the "I" of the 
reader and of the author "reads," and the maker of that 
text. The "I" of a medieval poem may be only a part 
of a larger textual convention formulaically referring 
to, even fully discussing itself in the poem; in this 
case the poetic text may be understood to be the 
dominant factor in the poem (Zumthor "Autobiography in 
the Middle Ages" 30-32), rather than, say, the "I" of 
modern narrative that was fully born in Romanticism. 
As Vance puts it, in the Confessions Augustine failed
to consummate the logic of autobiography by 
refusing to allow the "I" of narrative recollection 
to converge with the converted "I" that is writing 
[in part because] he finally distrusted any attempt 
on the part of man to know his true nature by 
commemorating his existence in the abyss of time 
and space [. . .]. ("Augustine's Confessions" 9)
As we shall see, the poets of the twelfth to fourteenth 
centuries represent a bridge from an Augustinian world 
view to a modern one, which is defined by their 
poetry's budding historicism, fictional values, and a 
self-referentiality that makes the poets as distinct 
from their autonomous texts as from the literary 
tradition out of which these texts emerged. Yet the 
seeds of this transformation are to be found, of 
course, in Augustine. His
poetics of selfhood in the Confessions does not 
really differ significantly from that of any 
narrator— Virgil, for example—  who seeks to 
inscribe the sundry fragments of individual 
experience in an order of discourse whose code
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serves as what we may call the notation of 
authority. In such conditions the self becomes
merely a contingent signifier. The deictic "I" 
becomes a purely "grammatical" sign pointing to an 
order of written signs identical with history, to a 
logos born not of the speaking self but of the 
divine Other by whom we are originally spoken.
(12-13)
Whatever the circumstances, in other words, even within 
a binary category such as fact/fiction, the literary 
"I" is in some measure subject to the text it is 
creating in the sense that this "I"'s ultimate terms of 
self-definition will have to include an understanding 
of itself as a text, whether or not the understanding 
is explicitly stated.
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Medieval poetic individuality, in the sense we have 
been speaking of it, can be said to have been a 
function of the very text in which such an individual 
may have appeared; that is, the individual is defined 
by the text. The ultimate measure of definition of the 
text's "I" is the text itself. Arguably, therefore, we 
might want to predict that a motif which can be found 
in all later medieval poetry is that of a persona who 
finds a reflection of himself in his text. This 
dynamic is a function of both the poet's effected 
inter- and intratextual maneuvers. The genre in which 
the voice of this individual first consistently shows 
itself is that of the troubadour canso. Thus we can
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say that textualized self-awareness in the troubadour 
tradition was compounded by the troubadour's vidas and 
razos of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, which 
comprised revisionist readings of the original 
troubadour songs; the impulse of this tradition reached 
forward in time beyond this poetry. Yet, as already 
noted, such an inter-/intratextual strategy reaches 
back at least to Augustine. The canso. to be sung, was 
also written down, which provided later commentators 
with a fixed version that could be invoked to support a 
revisionist, interpretive gloss or razo. Hence writing 
in and of itself called into being a secular textuality 
that matched the exegetical tradition as promulgated in 
works such as De Doctrina Christiana. In fact the 
canso. even if first apprehended by an audience through 
the singing of the i oglar, within the social 
interaction of the aristocratic court, contained an 
especially intricate structure that must to some extent 
have depended for its full appreciation on the 
leisurely and therefore careful scrutiny of a literate 
reader.
This is in part to say that the troubadours mark the 
transition from oral to written literature, perhaps in 
more dramatic fashion than their contemporaries, the 
writers of romance or geste. And at least some of what 
intellectual and political developments motivated in 
the romance genre can be said to have inhered in the
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courtly lyric makers (indeed, quite possibly more 
profoundly). In all circumstances— Chretien's romances, 
the Chanson de Roland. or the songs of Marcabru— what 
seems clear is the sense that there was an understood, 
inherent textual element within and beyond the spoken 
as well as the written word. All individuals, groups, 
and institutions could be defined in terms of texts. 
Again, this was the text as was most vividly defined by 
Augustine in the Confessions. whose vision of a "scroll 
of the firmament," we might remind ourselves, was that 
of "a layer of 'skin' [textus, tegumentum; cf. above] 
where the primary dictation of creation is dispensed as 
a written text, a Scripture (Confessions XIII.xv.16]" 
(Vance "Augustine's Confessions" 8). Thus, in the most 
graphic fashion, Augustine laid the groundwork for a 
later, fully evolved relationship between the "I" of an 
utterance and that very text the "I" speaks, writes, 
and even reads; by doing so the "I" reads itself as it 
is defined by its text. This dynamic is rooted in the 
association of skin. that which contains the physical 
body (as well as the soul) and which covers the self. 
and the text with which the self might both merge 
within a community and find distinction from that very 
same community. For the text represents the discourse 
that in turn essentially defines and orders the 
community as it is ruled by an ethical imperative.
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Chapter Two 
Guillem IX and Marcabru:
"Per savi * 1 tenc ses doptanssa" 
and the Poetics of the "I"
I
As late as the 12th century the world view and even the 
language of Augustine is very much present in the songs 
of the troubadour Marcabru. Marcabru1s songs are often 
meditations on the nature of themselves, as songs, on 
their ability to make meaning and to convey truth. 
Throughout the songs the poet carries on, at times 
implicitly, an argument between amors, true love, and 
amars., false, cupidinous love or lust. In order to 
arrive at this dialectic, the theology of Augustine has 
had to be taken up whole. Marcabru condemns the false 
use of words, a position that reflects contemporary 
rhetorical theory but one which is steeped in both 
classicism and early Christianity. "The blame of empty 
eloquence," as Linda Paterson has put it, is a pretext 
for establishing a true eloquence. This topos is 
traceable to Plato’s blame of Isocrates; and Augustine 
writes in De Doctrina Christiana. making Christian 
doctrine the foundation of true eloquence, "In ipso 
etiam sermone malit rebus placere quam verbis; nec 
aestimet dici melius, nisi quod dicitur verius; nec 
doctor verbis serviat, sed verba doctor" (PL XXXIV.119,
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and all of Book IV; in Paterson 11). This same outlook 
can be found more forcefully expressed in the imagery 
of the Confessions; the notion of false eloquence could 
have been derived from the false skins and garments 
(i.e., textus. tecrumentum, textilis) of the sinner. 
This issue is unavoidable when we read Marcabru—  
especially, for example, when he attempts to combat the 
propagation of a new, eroticized love, by his immediate 
forebear, Guillem IX.
Marcabru draws upon many textual sources in order to 
establish the ground of his own literary authority. 
Although often recasting and hence disguising his 
sources in paraphrase and allusion, he can be quick to 
remind us— as for example in the eleventh strophe of 
his song "Dirai vos senes duptansa"--of the source of 
his authority, in this case the Bible:
Qui per sen de femna reigna 
dreitz es que mals li'n aveigna, 
si cum la Letra’ns enseigna;
— Escoutatz!—  
malaventura'us en veigna 
si tuich no vos en gardatz!
Whoever is ruled by a woman,
it's right that evil should come to him,
just as the Bible teaches;
listen!
bad luck will find you 
if you're not on your guard!
(my trans.; cf.Wilhelm Seven 64)
He clearly enjoys and uses the book of Proverbs, and he 
often cites David and Solomon. His subject, James
128
Wilhelm writes, is often "the Christian exultation that 
antedated secular joy [. . .] the perennial newness,
the vita nova, of which Paul spoke." Accordingly, he 
tries to unmask "new impostors by restoring the 
original sacred values to their terminology" (65-66). 
Frederick Goldin observes that within this (newly 
restored) religious tone, Marcabru creates "for the 
first time the figure of the singer who takes a stand 
against 'false lovers', the fals amadors. whom he 
identifies as the other poets of the court" (Goldin 
Lyrics 52).
This troubadour "uses"— perhaps one could say 
"glosses"--other sources as well, as diverse as the 
classical Ovid or the contemporary Abelard. In his 
song, "Bel m*es quan la rana chanta," Marcabru attacks 
the false uses of eloquence by associating a frog 
("rana") with the joglar Alegret; Marcabru sees him as 
a flatterer, whose obsequiousness towards his patron is 
repugnant (Paterson 39-40). Although modulated by 
medieval writers like Peter Damian (cf. De decern 
Aegypti plaqis. PL CXLV.689) and Arnulf of Orleans (cf. 
F. Ghisalberti Arnolfo d 1 Orleans 217), as a symbol of 
boorish, noisy and finally "false loquacity" (39) 
Marcabru's image of a frog originally derives from the 
Metamorphoses (VI.339 ff.) where frogs are what boors 
become in their transformations (Paterson 39 n.). All
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the same, the matter of a classical Ovid has been set 
in a new context. We can consider Marcabru as strictly 
up to date in his likely borrowing of Abelard's sic et 
non dialectic to alert us to the danger in its possible 
misuse (see Kohler Trobadorlvrik und hofischer Roman 
[Berlin 1962] 173; in Paterson 9). In one song,
"L'iverns vai e*l temps s'aizina," Marcabru warns 
against Amars, which can set "a gracious trap" into 
which the "simpleton" can be lured in his attempt at 
divining truth:
Gent sembel fai que trahina 
Ves son agach lo brico,
Del cim tro' qu'en la racina,
Entrebescat hoc e no; [. . .].
(Dejeanne XXXI.37-40)
rAmars1 sets a gracious trap
When it lures the simpleton into its snare;
From the top to the root
It weaves together yes and no [. . .].
(trans. Paterson 9 n.4)
It is Augustine, however, with whom Marcabru remains 
on the most intimate terms. Marcabru begins his song, 
"Per savi’l tenc ses doptanssa," by contemplating the 
inherent ambiguity in all verbal expression and the 
misuse to which it can be put:
Per savi’l tenc ses doptanssa 
cel qui de mon chant devina 
so que chascus motz declina, 
si cum la razos despleia, 
qu'ieu mezeis sui en erranssa 
d'esclarzir paraul' escura.
I say he's a wise man, do doubt about it, 
who makes out, word for word,
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what my song signifies, 
and how the theme unfolds: 
for I myself take pains
to cast some light on the obscurity [. . . .]
(trans. Goldin 83)
Here the peril for the poet is the very language he
must use, a language that can easily be misconstrued.
Quite possibly, the poet's language will never
transcend an unavoidable obscurity taken in by the
listener/reader and especially by the "false lovers"
criticized in this poem's succeeding lines, those fools
(pointedly given the name--i.e., "n o m ." 1. 42--of
fool— "fols" [cf. 11. 42, 46, 49, 59]) who live in bad
faith. Thus the poem continues,
Trobador, ab sen d'enfanssa, 
movon als pros atahina, 
e tornon en disciplina 
so que veritatz autreia, 
e fant los motz, per esmanssa, 
entrebeschatz de fraichura.
E meton en un' eganssa
Falss' Amor encontra fina, [etc.]
(11. 7-14)
[. . .] those troubadours with childish minds
who worry honest men:
they scourge and improve
what Truth itself puts forth,
always taking pains to make their words
tangled up and meaningless.
And they put up that false love of theirs 
against true love, as though it were as good.
(trans. Goldin 83)
Yet here Marcabru's elaboration of a rhetorical 
tradition must be noted, a tradition that in fact 
precedes Augustine and one which the poet could easily 
have discovered in Cicero. As Paterson explains,
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When Marcabru introduces the problem of paraul1 
escura. he may well be thinking of the Rhetorical 
causa obscura: the kind of case 11 in quo aut tardi 
auditores sunt aut difficilioribus ad cognoscendum 
negotiis causa est implicata" ["in which either the 
audience is slow witted or the subject is bound up 
with matters which are fairly difficult to 
understand" (De Inventione I.xvi.20; cf. Brunetto 
Latini Li Livres dou tresor III.xvii.4)] . His own 
"case" could be described as obscure both because 
the subject is difficult—  it takes a wise man to 
perceive the exact truth in it--and because the 
foolish troubadours are tardi. The De Inventione 
says that in such a case the speaker must make the 
audience receptive in the introduction [De Inv. 
I .xvi.23] [. . . ].
Marcabru precisely follows Cicero's formula, step for 
step.
He tries to gain the good will of the audience 
by discreet flattery: "Per savi’l tenc . . and
a "modesty formula": "Qu'ieu mezeis sui en
erranssa . . . "  [cf. Curtius 84]; he then states 
the nature of the subject: "paraul1 escura," and 
after explaining the reason for his theme: that
foolish troubadours have been confusing the truth 
(stanza II), he states the subject as simply and 
clearly as possible: "E meton en u n ' enganssa /
Falss1 Amor encontra fina." False and true love 
are not to be equated. This is followed by an 
attempt to define the difference between the two as 
clearly and graphically as possible, and in doing 
so Marcabru closely follows the basic pattern of 
dispositio in Classical Rhetoric: introduction,
exposition, definition or division, defence of 
one's own case, refutation of the opponent's case, 
and conclusion [De Inventione I. xiv.19: exordium. 
narratio. part it i o . conf irmatio. reprehens i o . 
conclusio; a digression is possible before the 
conclusion (I.li.96). R h e t . ad H e r . I.iii.44 
exord i u m . narratio , divisio . conf irmatio . 
confutatio. conclusio]. (16-17)
Throughout his poems, Marcabru appears to be quite 
aware of the intellectual streams of thought of his 
time. All the same, his basic intellectual and
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spiritual positions are thoroughly grounded in the 
past, and it is Plato, rather than the Aristotle who 
has come to dominate contemporary thought, whom 
Marcabru finds most compelling. The notion of 
obscurity in "Per sav * 1," perhaps too easily
attributable to either Cicero or Aristotle, also 
resonates in Platonic doctrine. This doctrine, 
moreover, has been redefined by Paul and Augustine, who 
hold that the natural world reflects a divine truth, in 
that knowledge of the obscured meanings the physical 
world contains is understood to be essential to a full 
comprehension of Scripture. This concept is central to 
Augustine's pronouncement in De Doctrina Christiana 
that "Rerum autem ignorantia facit obscuras figuratas 
locutiones, cum ignoramus vel animantium, vel lapidum, 
vel herbarum naturas, aliarumve rerum, quae plerumque 
in Scripturis similitudinis alicuius gratia ponuntur" 
(11.24; PL XXXIV.47; cf. Paterson 3 0- 31). Nature, for 
Marcabru, can be understood in Scholastic terms, but ±n 
his songs we find an awareness of Augustine's teachings 
that in any event form the basis of later theology. 
For Marcabru, and for Augustine,
nature is a reflection of hidden truth and moral 
order, requiring wisdom and effort to penetrate its 
outward form and discover its true significance. 
This attitude governs his use of nature imagery: 
imagery which not only illustrates moral truths, 
but in some cases, through the use of symbols, 
reflects the need to probe behind the outward 
appearance of natural objects to appreciate their 
true significance. (Paterson 31)
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II
Obscure language, in the case of Marcabru, was an enemy 
to be reckoned with, for the poet's first 
responsibility was the words that most of all were his 
representation within his society. Thus the troubadour 
canso often took as its subject the travail of the 
poet's attempt to create clarity and truth that the 
poet saw as an ideal canso— the ideal form. It might 
be hoped that this form, a form of language after all, 
could convey the truth--that is, that it could not 
merely aspire to but could become the ideal. Yet if 
the canso represented the ideal to be achieved, it was 
in fact also seen to be the inevitable failure implicit 
in any striving towards that end. It was, however, in 
the failure that the ideal could be signified, could be 
gestured towards. The shaped beauty of the song could 
serve as the imperfect resonance of an ideal, singular 
temporality that had been felt to have been absent in 
language.
The ideal canso of the troubadours engulfs the 
potential individual; thus it precludes the possibility 
of the singular voice. Those who partake of this sort 
of literary experience, Godzich writes, "are there as 
the necessary correlatives of the memoria from which 
they derive their sense of identity and purpose" (xv-
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xvi) . The import of the canso1s discourse, then, is 
the need to plumb the obscure world in order to reach 
deeper, inner truths, while the very music of this 
discourse that is the poetry, itself attempts a 
linguistic perfection; it makes a claim for itself as 
being the ultimate possible mortal expression of the 
truth. Even in its time bound, flawed language, which 
must ultimately fail to create the ideal form of the 
canso, the truth is evoked by the very failure of 
achieving it--that is, of naming it.
The emblem of this dynamic and indeed the epitome of 
this poetry's discourse is the poet's act of 
autocitation. The troubadour names himself in his poem 
and comments on the very writing of that poem, and 
ponders its future survival. This is the burden of 
poems such as M a r c a b r u 's "Pus mos coratges s ' es 
clartits," "Per savi'l tenc ses doptanssa," "Contra 
1'ivern que s'enansa," and "Aujatz de chan com enans e 
meillura."
Guillem IX, Marcabru and other troubadours have not 
constructed the fully evolved autobiographical voice to 
be found in Dante, Chaucer or Langland; yet these 
earlier poets confront the issue of auctoritas. And 
they do this with great subtlety. What should we 
think of Peire Vidal's slightly self-derisive 
contemplation of his own poetic efficacy, durability,
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and most of all singularity?:
Ajostar e lassar 
sai tan gent motz e so, 
que del car ric trobar 
no'm ven hom al talo [etc.]
(11. 1-4)
I can put together and inter­
lace words and music with such skill, 
in the noble art of song 
no man comes near my heel [ . . . . ]
(trans. Goldin 255)
For the troubadours, autocitation always served a 
specific end: theirs was an ongoing meditation in their 
poems on the act of making poetry. Perhaps it is not 
too farfetched to assert that the name they were 
after--that is, the ideal— was eloquence itself, that 
which cannot be named but which can be, as it were, 
softly spoken through a poetics. Working within the 
poetic tradition, Vidal nevertheless asserts that his 
individual achievement will set him apart from the 
literary, inherited past, the literary river that 
nourishes him. Indeed, Vidal speaks of poetry as the 
form for the voice of the poet, a form that must by 
definition subsume that voice--could the ideal of 
itself be attained. The force of his statement is 
contained within a conundrum whose power resides in the 
statement's commentary on itself. Vidal is saying, I 
can compose the ultimate song--that is, I can create 
the absolute song that must sing only of itself in its 
formal meditation— yet I can claim for myself the fame
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for having made this song that in a sense will always 
"forget" me, for as its maker I have become its mere 
instrument, through which it has been brought into 
being. In making this song, however, Vidal has invoked 
a literary-historical time frame. He is looking 
backwards within a continuum and setting himself apart 
from it by suggesting that he is at the least its equal 
(e.g., the claim, "no'm ven hom al talo"). If Vidal is 
not engaged here in a fully blown contemplation of 
himself, an extended introspection of himself as poet, 
he is just the same creating by a kind of self-citation 
the very emblem of such an inward journey that must 
ultimately yield the full, unique voice of self- 
knowledge and self-acknowledgement.
Vidal and all troubadours name themselves and their 
competitors, as if to invoke totemic power, but such 
naming resides within the context of the craft not only 
of poetry but of the larger sensibility of the cortezia 
they serve and in which they ostensibly seek to be 
subsumed. This view of poetry as an adjunct of a more 
fundamental world view is firmly established in the 
twelfth century and it persists at least as late as 
Chaucer. Quite possibly the most emblematic of 
Chaucer's figures, for instance, which suggests the 
analogy between courtly loving and poetic inquiry— the 
makvr1s epistemology--is the opening gambit of the 
Parliament of Fowls:
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The lyf so short, the craft so long to lerne, 
Th'assay so hard, so sharp the conquerynge,
The dredful joye, alwey that slit so yerne:
A1 this mene 1 by Love [ . . . ] .
[1-4 (my emphasis)]
Formalism, as the guiding light of fin' amors, here 
becomes the principle in forging the mimetic artifact; 
these first lines may hint as well at the likelihood 
that all knowledge--all modes of apprehension of a 
world--must not only proceed by way of an artificial, 
"formed" method, but that knowledge is actually the 
forms themselves— "knowing" as one with form. It 
should follow that philosophical ideality (i.e., a 
notion of a perfect, pristine dimension) as well as the 
creative, or intuitive impulse must be amorphous in the 
sense that such a dimension is inferred by all finite, 
corporeal, perhaps lapsarian or "fallen" forms that are 
distinct from this ideal state. These forms are the 
manifestations or at least the Platonic shadows of it, 
the "ideal form." Logically, however, the notion of an 
ideal form is untenable, especially when form is 
understood in sensible, material contexts such as 
literal, physical shapes. Yet more abstract and
1. The lines are a conscious echo of Horace's "ars 
longa, vita brevis" (see Chapter Four, n. 1, p. 271). 
We should also note the ending of the Parlement of 
Foules. where Nature herself could not bring the birds' 
debate to an orderly end; the birds, however, must 
borrow an artificial order from French poets.
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imaginative forms are easily recognizable— courtly 
mannered behavior, for instance, or literary genres. 
Such organizing principles as these are also 
limited, in any event; and mortal humans only know 
these finite forms although they may intuit— they make 
the attempt to conceive of, to know— the ideal, the 
infinite.
The question of God's active presence in the 
palpable universe (i.e., ideality perceived as existing 
in or through the sensible objects of the world) does 
not involve Chaucer directly, yet there is an 
underlying philosophical dialogue taking place, 
particularly in his dream poems. Nominalist thinking 
of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, 
remained intimately bound up in what was and perhaps 
still is skepticism in regard to a subtle relationship 
that might exist between imaginative and experiential 
cognitive realms. Nominalist doctrine emphasizes the 
particulars of the world landscape but refuses to 
accept the possibility of a universal ordering of these 
"things" of the world: the ideal may only be
apprehended indirectly— if at all— through knowledge of 
the individual or perhaps through knowing the instant 
in time.
The dream visio. on the other hand, is for Chaucer 
the esthetic alternative to this dilemma, much as the
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poetry of the ideal canso serves to answer the 
underlying Christian dichotomy that is the context of 
troubadour poetry. What is crucial in this dynamic is 
the very fact that the troubadours serve cortezia. that 
they are therefore determined by the poetry as the 
instruments, the mere scribes or ioqlars they despise 
and with whose identification they fear. Yet finally 
there is a subtle assertion of individuality, of 
individual will, among these auctors . They must 
excoriate the ioqlars. They fear being seen as mere 
performers who are in a sense liars, rather than as 
authors. And most of all they fear being silenced.
The minnesanqer Heinrich von Morungen 
counterbalances the making of verse through which, as 
he claims, he will attain true worth, with the 
recollection that when he "[stands] mute in sorrow" he 
is worth nothing (to his lady): "do ich in leide
stuont, do huop ich si gar unho" ("Leitliiche 
blicke und grozliche riuwe" 1. 12; trans. Goldin
German 44, 45). Through composition and service,
though, the poet may realize himself. In fact, this 
construct can become the vehicle for the ultimate 
self-enunciation, as in Walther von der Vogelweide's 
elegy for Reinmar von Reuenthal, which quotes a line 
from the dead poet ("'so wol dir, wip, wie reine ein 
nam! , 111 —  "Joy to you, Woman, how pure a name"). Here 
Walther pays homage to his predecessor, but he does so
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in order to valorize the art of poetry itself. 
Significantly, Walther is asserting his individuality 
in terms of a text, an inherited text. Reinmar's text 
becomes the example of how each of these poets serves 
courtly song. It is the text that reminds us of the 
worth of the poet that resides in his service to a 
beloved and which can in turn be expressed in the terms 
of devotion to the poetic vocation that is always in 
pursuit of an ideal or true art.
This is the hierarchy of the superlative, and in 
looking upwards toward the ideal, the individual feels 
himself as less and less distinct, yet there is no 
choice but to ascend. Nevertheless, there are ways out 
of this dilemma. Walther's ultimate self-assertion and 
his song turn on the very recognition that the art of 
song comprehends both himself and Reinmar:
Deswar, Reimar, du riuwes mich 
michels harter danne ich dich, 
ob du lebtes und ich waer erstorben. 
ich wilz bi minen triuwen sagen, 
dich selben wolt ich liitzel klagen: 
ich klage din edelen kunst, daz sist verdorben. 
["Owe, daz wisheit unde jugent" 11. 14-19]
The truth is, Reinmar, I mourn for you 
much more than you would mourn for me 
if you were living and I had died.
I want to say this on my honor:
you yourself I would not shed a tear for.
I mourn the passing of your noble art.
(trans. Goldin 130, 131)
Walther defines himself within the terms of courtly
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forms. We know him to be the one who, at least as an 
appreciative witness, can name the art of courtliness 
as that which sustains him. And in the last lines of 
his poem he does not fail to align himself with his 
Other, thus to suggest perhaps his own poetic power. 
Addressing Reinmar, he foretells, poignantly, a future 
reunion:
so leiste ich dir gesellschaft: 
min singen ist niht lane.
din sele mueze wol gevarn, 
und habe din zunge danc.
[11. 25-26]
Well, I shall be with you again, 
my singing is over.
May your soul fare well,
and your tongue have thanks.
(trans. Goldin 130, 131)
Through the naming of the Other, then, even in 
derision, as can be seen in the poetry of Vidal, 
Walther and others, the poet can achieve self­
elevation. The name embodies great ethical power. La 
Comtessa de Dia, for instance, comforts herself in her 
attempts to win back a lover by noting that her name in 
itself is an asset in luring him to her: "Valer mi deu 
mos pretz e mos paratges" (etc.; 1. "A chantar m'er de 
so gu'eu no volria" 1. 29). Here the rewards of naming 
are obvious. The troubadour's strategy need hardly be 
deciphered— and in her example we perhaps observe the 
most compelling evidence of naming as a poetics. There 
is value in her "pretz" or "worth," an ambiguous term
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as used here, which perhaps suggests both a kind of 
intrinsic human and a monetary worth, and surely a 
worth in relation to her familial descent ("paratges"). 
Within this tautological ("Valer [. . .] pretz") and
virtually untranslatable line, however, the poet has 
inscribed the notion of fama. in ethical terms the good 
name of the worthy lover who in this case is doubly 
worthy in that she has been ennobled a second time 
through her longing for the distant beloved. This 
longing makes possible the bettering of the individual 
who subscribes to the courtly love experience. The 
longing, too, informs a poetry that aspires to its 
ideal.
Naming finds many ways of manifesting the poet's 
sense of an individuated self-worth. Peire D'Alvernhe 
not only names himself in one of his verses but he 
systematically dispenses with twelve of his fellow 
poets over the course of the same number of stanzas (in 
"Cantarai d'aguestz trobadors"). Yet, again, the form 
is what is important.
Given the expectations of Marcabru's audience, 
however, and the fact that he will employ a poetics of 
naming, we also find in his verse, remarkably, a 
poetics of absence. We examined this ploy as it is 
used in Dante's Commedia (see the "Introduction," 
above). Earlier poets, arguably, have shown Dante the
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way in this. We have also observed Heinrich's 
conspicuous absence. Other troubadours have made use 
of absence too. One of Bernart de Ventadorn's songs 
names no one particularly, yet the poet manages to 
align himself with the song that comprehends all poets:
Non es meravelha s 'eu chan 
melhs de nul autre chantador, 
que plus me tra•1 cors vas amor 
e melhs sui faihz a so coman.
Cor e cors e saber e sen 
e fors' e poder i ai mes.
Si’m tira vas amor lo fres 
que vas autra part no’m aten.
[11. 1-8]
Of course it's no wonder I sing 
better than any other troubadour: 
my heart draws me more toward love, 
and I am better made for his command.
Heart body knowledge sense
strength and energy— I have set all on love. 
The rein draws me straight toward love, 
and I cannot turn toward anything else.
Bernart concludes his song by turning it back on 
itself; he will send it to the beloved at whose 
instigation he has had the opportunity to serve love 
truly, to serve cortezia. and thus to become a better 
poet and a better man:
A Mo Cortes, [. . .]
tramet lo vers, e ja no’lh pes
car n'ai estat tan lonjamen.
[11. 57-59]
To Mon Cortes, [. . .]
I send this song, and let her not be vexed 
that I have been so far away.
(trans. Goldin Lyrics 126, 127)
The burden of B e r n a r t 's discourse in "Non es
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meravelha s 1eu chan" depends upon an equation that was 
established by poets of his previous generation, which 
describes a cause and effect relationship between 
success at making truly great poetry—  synonymous with 
speaking the truth— and having the capacity to truly 
love. Bernart's a priori assumption is that he sings 
best of all, because he exists for the purpose of 
serving love; through such service he must thrive. The 
terms of this love reflect a dichotomy that was 
thoroughly explored by Marcabru.
Ill
In "Per savi'l tenc ses doptanssa" the poet is not 
specifically named, but he manages to assert himself 
through a first person voice that constantly insists 
upon itself as being someone who is not foolish, not 
brutish, not without speech, and so on; all that he is 
not perfectly describes other poets, other detractors, 
liars, and for that matter all others who live in a 
kind of bad faith. The voice does not invoke its owner 
through naming but, albeit less elaborately than the 
future Dante's triptych "io sol uno" (cf. the 
"Introduction," above), and in keeping with what can be 
called a poetics of the superlative, Marcabru employs a 
figure to refer to himself twice over— "qu'ieu mezeis 
sui (1. 5). Thus, subtly and powerfully, the poet
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emphasizes himself, thereby distinguishing himself from 
all others. In doing so, moreover, he juxtaposes 
himself with the notion of light that can plumb, or 
clarify the obscurity of ordinary speech:
qu'ieu mezeis sui en erranssa 
d'esclarzir paraul escura.
(11. 5-6)
Ordinary speech is either spoken or sung by the 
troubadours of the next lines ("Trobador, ab sen 
d ' enf anssa, 11 etc.) who are essentially without true 
speech and who therefore "worry honest men" ("movon als 
pros atahina" 1. 8). Indeed, Marcabru1s point is
typical of the thought of his time, in part dramatized 
by a resurgence of interest in categories, as seen in 
Porphyry's tree that delineates by genus and species 
the various possible forms of worldly existence (cf. 
Vance From Topic 85-87). Later in this song Marcabru 
finds he cannot even bring himself to refer to such 
troubadours as human; rather, they are the "dogs" of 
his world who have been "kept in the dark":
La defenida balanssa
d'aquest vers e revolina
sobr' un' avol gen canina
cui malvatz astres ombreia, [. . . .]
[11. 55-58]
The end of this vers 
takes its stand and turns 
on a vile people, dogs
whom an evil star keeps in the dark [. . .].
(trans. Goldin 84-85, 86-87)
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We have traced Marcabru■s construct of obscure 
speech— versus the clarity the persona can bring to 
bear on such speech— to Augustine, and particularly the 
Augustine of De Doctrina Christiana. As well, we have 
noted how Marcabru establishes a dialectic; on the one 
side lies obscurity, the consequence of false love or 
amars (e.g., "qu'ieu die: que Amar s'aizina / ab si 
mezesme guerreia" [11. 15-16]--"And I say: whoever 
settles down with Lust / wars against himself"; trans. 
Goldin 82, 83), and on the other side lies amors.
through whose power one can enjoy both insight and 
eloquence. These poles roughly resemble the 
Augustinian concept of cupiditas and caritas. In light 
of Augustine, it is possible to say that the basic 
impulse in Marcabru's verses is to restore an older 
ontological order that had been disturbed by immediate 
predecessors like the troubadour Guillem IX (cf. above, 
and Wilhelm Seven 65 ff.) who helped to fashion a 
revolutionary concept of courtly love that admitted of 
eroticism; yet this love, roughly speaking Marcabru's 
amars. was understood to be an ennobling force.
What has not been fully examined is the debt 
Marcabru's ideas owe to a textual tradition that can be 
credited first and foremost to Augustine in De Doctrina 
Christiana and particularly to the Augustine of the 
Confessions. For it is here that Marcabru most closely 
aligns himself with the Church father. Marcabru's
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poetry elaborates an Augustinian view of textuality and 
creativity, the relationship between them, which 
defines itself in direct relation to the question of 
love. Furthermore, it is precisely the poem in which 
the poet does not overtly name himself, when the 
expectation of the time was that this is what poems 
would convey, which names the poet most profoundly.
In this fashion Marcabru most becomes his text. 
Within a dialectical matrix of amors and amars, "Per 
savi'l" discusses Marcabru1 s struggle to create true 
eloquence by using the imagery of light and the 
question of love, and by aligning these values with the 
success at making verse. Within this matrix we can say 
that the poet has truly become his text--for that is 
his implicit claim, as demonstrated in what amounts to 
his signature, the diptych ieu mezeis seu.
Marcabru’s superlative assertion in "Per savi*l" 
that the poet sings best of all is set in opposition to 
the fools who cannot understand his song and who 
emptily mimic the true poet in the noise they produce 
("Fols, pos tot cant au romanssa, / non sec razo, mas 
bozina" [11. 49-50]--"The fool, since everything he
hears he sings to others, / does not follow reason, he 
just makes noise" [trans. Goldin]) . They are 
incapable of reason ("razo"), both in the sense of 
being rational, truly human and perhaps capable of
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possessing wisdom, and as well in the sense of reason
as it is used to denote the formal properties of
eloquence, for the fools are also bad poets and poor
exegetes (cf. 11. 4 and 50). This conjoining of
eloquence and wisdom, as a kind of working definition 
of true poetry, is in turn used as a measure of the 
poet's moral worth. For Marcabru, intentionality 
prescribes the truth, insofar as a speaker's individual 
will is expressed in the sense of his words— a 
thoroughly Augustinian idea. Marcabru is reacting to a 
poetical climate that is most clearly enunciated in the 
work of his predecessor, Guillem IX, who attempted a 
revision of Augustinian thinking about language and 
truth in his poetry. Remarkably, Guillem's discourse 
reflects the philosophical inquiry into language, 
intentionality and objectivity, of Anselm in the tenth 
century.
In De Doctrina Christiana Augustine held that lying 
was constituted of three criteria: "objective untruth,
the intention to deceive, and a misguided sense of what 
is to be loved and hoped for" (1.36.40, and cf. 
Confessions 5.35, 10.41.66- 10.42.67; paraphrased in 
Colish "Stoic" 30). Significantly, for Augustine lying 
involves an immoral intention that brings together 
both the hearer of the untruth and the speaker himself; 
moreover, it involves a "wrong intellectual attitude
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toward the truth" (De Doctrina 3 ff.; paraphrased in 
Colish 30) . In sum we may say that for Augustine— and 
for Marcabru— in lying there is a disassociation of 
words from the state of being marked by the presence of 
caritas. which reflects, on the part of a speaker, a 
hearer or, specifically, an interpreter, a defective 
love of the self and of others too (31). All the same, 
by the time of Anselm the machinery of rationality had 
already been brought to bear on religious or more to 
the point quasi philosophical tenets, which initiated a 
rethinking of the issues surrounding language and truth 
most comprehensively defined in the fourth century. 
Anselm sought to more finely distinguish among the 
parts of language, which led him to separate the Latin 
substantive grammaticus into two aspects, one 
adjectival and the other truly nominal. Of major 
importance is that this distinction also necessitated a 
rethinking of accepted notions concerning the role of 
the individual will in human affairs, especially as 
this related to the issue of language and its power to 
accurately describe experiential truth.
As Colish observes, rather than blindly embracing 
Augustine, Anselm "[resuscitates] the Stoic doctrine of 
lekta and the logical statements which they constitute" 
in order to contrast the kinds of statements that 
possess "a natural truth" and those that merely possess 
"an accidental truth" (39). But rather than
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Augustine's perception of natural truth, in De veritate 
Anselm does not directly concern himself with the 
denotative ability of language to signify an objective 
truth, nor with non-linguistic natural signs, signs 
that for Augustine involuntarily denoted things in 
experience (such as smoke that will signify the fire 
producing it) (De veritate 2, 13 Opera omnia, vol. 1). 
Aristotle's distinction between substance and accident, 
furthermore, particularly obtains to semantic 
developments under way with Anselm. For Anselm holds 
that
[. . .] all statements, in virtue of their semantic
coherence, possess an intrinsic truth (veritas). 
This truth inheres in them as a function of their 
logical and grammatical cogency, whether or not 
they correspond with anything in the real order [of 
things]. However, such propositions, while they 
always possess truth, do not always possess 
rectitude (rectitudo].
For there to be rectitude, a statement must indicate 
both a world beyond itself and a "reality" within 
itself. In other words, it must be
objectively accurate as well as internally cogent. 
A statement that has mere semantic truth is true 
naturally (naturaliter) while a true statement that 
also has rectitude is true accidentally and 
according to use (accidentaliter et secundum usum).
(Colish 40)
Any statement can signify, yet to what ends would 
such a statement serve? Anselm believes that all 
significatory utterances possessed natural truth; that
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is, in terms of semantics, such expressions are said to 
be true. This is a revolutionary recognition, one 
wh ich compels Anselm to demote the status of 
intentionality in Augustine's conception of falsehoods. 
The later theologian
omits the intention to deceive as the sine qua non 
or even as one of the necessary components of a 
lie. [Rather, in] De veritate. where he considers 
lies under the heading of the veritas 
enuntiationis. he confines lying purely to the 
level of incorrect objective reference. [Thus] his 
real goal [. . .] is to exalt both intellectual and
moral rectitude as the criteria of truth in all 
respects. (40; my emphasis).
What must be underlined here is that in Anselm's 
scheme, except for the essences of things, nothing 
automatically possesses rectitude, and so in human 
affairs rectitude becomes "a function of the free 
exercise of human will and judgment," which Anselm 
prizes more than actions of a reflexive nature (40). 
He has virtually resurrected "the Stoic conception of 
logical statements as possessing their own internal 
rules" (41).
We of course see this issue played out to its 
greatest effect in the 14th century poem Piers Plowman. 
whose persona, Will, is to be viewed in the midst of 
yet a later struggle to reconcile or otherwise 
reestablish a balance between Augustine and— instead of 
Anselm, or for that matter the later Abelard or
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Aquinas— Ockham and later speculative grammarians and 
realists. Anselm agrees with Augustine and the Stoics, 
that "lekta cannot legislate for the world outside the 
mind" (41), whereas the realists— in contention with 
Ockham and others like Robert Holcot— assert the 
primacy of language as the determinor of what could be 
held to be actual.
In the 12th century, an earlier version of this 
struggle is depicted in what might be called nothing 
less than Marcabru1s counterrevolutionary ideology, 
which he promulgates in reaction to the new courtly 
love that had been elaborated at least by the time of 
Guillem. There is of course no textual evidence to 
support the claim that courtly love had fully evolved 
well before Guillem--and thus, perhaps, as early as 
Anselm— but as the poet and troubadour translator 
Paul Blackburn has proposed, we can see in the work of 
Guillem, who died in 1127, that he
is already bored with [his own] poses of being 
fated, of being sorcered, of being so dizzy from 
love that the troubadour cannot tell if he's coming 
or going or asleep or awake, of being sick and near 
death from [his] lady's refusals [of his romantic 
approaches]— even the theme of "the love afar" is 
there, which we do not otherwise find until Jaufre 
Rudel sings [of] the countess of Tripoli in the 
middle of the 12 C. (Proensa 275)
Employing terminology and concepts similar to Guillem, 
Marcabru's "Per savi * 1" attacks what he considers to 
be a false language he finds generally in use all
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around him— in the courts, on a crusade (Makin Provence 
122), among other troubadours, and so forth.
In Guillem's songs, on the other hand, fundamental 
assumptions about perception (in other words, 
Augustinian assumptions), Biblical imagery and the 
Christian hierarchy of values are all invoked for the 
purpose of delineating and thereby elevating a system 
of secular, erotic love. In "Mout jauzens me prenc en 
amar" we find "a brilliant expression of mysticism 
applied to material objects" (Wilhelm 54). Guillem 
praises his lady, and in doing so, by a constant 
repetition of the word joy, he deftly makes of this 
emotion her very emblem:
Mout jauzens me prenc en amar 
un joy don plus mi vuelh aizir, 
e pus en joy vuelh revertir
ben dey, si puesc, al mielhs anar,
quar mielhs orna'm, estiers cujar, 
qu'om puesca vezer ni auzir.
[11. 1-6]
I begin, rejoicing already, to love 
a joy that I want most to settle down in; 
and since I want to come back to joy,
I must go, if I can, the best way:
for I am made better by one who is, beyond dispute,
the best a man ever saw or heard. (trans. Wilhelm)
In this and in the ensuing stanzas ioy. which denotes 
for the poet a state of sheer rapture, echoes the 
liturgical gaudium that was
the favorite word of hymnologists to describe the 
emotional impact of religious belief or awakening.
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It occurs again and again in Easter hymns and in 
poems written in praise of the Virgin Mary. As a 
result, when William writes in praise of his own 
lady, he seizes upon the sacred word and travesties 
it with the same kind of exultant repetition that 
one finds more often in the Latin Carmina Burana.
(Wilhelm 53)
Guillem "echoes the Scriptures" (Philippians 2.10), 
Peter Makin observes, when claiming that
Every joy must bow down before her
and every pride obey
Midons
and in the formula,
no-one can find a finer lady,
nor eyes see, nor a mouth speak of [etc.].
Moreover, the "incantatory fifth stanza of this song 
enumerates powers that were invoked every day in the 
Virgin and the saints [cf. the Te Deum and the Psalm 
Confitemini Domini from the Vulgate]" (102, and 324 
nn.). Here we see only three of many possible examples 
of the ways in which Guillem remakes a received 
sensibility into a shape that can express new courtly 
values. And this amor courtois
was not "religious" in the sense of being part of 
any Christian ethic; it was a religion in its 
psychology. The courtly lover did not think of his 
lady as the Church thought of her, but as the 
Church thought of God. (102)
Yet at heart Guillem's strategy presupposes a view of 
language that echoes Anselm's emendation of Augustine,
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who constructed the parameters of language and truth 
that affected the European world view well into the 
Renaissance. Guillem could not have made such novel 
and what in some circles would have been thought of as 
sacrilegious uses of language had the freedom to 
believe in a language that could be, in and of itself, 
either capable of truth or falsehood not been created 
by Anselm's testing of contemporary language theories 
with the force of logically determined, nascently 
forensic procedures. This is a subtext of Guillem's 
song, "Companho, faray un vers . . . convinen." Here
he weighs the question of what expressions and/or 
thoughts can be considered to be truly fitting, 
appropriate, to use Anselm's term, perhaps, what 
expressions can truly possess rectitude. The specific 
question Guillem asks, which will have the greatest 
impact on what status courtly love can enjoy within its 
larger society, is whether or not foolish talk can be 
of any worth at all. For if in a vers such foolishness 
can be found to be worthy, even beautiful, then perhaps 
courtly love, amars rather than amors, can be seen as 
being a noble way of living and, implicitly, therefore, 
as being capable of redemption:
Companho, faray un vers . . . covinen:
et aura*i mais de foudaz no’y a de sen,
et er totz mesclatz d'amor e de joy e de joven.
[11. 1-3]
My companions, I am going to make a vers 
that is refined,
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and it will have more foolishness than sense, 
and it will be all mixed 
with love and joy and youth.
How can such foolishness, lack of sense, be refined, 
fitting, but that it is mixed up with love and joy? 
Guillem tells us that only those who are noble will 
understand and have an answer to this question:
E tenguatz lo per vilan qui no 1 1enten 
o dins son cor voluntiers qui no l'apren; 
greu partir si fai d'amor 
qui la trob'a son talen. [11* 4-6]
Whoever does not understand it, 
take him for a peasant, 
whoever does not learn it deep in his heart.
It is hard for a man to part from love 
that he finds to his desire.
(trans. Goldin 20, 21)
Here he proves his point, and furthers argument in 
favor of erotic if not courtly love (indeed, the 
remainder of this song is thoroughly salacious— as is a 
considerable amount of his oeuvre) by invoking the 
Pauline and later Augustinian argument for exegesis 
that prescribes the proper C"convinen") reading of a 
text, so that the truth will out, despite what the 
words may signify on the surface. Guillem's attitude 
about language and communication emphasizes, though, 
the ambiguity of expression, and furthermore the 
possibility of a new kind of expression, one that 
demonstrates the divorce of word and intention. His 
expression is the very sign of the hairline fracture 
Anselm created in what had been an overall cosmology
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whose cogency depended upon a seamless communion 
between language and truth, even if it was a language 
that had been made obscure.
IV
Reading Marcabru, and looking back at Guillem's 
"fractured" language— "totz mesclatz"— what the bawdy 
story teller is arguing for becomes more significant, 
inasmuch as Marcabru will later clearly favor a kind of 
expression in which language embodies the individual 
will, or, that is to say, in which language and 
intention are reunited in the Augustinian spirit. In 
"Per savi'l," for example, Guillem might easily be 
included in that group of troubadours who are 
e s s e n tially without speech ("Trobador, ab sen 
d 'enfanssa"— i.e., as in the Latin infans; 1. 7, my
emphasis), who thus, in making meaningless noise, 
"worry honest men" ("movon als pros atahina" 1. 8), and 
who twist beyond recognition the teaching of the 
auctores ("e tornon en disciplina / so que veritatz 
autreia" 11. 9-10; note the binary nature of "autreia," 
which suggests auctoritas as well as slander or 
detraction). In other words, these false speakers take 
the very words of the inherited past and make them 
tangled up and fractured ("e fant los m o t z , per 
esmanssa, / entrebeschatz de fraichura" 11. 11-12); and
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in doing so they equate their false love with the true 
("E meton en un' eganssa / Falss' Amor encontra fina" 
11. 13-14).
Again, the basis upon which either Guillem or 
Marcabru validates his claim about love and language is 
the poetry itself, which significantly must, in turn, 
represent them; their mode of self-enunciation is their 
poetics. In "Per savi’l" self- enunciation takes the 
form of the poet's actual statement of poetics that 
comprises the burden of the poem's opening lines. 
Marcabru's prescription for poetry is to have the 
theme of the poem unfold as each word is taken in and 
comprehended ("devina" 1. 2) by the listener or reader. 
What is suggested is that to understand his poem, which 
means to appreciate his view of how poetry ought to 
proceed, is to understand Marcabru, the author of the 
poem. In this metapoetical statement, it is the poet 
himself who will demonstrate the art of true poetry by 
making the effort to achieve in words a clarity of 
vision ("qu'ieu mezeis sui en erranssa / d'esclarzir 
paraul ' escura" 11. 5-6) . The "I" in these
troubadours' poems ultimately understands itself as a 
text, just as these poets define themselves in light of 
their vers that serves as the vehicle by which they may 
judge others of their society, and by which they may 
ultimately set themselves apart from those others who 
are false in love, lacking in wisdom, and as implied,
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who use language unwisely and i m m o r a l l y . In 
"Companho, faray un vers . . . convinen" Guillem
writes, "[. . .] tenguatz lo per vilan qui no l'enten" 
("whoever does not understand [the song], take him for 
a peasant" 1. 4; trans. Goldin 21), and in "Per savi*l" 
Marcabru retorts, "La defenida balanssa / d'aguest vers 
e revolina / sobr1 un' avol gen canina [. . .] c 1ab
folia cuida bobanssa" ("The end of this vers / takes 
its stand and turns / on a vile people, dogs / [• . .]
all pompous with their dumb ideas" 11. 55-57, 59;
trans. Goldin 85, 87).
This association of the poet with the text takes 
place within the broader context of a meditation on 
naming that mirrors previous and current thinking about 
the role of names in thought and more largely in 
theological affairs. What either of these poems can 
show us is that their authors treat them— and therefore 
we can guess how they approached all poetry--as the 
forums in which their assertions can be vindicated and 
perhaps redeemed. If the poem is true to itself, then, 
the ideas it presents will also ring true. This 
textual connection in part accounts for the almost 
constant ploy, in much of troubadour verse, of self- 
ref erential ity at the ends of poems, which both 
poetically and rhetorically provide closure, a 
roundness to the poetic discourse, but which also
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emphasize the fact that the discourse is rooted in a 
certain philosophy and poetics of the self, as we have 
seen in Marcabru's inward turn that concludes "Per 
savi‘1" (see above), particularly in the use of the 
word "revolina." Guillem's "Pus vezem de novel florir" 
ends first with a call to all noble persons to read the 
poem correctly, followed by a brief review of precisely 
how the discourse was carried out, and then the comment 
that indeed Guillem is pleased with what he has made, 
for it is worthy:
Del vers vos dig que mais en vau 
qui ben 1'enten e n'a plus lau,
que “I mot son fag tug per egau,
comunalmens,
e*l sonetz qu'ieu mezeis me*n lau 
bos e valens.
["Pus vezem de novel florir" 11. 37-42]
Concerning this vers
I tell you a man is all the more noble
as he understands it, and he gets more praise;
and all the strophes are built exactly 
on the same meter,
and the melody, which I myself am happy about, 
is fine and good.
(trans. Goldin 39)
Furthermore, Guillem proposes that his very song 
represent him to others, when he is unable to do so:
Mon Esteve, mas ieu no'i vau, 
sia’l prezens
mos vers e vuelh que d'aquest lau 
sia guirens. [11. 43-46]
Let my vers, since I myself do not, 
appear before her,
Mon Esteve, and let it be the witness 
for my praise. (trans. Goldin 41)
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While Marcabru's intentions are to wage war on the 
values of Guillem, in order to restore society and 
poetry to a proper balance, both poets reflect a 
contemporary, gradually changing attitude towards 
language. Language was coming to be understood as 
capable of being either a mental construct in and of 
itself, or a medium, perhaps the cement that holds 
society together as a vibrant whole. As already noted, 
we can locate the most dramatic shift in the way 
language was viewed in the writings of Anselm, who 
elaborates a conception of what language is through the 
critical recognition that language can, in a sense, 
enjoy its own internal coherence or rather logic,* and 
this language can also signify a world beyond the 
language per se. a world that becomes the arbiter of 
the language's rectitude.
For Augustine, the palpable world had to be "read" 
or interpreted in order to arrive at the truth of it, 
because it was at best an imperfect reflection of the 
real. For Anselm, this imperfect reflection becomes 
the standard for measuring the worldly power of any 
given statement. Augustine's view of words and 
statements was that, even as they were a part of a 
world, a world as an imperfect reflection of the 
divine truth, they were nevertheless derived from the 
'world they sought to represent; they were in keeping
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with that world, intrinsically of a piece with it. 
Augustine's, and Anselm's ideas are much like the 
earlier Stoics who viewed words as being 
"[automatically correlated] with the material and 
corporeal realities for which they [stood]" (Colish 
"Stoic" 19).
With Anselm, however, the hierarchy of natural 
speech is transformed. Augustine's speech was natural 
in its "automatic correlation" to the phenomenal world, 
yet his doctrine never fully recognized an integrity to 
language in and of itself, an integrity separate from 
the world the language aspired to signify. As we have 
seen, Anselm calls natural that speech which need not 
signify any reality other than itself; all the same, he 
ascribes to language a propriety (i.e., rectitudo) that 
takes the capacity for actual, objective reference as 
its criterion for validation, where such propriety is 
the function of human will and judgment.
Marcabru is surely, if unintentionally, echoing the 
Stoic distinction between the articulate human voice 
and the meaningless, inarticulate sounds made by 
animals, when in his songs he sets himself apart from 
the others (i.e., the troubadours and joglars) who are 
without mature speech, perhaps without any speech 
whatsoever ("Trobador, ab sen d'enfanssa"; in "Per 
sav*l") . At best, they make sounds that would
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approximate true discourse but are finally meaningless, 
like the sounds of animals, for these others are the 
"gen canina" (57). Marcabru's point, of course, is in 
keeping with Anselm's tenet of rectitudo. for a "freely 
willed decision," Anselm notes, "is superior to a 
merely automatic reflex" (De veritate 4-5; paraphrased 
in Colish 40) ; likewise, true eloquence for Marcabru 
can only result when an individual is engaged in a 
fully reflective process. It is then that individuals 
can be said to have songs of their own, songs possessed 
of razos or rationality, harmony, poetic integrity, and 
to all other uses this razos was put. We find razos 
especially contrasted in Marcabru's depiction of a 
bluejay as "an image of pride and discord" (in "Quan 
1'aura doussana bufa"), which draws on a tradition that 
saw the jay as a gossip and "imitator of other bird's 
songs." Moreover, those cries were ugly (Paterson 36- 
37) : '
Quan l'aura doussana bufa,
E *.1 gais, desotz lo brondel,
Fai d'orguoil li ramel,
Ladoncs deuri1 hom chausir 
Verai' amor ses mentir 
C'ab son amic non barailla.
[11. 1-6]
When the gentle wind blows,
And the jay beneath the twig
puffs itself up with pride and disdain,
and the branches are shady,
then one ought to choose true, undeceiving love, 
which causes no strife with its lover.
(trans. Paterson 37)
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What is perhaps clear in Guillem, Marcabru, and other 
troubadours, is not simply the recognition that 
language can be possessed of plenitude, clarity, and 
thus can be truly glorious, but that there is another 
possibility, which is that language can be empty, even 
tragically narcissistic and self-involved, so that it 
is no longer capable of conveying truth in the sense 
that Anselm speaks of rectitude. Such a language, for 
Marcabru particularly, will remove its user to beyond 
the pale of courtly (lege: human) society, and so the 
language is not only ultimately useless but pernicious 
as well.
In effect, what Anselm initiated in elevating an 
intellectual system to a level commensurate with a 
moral one was the contemplation of a language that is 
untrue, that is irresponsible towards objective truth.
[ . . .] Anselm obliterates the distinction between
lies and falsehoods drawn by [. . .] Augustine, for
he omits the intention to deceive as the sine qua 
non or even as one of the necessary components of a 
lie. In [. . .] De veritate. where he considers
lies under the heading of the veritas 
enuntiationis. he confines lying purely to the 
level of incorrect objective reference.
One should not be misled by Anselm's apparent 
neglect of ethics at this point or by the fact 
that, in calling rectitudo an accident, he appears 
to be placing it on a lower plane than the semantic 
or natural veritas of propositions. His real goal 
in De. veritate is to exalt both intellectual and 
moral rectitude as the criteria of truth in all 
respects. (Colish 40)
Marcabru's trobar naturau . as if consciously
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comprehending both Augustine and Anselm, includes what 
is within as well as beyond the pale, in the sense that 
Marcabru "is concerned with what is in harmony with 
nature and outside it, ‘segon natura et estiers' 
(XLI.5)" (Paterson 29-30). It is precisely this 
harmony that is at stake in Anselm's presumption. 
Ironically, perhaps, we see this most acutely in his 
attribution of the term "natural" (naturaliter) to any 
statement that might possess an "intrinsic truth" 
(v e r i t a s ), a decidedly internal, "logical and 
grammatical cogency," even when such cogency does not 
"correspond with anything in the real order" of things 
(Colish 40; cf. "Chapter One" above). In these terms, 
then, Marcabru most profoundly seeks to restore an 
older order that reaches back in time to before Anselm, 
while the poet necessarily employs the terminology and 
concepts inherited from the recent theologian.
Marcabru especially locates these language problems 
within the social sphere. Trobar naturau includes 
rationalism and intellectualism in its vision of the 
world (Paterson 29-32), but it sees this rationalism as 
a necessary component in a world harmony. Similarly, 
John of Salisbury saw rhetoric as a necessity in any 
system of thought that might accurately comprehend 
society and its larger sustaining world. The 
Metalogicon (ed. Webb, pp. 7, 13 ff.) proclaims that
"[r]hetoric is the beautiful and fruitful union between
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reason and expression. Through harmony, it holds human 
communities together" (paraphrased in Curtius 77). In 
a poem, John restates Cicero's view of rhetoric (in De 
officiis I, 50), which has its roots in Posidonius and 
Isocrates; reason and speech, acting in conjunction 
with each other, create the foundation for manners and 
society:
Eloquii si quis perfecte noverit artem,
Quodlibet apponas dogma, peritus erit.
Transit ab his tandem studiis operosa juventus 
Pergit et in varias philosophando vias,
Quae tamen ad finem tendunt concorditer unum,
Unum namque caput Philosophia gerit.
(Entheticus pp. 250, 363 ff; in Curtius 77)
Augustine is of course a trained rhetorician, and we 
have seen how central a role discourse and textuality 
generally is in his world view. In the same way, 
language for Augustine was integral to all meaning, 
intrinsic to the unfolding of world events, (albeit it 
was seen by him to be opaque, in the Pauline sense of 
vision through a glass darkly). Thus Isidore of 
Seville could construct his Etvmologia predicated on 
the belief that the "intrinsic meaning of an object 
[could be discovered] through often hypothetical 
etymology" (Paterson 31); Isidore's procedure was a 
direct outgrowth of Pauline typology and the 
Augustinian notion that the objects of the world 
contained hidden meanings, meanings capable of being 
deciphered, which had led to interpretation of
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Scripture and all literature of Latin Antiquity "in the 
light of supposed symbolic meanings" they contained 
(31) . And according to Isidore, words possessed a 
natural hidden force that could be disclosed through 
etymology:
Etymologia est origo vocabulorum. cum vis verbi vel 
nominis per interpretationem colligitur. . . . Nam 
cum videris unde ortum est nomen, citius vim eius 
intelligis. (PL LXXXII.105)
This world unity, a harmony among the world's 
elements, is revealed in the language of Occitan and 
particularly in the use of that language, which reveals 
a poet's opportunism but also suggests his like 
attitude towards the world and as well as towards the 
language with which he wishes to speak of the world. 
Marcabru defined this epistemological construct most 
profoundly in his ability to utilize the philosophical 
view that saw a fundamentally intimate relationship 
between language and the phenomenal world; he did so in 
order to speak about poetry and, ultimately, to speak 
about himself as being at least as worthy and noble as 
the poem he has created. If the "major innovation 
Augustinian rhetoric offers is the valorization of 
desire, or will," as Sarah Spence contends, then will 
becomes the "motivating force of persuasion" (114); in 
a model of discourse in which will must be present in 
both speaker and listener, in order for the language of
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the discourse to have an effect, we can note an 
inherent relationship between language and will, on the 
one hand, and on the other "a dialogue of powers in 
which reason is balanced by faith and will" (114). 
Consider the rich pastoral scene of a song such as "Bel 
m'es can s'esclarzis l'onda," in which Marcabru 
insinuates himself among the many b i r d s — each 
possessing its own language--and the poet capable of 
singing better than any of them. He sings best of all 
because of a joyful understanding:
Bel m'es can s'esclarzis l'onda 
E qecs auzels pel jardin 
S'esjauzis segon son latin;
Lo chanz per lo(s) bees toronda,
Mais eu tropo miels qe negus.
Qe scienza jauzionda 
M'apres c'al soleilh declin 
Laus lo jorn, e l'ost' al matin,
[etc.; 11. 1-8]
It pleases me when the wave grows bright 
and each bird in the garden 
rejoices according to its own language; 
the singing gushes from their beaks, 
but I compose better than any.
For joyful understanding taught 
me to praise the day at sunset
and my host at sunrise (to count my blessings) 
[. . . .] (trans. Paterson 30)
Marcabru has deftly aligned his ability to sing— to 
compose poetry--with the natural cycles of the sun; 
thus the confirmation of his poetic powers is 
effected, not merely by his bald assertion that he is 
the poet par excellence, but by comparing himself with
169
nature in which he derives a joyful understanding of 
the world. He is suggesting that his own cycles of 
composition are as true as the cycles of the day and 
night, the seasons, and so on.
We need only to return to "Per savi’l" to realize 
the full import of Marcabru's strategy here:
Per savi'l tenc ses doptanssa 
cel qui de mon chant devina 
so que chascus motz declina, 
si cum la razos depleia, [. . . .]
Here we see that the true reader, who we must presume 
possesses the joyful wisdom that understanding of the 
natural world and one's place in it brings, will be 
able to "divine" the structure, rationale (razos) and 
purpose of Marcabru's song. There is no doubt ("ses 
doptanssa") about this, for the poet is in step with 
the progression of the world's events— as we see 
precisely in his song that represents him: wise persons 
will appreciate how each word unfolds ("declina"), much 
as the day and night unfold naturally according to the 
declination of the sun, as we see in "Bel m'es can." 
"[I]nstead of seeing the necessary distance from God 
and truth as frustrating, Augustine suggests [in De 
Doctrinal that such a gap provides necessary room in 
which [a] divine spark can occur" (Spence 109). The 
Pauline echo ("paraul' escura") is used to full effect 
as both poet and reader— indeed, all members of a
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society e ssentially defined by their joyful 
wisdom— engage in an Augustinian struggle to tease out 
("d1esclarzir") from an opaque and symbolically rich 
language the transparency of the truth. The struggle 
also finds a parallel in Jerome's dictum that in 
translation the spiritual meaning of a text should be 
"extorted"— "exprimere"—  from the litera.
To elucidate the truth finally is for Marcabru to 
restore a unity in the world, a unity that has been 
threatened by all misusers of language who create the 
fractures in discourse and perception and thus cloud 
the truth. In "Lo vers comens quan vei del fau" he 
attacks those who would "confuse the truth" (the "menut 
trobador bergau / entrebesquill" 11. 9-10— the
"buzzing, petty troubadours who confuse the truth"; 
trans. Paterson 9). And when Marcabru writes that "En 
do cuidars ai conssirier / A triar lo frait de 
l'entier" (Dejeanne XIX.9-10— "In two ways of thinking, 
I am anxious to distinguish the broken from the whole"; 
trans. Paterson 10), he is elaborating his "theme of 
imprecise and corrupting use of words [as] bound up 
with [his] concept of 'dos cuidars', the 'entier' and 
the 'frait', the right and illusory ways of thinking" 
(Paterson 10).
Such a perception of this fractured language that is 
incapable of denoting objective reality, yet which
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might seem to be capable of such signification, is a 
consequence of Anselm's postulation of a naturally 
occurring language, in a sense one which need not 
comply with any objective truth. Such speech is 
false1; thus it sets the natural world in opposition to 
truth, and in its use this language sows confusion and 
doubt. Marcabru's task to restore truth and certitude, 
to reassociate these values with the workings of the 
phenomenal world, that world through which he derives a 
"joyful understanding," drives him to compose his 
songs. To accomplish this is to return to the 
Augustinian vision of truth as discourse, to the unity 
embodied in the notion of a world text.
V
Certain basic assumptions underlie a poem like "Per 
savi • 1." Viewed in their context, the poem
represents the later Middle Ages' shifted and enlarged 
apprehension of time, the society's conception of 
auctoritas within an overall hieratic framework, and 
the developing claim for individual poetic authority in 
the light of a specifically literary auctoritas. on the 
part of the poets of that society. Marcabru's poem 
represents the cultural nexus of an older, dying 
culture, and a newer literate culture in which we 
witness the individual poet's struggle for singular 
recognition. The poem is precisely about such a
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struggle; it conveys the sense of that struggle through 
both its discourse and its poetic per se. Furthermore, 
the poem displays the intersection of the two 
intellectual streams that provide the language and thus 
the thought processes of a "modern" culture, in which 
individuals define themselves as much against the past 
and hierarchical authority as from within it. 
Particularly the thinking of Aristotle, Cicero and 
Quintilian, as they are appropriated in the twelfth 
century, presides over the birth of the literate and 
modern world of individuals who feel compelled to 
inscribe themselves within the collective text of their 
society.
At its deepest level, Marcabru's poem reveals an 
anxiety over the possibility of being kept silent; or 
rather it concerns itself with the question of whether 
or not the poet will be able to speak, to sing, to 
utter an existential truth. At the poem's surface, 
therefore, its discourse takes up the question of 
poetic form that is the manifestation of the broader 
and generative form of fin' amors. The poem asks and 
also answers the question for itself, the new poetry 
an authentic language, a language capable of conveying 
a true assessment of the changing experiential 
landscape.
The binary oppositions that form the matrix of this
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discourse are several: love versus lust, poetry versus 
mere m e t r i c s — and, perhaps at the root of these 
opposites, reason (i.e., "razo," ratio) versus chaos or 
disorder. In invoking razos. moreover, the poet 
comprehends a debate about whether or not narrative is 
a discourse capable of conveying truth: the nature of 
time (perhaps the various forms of time-cf. Le Goff's 
observations, a b o v e ) , the empirical validity of 
history, and the ontological validity of the literary 
impulse, are all thus also invoked in the poetic 
attempt at speaking or singing the truth— that is, at 
rendering an accurate verbal description of reality. 
Interpretive strategies common to exegesis, according 
to Judson Allen (Friar as Critic 42 ff.), were
appropriated by writers of fiction. As Gellrich 
comments, however, purely literary endeavors in the 
later Middle Ages did not simply replicate, mirror and 
otherwise repeat the inherited "matter" of Scripture 
and antiquity— an operation that was "[grounded] in the 
Platonic and Augustinian concept of imitation" 
(25)— but rather the rewriting of the past in the hands 
of poets like Dante, Chaucer and Langland, was 
constituted of "a new kind of interpreting, one that no 
longer allows for the straightforward validation of 
meaning in an "old book1, the sequence of events, or 
the voice of a speaker." The "convention of imitation" 
was usually undermined "by casting the narrator in the
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role of copyist or reporter" (26). What Gellrich calls 
the inherited "Book of culture," essentially defined by 
the Church Fathers’ exegetically sanitized versions of 
Scripture and pagan myth,
leaves no doubt that it is a true account of the 
cosmos, history, nature, and the afterlife. 
Medieval fictions, in contrast, specialize in 
doubt, and while they also delight in religious 
values, they remain basically different from, if 
not opposed to, the myth of the book of culture.
The opposition consists in the recognition that 
Plato mentioned in the Phaedrus [275AB; cf. 
Gellrich 33 and n. 6] and the Republic [II; cf. 
Hazard Adams 22-23, and Gellrich 47 and n. 31] and 
that is extended so clearly in Boccaccio [in e.g. 
"De Genologia deorumjL cf. especially Boccaccio on 
Poetry 63; cf. Gellrich 47]: fiction creates
illusions self- consciously and proceeds on the 
assumption that readers will not turn away 
complaining of its "lies." (48)
A poet like Dante understands literature to be for the 
sake of his reader in the sense that "Dante's poem is 
less an allegory of history than a reflection of the 
reading process, with all its limitations in the 
uncertainty of meaning and the temporality of 
understanding" (24; cf. Mazzotta Dante). Thus such 
fictional narrative procedures are significations that 
destabilize logocentrism as never before "in the pages 
of the grammarians and exegetes, and the question about 
locating the authority of meaning in an origin or text 
is postponed indefinitely [. . .]" (24). We clearly
witness such a destabilization in obvious ways, such as 
the profoundly unreliable narrator to be found in the 
greatest part of Chaucer's work. Chaucer's Geffrey is
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a "mere” reporter who warns us of the questionable 
accuracy of his narrative due to the fallibility of 
both perception and memory.
The destabilizing force is what a modern reader 
would quickly identify as the element of play. 
Huizinga has noted that the Middle Ages
[. . .] had inherited its great culture-forms in
poetry, ritual, learning, philosophy, politics, and 
warfare from classical antiquity, and they were 
fixed forms. Medieval culture was crude and poor 
in many respects, but we cannot call it primitive. 
Its business was to work over traditional material, 
whether Christian or classical, and assimilate it 
afresh. (Homo Ludens 179; cf. Gellrich 49)
It is in the context of a tension between the authority 
of the past and the present author that we ought to 
read a poem like the Cpmmedia, because the allegory at 
the heart of this work
[. . .] consists in the structure of temporal
distance between the originary 1 iber of God, 
envisioned in the sky at the end of the poem, and 
the book of written efforts to explain the 
experience of its meaning. The allegorical sign is 
constituted not by a desire to represent its 
referent — to have ontology— but rather by the 
impossibility of the sign to coincide with the full 
significance of its origin or end. The 
understanding, therefore, that the allegorical mode 
occasions for Dante is the recognition of the 
continuing desire for recovering the volume with 
which he began— both his memory and its image of 
God's presence. For the determination to move 
through the limits of language in time, to struggle 
with meaning, was another medieval way of realizing 
the desire for God. (Gellrich 165)
The parameters of what amounts to Dante1s meditation on
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ontology and epistemology, a discourse as much 
philosophical as theological, will presently be taken 
up at length. For now, all we might note is that there 
is an inherent "playfulness" in all narrative, in that 
narrative will always invite acts of judgment and 
interpretation. One sign of this emerging aspect of 
play in the later Middle Ages, grounded in the 
dialectical impulse, is of course a separation insisted 
upon by the individual poet, between himself and both 
his own text and those texts of the past.
The fundamental burden of Marcabru's poetic 
enterprise is this separation. His budding narrativity 
is evident first of all in the pose he adopts in 
relation to his society. There is a pitched battle 
taking place between himself, the poet, and those who 
love falsely and who are untrue in the very language 
they use. As a poet, Marcabru is steeped in the 
rhetorical tradition. His diction consistently 
resonates earlier Latin meanings that are the conveyors 
of that tradition. "Per savi,l" is built out of such 
terminology; as well, the poem is precisely organized 
according to the structure of medieval dispositio. "the 
ideas in [the poem] clearly arranged, [. . .] the
Rhetorical structure [coinciding] with an especially 
strong concern to clarify, define, and argue his ideas 
on love" (Paterson 18-19). Marcabru's songs, in fact,
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are definable both in terms of rhetoric and medieval 
dialectics, while the power and ingenuity of his trobar 
naturau comes from an understanding of the phenomenal 
world that derives from contemporary Scholasticism.
Of special importance is the fact that dialectical 
procedures, which might be structured according to the 
precepts of rhetorical disputatio. let us say, gave 
rise to poetic forms like the partimen (see, for 
instance, "Amies Marchabrun, car digam" by Marcabru and 
Ugo Catola). As it "came to dominate the trivium" in 
the twelfth century, Glynnis Cropp points out, 
dialectics "had the special task of being used to 
distinguish true from false, in contrast with rhetoric, 
which could be used on behalf of both" (95). Hence in 
its examination of dialectics the Levs d 1 amor. for 
example, reveals the peculiar cast of Augustine and 
Cassiodorus both. Augustine had written, "Qui enim 
disputat, verum discernit a falso" (in Kohler 
Trobador-lvrik 279 n.32); and Cassiodorus similarly 
claims, "Vera sequestrat a falsis" (Institutiones II, 
Praef. 4; cf. Cropp 110 n. 13). Likewise, the Leys 
d 1 amor sharpens the powers of discernment.
Dialecta ensenha tensonar, contendre e disputa e 
far questios, respostas e defensas la us contra 
1 1 autre e mostrar per dreyta razo e per vertadiers 
argumens la vertat e la veraya oppinio de la 
questio moguda.
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[Dialectic teaches one how to argue, contend, 
dispute and to compose questions, answers and 
defence in opposition to one another and to show by 
sound reasoning and by truthful argument the truth 
and the correct opinion about the question set.] 
(Anglade, ed. Las Levs d 1 Amors [Toulouse, 1919] 
t.I, p. 81; in Cropp 95 and 110 n. 14)
Dialectics had once been "viewed as a snare set to trap 
the believer" (Murphy Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 4 6) , 
as in Hilary of Poitiers' De trinitate that celebrates 
truth for its innate resistance to "marvelous devices 
of perverted ingenuity" as were contained in Arian 
logic (VII.1; PL 10.199; in Murphy 46). But dialectics 
came to be regarded as the means for arriving at truth, 
which in turn allowed for the manipulation of others 
through the ability to prevail in dialectically 
structured argument. Thus Peire de Corbiac's 
thirteenth century encyclopedia offers, as a definition 
for dialectic, the following.
Per Dialectica sai arrozonablemens a pauzar e 
respondre e falsar argumens, sofismar e conduire, e 
tot gignozamens menar mon aversaire ad 
inconveniens.
[Through dialectic I know to present a case and 
reply and falsify arguments by reasoning, to use 
sophistries, to conduct and lead my adversary quite 
cunningly into discomfiture.]
(Paterson 2 6-27; cf. Cropp 110 n. 15)
On his part, Marcabru "attributed to the troubadour 
the legal role of 'investigator, defender and 
inquisitor1 in the enquiry into the truth about love" 
(Cropp 95). Note, for example, these lines:
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Qu'ieu sui assatz esprovaire,
Deffendens et enguistaire, [. . . . ]
[11. 43-44]
For indeed I am investigator, 
defender and inquisitor, [. . . . ]
(Dejeanne V; trans. Paterson 14)
The point here is that the poetic form of the partimen 
invites a poet "to discriminate between right and wrong 
(lo dreit and JLq tort) , to choose the better 
alternative" (Cropp 95). Through such rhetorical and 
cognitive procedures, then, we can say that the 
discourse of a poet such as Marcabru, grounded in 
recent developments in dialectics, embodies a nascent 
assertion of individual poetic authority within the 
confines of a poetic that makes a convention of the 
individual singer. This singer, however, is understood 
to be a part of the larger text that comprises the 
song, one which subsumes the singer under its aegis
(Zumthor "Autobiography" 30-33, and cf. above). In
other words, the struggle to assert the individual is 
mirrored in the intellectual movements of the time.
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Chapter Three 
Marcabru, the Modistae. Aquinas and Dante:
The Poet As Text, the Text As Name
I
The legacy of Augustine determined that the concepts of 
writing and text would comprise the chief metaphor for 
truth in the Middle Ages. The Book, as image, was a 
primary instance of this metaphor. Its "idea," 
Gellrich writes, "is perpetuated in a sense of writing 
as a metaphor of the 'system of signified truth1" (44; 
cf. 29-44, 96-101 ff.). Writers of the later Middle
Ages can assert themselves as individual auctors 
through their manipulation of this metaphor. Hence, 
their "fictions" are integrally, inherently, bound up 
with the notion of textuality, for textuality must 
become their ultimate subject; in the metaphor of the 
text lie the profoundly theological and/or 
philosophical issues that centered themselves around 
the issue of signification. It is inevitable that, 
through a self-imposed identification with a text. 
poets announce themselves as unique, and this is 
particularly true in the later Middle Ages when poets 
purport to speak to us from their very own texts; in
their alignment with the issue of textuality, they make
the claim that they are the unique text sine qua non.
They are authors who would speak to us in that they
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are themselves t e x t s . This fundamental poetic 
assertion mirrors its larger Christian world. For in 
the Middle Ages, Bloch writes, "words always refer to 
the Word" (Etymologies 60; in Gellrich 121 n. 75). 
Words are the attempt to recover the "plenitude of God" 
after the Fall, as follows from the sense of the 
relationship of part to whole established by Augustine, 
for whom creation was
a concatenation of utterances proceeding from the 
first Word [ . . . . ] Although the primordial
creation is a moment of profound differentiation, 
the created world and words of Augustine endure not 
a breach but an expansion from their origins of 
meaning. (Gellrich 120-21)
Augustine's expression of a sentiment such as in the 
Confessions, "Ipsum est verbum tuum, quod et Principium 
es quia et loquitur nobis" PL 32, 812), provides the
basis of the traditional source for the identification 
of author with his text; his authority for this 
conception is the received notion of the Word 
incarnate. Furthermore, particularly in the 
Confessions, he employs the strategy of textual self­
commentary. In the eleventh chapter, for instance, 
just as the distinction between divine and human 
discourse is being made, he parallels his own act of 
writing
with the creating Verbum: while there is nothing 
similar in essence between them, the first 
nonetheless is profoundly involved in the second
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by virtue of the differentiation they both carry 
out. The strategy through which the text comments 
on itself occurs at various points when Augustine 
speaks of haec v e r b a . but it is particularly 
emphatic in the interrogative mood, with which the 
chapter closes: "By what word of yours was it
announced that a body might be created, from which 
these words might be created?" ("Ut ergo fieret 
corpus unde ista verba fierent, quo verbo a te 
dictum est?" 11.6, [PL 32, 812]). (Gellrich 120)
Through such an alignment medieval authors also make 
possible their emergence from a textual tradition as 
entities distinct from it, and from their own "new" 
texts as well, which they are at the moment creating. 
After Augustine, we see the way for this assertion 
prepared in the development of dialectical thought, 
which in its ability to atomize systems makes possible 
the fundamental bifurcating transformation of poetry 
into double voiced discourse, a human discourse that 
will eventually lead to "the structural complexity and 
heterogeneity" of a work like the Canterbury Tales 
(McClellan 485). Chaucer is actually a far cry from 
the Confessions. Yet— a case bearing resemblance to 
Marcabru (cf. above)--in Augustine's thought and in 
later treatises on dialectics we can locate the ground 
for the eventual differentiation that occurs. The poet 
stands back from his text; such a poet establishes 
himself as a reader and commentator, and of course as 
the author of that text. Using Bakhtin's theory of 
dialogic discourse as a model for reading medieval 
texts, William McClellan has analyzed these texts in a
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way that can demonstrate their filiations with seminal 
works like the Confessions as well as with other 
contemporary or near contemporary writing. Chaucer's 
"Clerk's Tale," for instance,
is one of the tales where Chaucer was experimenting 
with multi-voiced narrative discourse. The 
combination of vari- directional discourse and the 
decrease in objectification of the narrative voice 
results in a mode of discourse where several 
different narrative voices participate in the 
tale's narration. These heterogeneous voices can 
conveniently be identified as the Petrarchan voice 
of moral allegory, the clerkly voice of humanistic 
pathos, and the nominally Chaucerian voice of 
grotesque parody. These different voices are not, 
however, completely autonomous voices. Although 
the tendency toward the radical extreme of complete 
splitting has progressed sufficiently to make these 
different voices distinctly identifiable, they are 
only relatively autonomous. They are still 
intertwined with each other; they form a conceptual 
bond; that is, they constitute a dialogic 
relationship. ("Bakhtin's Theory" 483)
Fourteenth century narrative possibilities, such as we 
see in Chaucer, exhibit the tension between past and 
present to the extent that there is a struggle for a 
unique point of view that must emerge out of a world 
view that insists upon homogeniety. The effect of such 
writing
is to see the past and present from a different 
perspective, and that difference compares with the 
objectivity sought by scholars in the renaissance 
who wanted to separate themselves from medieval 
tradition by understanding the past in its own 
right before [Christological] time put meaning upon 
it. Medieval fictions certainly brought about no 
Copernican revolution. But the difference of myth 
from fiction figures prominently in the separation 
of "Middle Ages" from "Renaissance" [. . . . ]
(Gellrich 50)
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Fourteenth century nominalism is a mark of this 
shift--just as it is a contributor to a further 
evolution of narrative writing. The same can be said 
for an increasing reliance, among intellectuals, on 
empiricism as it came to apply to a budding physical 
science. So too, fiction writing might also have 
contributed to "important changes in the modes of 
signifying meaning" (50). We see this transformation 
serving as the fabric of Chaucer's writing. But 
Marcabru, Dante and Langland are the pivotal poets 
whose works exhibit intellectual developments that will 
include what we may call a "poetics of the text." All 
four of these poets align themselves with their texts 
in progressively complex, subtle and powerful ways. 
The development of fictional narrative poetry makes 
possible the creation of figures or characters who 
represent the poet, and who therefore are at a remove 
from their author-signifies as a part of the poetic 
texts. Yet they are used to maintain a link with their 
authors; this maneuver is most readily discernible in 
the fact that these figures bear the names of their 
authors and are often portrayed, to one extent or 
another, within the contexts of many of the events of 
the authors' real lives. That is to say, we know 
something of the lives of Dante and Chaucer; we know 
little if anything about Marcabru and a poet like
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Langland presents a slightly different problem, as we 
shall see.
By the fourteenth century, especially but not 
exclusively as concerns an increasingly popular dream 
vision genre, the author's act of "signing" his or her 
text took a wide variety of forms such as overt naming, 
cryptograms, anagrams, codes of alphabetic numbers, 
"acrostics and syllabic disarrangement with punning 
effect" at times employing macaronics, and so on (Kane 
Piers Plowman: The Evidence 54) . This naming could, 
moreover, extend to other real personages in the poet's 
life. A rondel by Eustace Deschamps is a good example 
of how subtle and clever such "signatures" can be:
Les noms sarez du seigneur et servent 
Couvertement en ce rondelet cy 
Maiz diviser les vous fauldra ainsi:
Une silabe prendrez premierement 
Du second ver et la fin autressy:
Les noms sarez du seigneur et servent 
Couvertement en ce rondelet cy.
En reversent prendrez subtivement 
En derrain ver troiz petiz mos de li:
A ce eust bien un autre defailli.
Les noms sarez du seigneur et servent 
Couvertement en ce rondelet cy.
Mais diviser les vous fauldra ainsi.
(Oeuvres, 1880, iv, p. 114; in Kane 68)
George Kane writes of this poem that its "essence 
[ . . . ] is the technical ingenuity applied to
compliment" Deschamps's patron, Coucy (who is signified 
by the combination of the first and last syllables of
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the poem's second, seventh and eleventh lines— cf. my 
emphases above). But Deschamps's true poetic mastery 
is revealed in his ability to "covertly [name] patron 
and poet together" in a poem whose subject is such 
naming. Deschamps succeeds in aligning himself with 
his patron, within "an exacting lyrical form," while in 
doing so he associates himself with that form, which is 
his text (note Deschamps' signature in the poem's tenth 
line— cf. my emphasis of his name embedded in the poem 
in reversed syllabic order) (68) .
In a sense, Kane has quite possibly missed the point 
of this poem when he asserts that the "poem has, in 
effect, no other meaning"— or we may presume no other 
purpose--than to signify Coucy and his poet (the 
"seigneur et servent" respectively). The poem's first 
line announces, on the contrary, a submotif that 
establishes a logical pretext for the clever acts of 
naming, one which would not have gone unnoticed to a 
contemporary audience. Both Deschamps and Coucy are 
elevated in stature precisely because they are named, 
and, again, the entire poem is a discussion of how 
naming occurs, how language functions, and so forth. 
Too, we should note that the poem is self-reflexive; 
the poem's naming is here presented as being an 
integral part of a particular genre, the "rondelet," 
which has been impressed into the service of a rather 
cool discussion of how exactly the poem goes about
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signing both its author and his patron (and in so 
doing, implicitly signing itself as the agency of such 
naming) as a subtext of the rondel form. The 
signatures covertly ("Couvertement") insinuate the 
purpose of the poem, the poem's ultimate end, which is 
also, we are left to conclude, the poem's instigation. 
In other words, it might not be too farfetched to say 
that the poem is about the act of naming; the discourse 
of the poem suggests that its very genre, in this 
instance the rondel. has been created for, or at least 
is presently serving, the act of nomination. 
Deschamps's poem is particularly powerful for its 
ability to encapsulate the language and epistemology 
theories of his time in a few circular, well turned and 
symmetrical lines that offer a polish, an esthetics of 
finish, which suggest perhaps a benign and airy 
innocence, even pseudo- childishness. At the same time 
the poem not quite secretly carries out a serious and 
penetrating examination, a demonstration of how 
language works. Furthermore, the implication is that 
the structure of language either mirrors or can be used 
to structure human society, to promote and advance 
certain individuals while, it might occur to the poem's 
readers, language can be the downfall of others.
Indeed, the poem indulges in detail concerning the 
ways of language signification, which brings to mind
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Robert Payne's observation regarding Deschamps' 
friend, Chaucer. In Deschamps1s rondel constructed 
personae are deeply, textually embedded. Chaucer's 
Hous of Fame conducts a discourse concerning the 
dynamic of language and idea, as being grounded in the 
physicality of experience. The character of the eagle 
establishes the basis for one of Chaucer's ongoing 
preoccupations: not merely an author's ability to
"speak" with his present audience, but with future 
readers as well. The issue of what constitutes a 
sentence, a word, a syllable— all of which is raised by 
Deschamps in his rondel— is echoed in Chaucer. Or 
perhaps Deschamps was echoing Chaucer. One poem is 
decidedly more comical and irreverent than the other, 
yet this difference may be pointedly unimportant to the 
poem's shared agenda:
Loo, this sentence ys knowen kouth 
Of every philosophres mouth,
As Aristotle and daun Platon,
And other clerkys many oon;
And to confirme my resoun,
Thou wost wel this, that spech is soun, 
Or elles no man myghte hyt here;
Now herke what y wol the lere.
"Soun ys noght but eyr ybroken,
And every speche that ys spoken,
Lowd or pryvee, foul or fair,
In his substance ys but air;
For as flaumbe ys but lythted smoke, 
Ryght soo soun ys air ybroke.
But this may be in many wyse,
Of which I wil the two devyse,
As soun that cometh of pipe or harpe. 
For whan that a pipe is blowen sharpe, 
The air is twyst with violence 
And rent; loo, thys ys my sentence;
Eke, whan men harpe-strynges smyte,
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Whether hyt be moche or lyte,
Loo, with the strok the ayr tobreketh;
And ryght so breketh it when men speketh.
(HF 757-80)
Speech here, for Chaucer, is a natural sign, much in 
the vein of Augustine's set of semiological 
distinctions. In fact, Augustine employs the example 
of smoke as a natural, unintentional sign of fire in De 
Doctrina Christiana (2.1.1 through 2.3.4-5; in Colish 
"Stoic" 28-29); Chaucer makes the analogy for sound as 
speech by positing that "flaumbe ys but lyghted smoke" 
(1. 7 69, above).
As Augustine would have had it, the notion of speech 
being defined by the eagle, if it is to be likened to 
natural signing, embraces the concept of 
unintentionality. Lack of intention is perhaps at the 
heart of Chaucer's humor in this first book of his 
poem, for in one sense, to speak unintentionally cannot 
help but be an act devoid of decorum, judiciousness, 
purpose, dignity, and otherwise importance or 
profundity, and in the world of human affairs (versus, 
say, the world of animals such as an eagle, or of gods 
such as angels) to speak unintentionally is to forego 
the possibility of making meaning or in any sense being 
truthful. Thus the act of human speech in the 
postlapsarian world, and more so perhaps the act of 
making poetry, Chaucer is telling us, is fraught with 
the greatest risks. On the one hand there is the
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possibility of uttering less than the full meaning 
experience proffers to the seer. On the other hand one 
risks uttering falsehoods, banalities, but by extension 
blasphemies.
In any case, it is within this framework of the 
rehashing of current language theory that Chaucer is 
able, as Payne puts it, to "[manipulate] his self-image 
as narrator not (insofar as we can tell) for any overt 
psychological revelation, but to help try to define the 
poetic process [and therefore his poetic process]" 
("Late Medieval Images" 251). It must be added that 
this poetic process is one which has been made into an 
emblem by Chaucer, an emblem that stands for the very 
poet who has gone to great lengths to create it, as 
well as to create a larger symbol system in which 
utterance and therefore formal utterance such as poetry 
become representations of their authors. This strategy 
on the part of poets like Chaucer and Deschamps 
partakes of the same tradition that produced a larger 
preoccupation with names and naming, which by extension 
included the notion that all particles of speech, even 
the letters that made up the very words of such speech, 
were reflections and thus in some measure 
representations of their divine and natural origins; 
that is, even letters, besides contributing to the 
signification of one or another meaning within a word
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or group of words, also signified to a degree their own 
ontological ground in that they bore the mark or were 
somehow suffused with the essence of their origins in 
Adam's speech of the world before the Fall.
Letters, like words, maintained a "natural" 
connection with the past; it was possible to trace them 
to their divine source. John of Salisbury, for 
example, believed that
the very application of names, and the use of 
various expressions, although much depends on the 
will of man, is in a way subject to nature, which 
it probably imitates.
The study of grammar was also, for John, "an invention 
of man"—  even as it "imitate[d] nature, from which it 
derive[d] its origin" ("naturam tamen imitatur, et pro 
parte ab ipsa originem ducit" fMetalogicon p. 39; PL 
199. 84OD; in Gellrich 102-3]). And, as it followed
that words and names bore the cachet of their origins, 
so too could letters that for Isidore of Seville were 
"the indices of things, the signs of words." 
Interestingly, he goes on to qualify his perception 
when he observes that in them "there is such a power 
that they speak to us without voice the discourse of 
the absent" ("dicta absentium sine voce loquantur" PL 
82.74-75; in Gellrich 103). The question of absence is 
an important one, which must be explored at some 
length. For the present, it need only be remarked that
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it is possible to read both Deschamps' and Chaucer's 
poems as containing the presence of their authors, even 
when these authors are absent from the scene of 
reading; in lieu of themselves, they have constructed 
poems that are their emblems, poems that in effect name 
them and therefore bring them into being. In a sense, 
then, it can be said that these poems furnish for their 
poets an ontological ground.
II
Of course, the role of absence in the thinking of 
intellectuals and poets of the Middle Ages presumes the 
construction of an ontological hierarchy that accounts 
for the phenomenon of language and which allows for a 
unity of experience precisely in that the language of 
contemporary human affairs came to be palpably linked 
to a historical continuum, to say nothing of a link 
with the more fundamental continuum of truth itself, in 
both a pre- and postlapsar ian world. Such a 
philosophical outlook affords poets like Chaucer and 
Deschamps a ready made vocabulary, a set of metaphors 
and other cognitive tools they can readily bring to 
bear on their fascination with poetry and how it is 
both connected to and separated from them. Just as the 
word, even the letter, represents an immanent truth as 
well as a historical origin, so too the poem can be 
constructed so that its discourse will come to include
193
an annunciation of its origins, its terms of existence, 
and, particularly, its very capacity to serve as the 
emblem of its author.
Both Deschamps1 "silabe" (1. 4) and Chaucer's
perception that "spech is soun" (1. 6), at their
deepest levels, hearken back to the Augustinian 
dichotomy of phenomenal meaning and ultimate meaning, 
which is embodied in his image in the Confessions of 
the angels' silent syllables. Addressing God, 
Augustine says of the angels that they
have no need to look upon this firmament, to know 
through reading your word. For they always see 
your face, and read there without the syllables of 
time your eternal will. They read, they choose, 
they love. They are always reading [. . .] the
changelessness of your counsel. (in Gellrich 29)
Augustine records in the Confessions the death of his 
mother, which suggests for him the silent will of the 
Divine. The "tumult of the flesh" ("tumultus carnis") 
has been silenced, as well as "every tongue and sign" 
("omnis lingua et omne signum") . Not even the 
"obscurity of a similitude" ("aenigma similitudinis") 
interfered in their final conversation (9.10; PL 32, 
774; in Gellrich 118). Thus, Augustine has confronted 
"outright the irony of speaking and writing about 
silence"; and so he must seek
a means of avoiding further confused wandering in 
the reqio dissimilitudinis. He recognizes fully
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the separation between the text that the angels 
read "without the syllables of time" ("sine 
syllabis temporum") and his own noisy, distracted 
reading [PL 32, 852]. But he is led irresistibly 
toward that Book, toward the discourse that 
Ambrose, like the angels, read in silentio [cf. PL 
32, 720] and that he now reads with Monica.
(Gellrich 118)
As for Chaucer, he compounds this fundamental 
Augustinian dichotomy with Aristotelian notions of 
substance and accident to conclude, perhaps, that the 
last, best hope for communication lies in poesis. Our 
speech is likened to breaking wind (especially when 
implicitly compared with that of a n g e l s ) . Yet 
Chaucer's ongoing meditation throughout his corpus on 
the nature of the past, the efficacy of the 
specifically literary past to bear the burden of the 
truth, the dichotomy of books and writing versus first 
hand experience (as is most sharply drawn in the 
opening lines of the "Prologue to the Legend of Good 
Women")— this great and multifaceted question of which 
the present discourse with the eagle is a part--is 
raised finally for the purpose of staking an 
ontological claim for poetry, for specific poems, and 
ultimately for the poet who is the maker of such 
formal, poetic language. Chaucer must win a place for 
himself in the pantheon of poets through the ages. His 
best hope of doing so lies in the trenchant exploration 
of the possibilities for communication which his own 
and all poetry affords. Here we find the background
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for and some of the extended meanings of Deschamps1 
rondel; in them we can appreciate the even larger 
theological, philosophical resonance having to do with 
the question of whether language can serve an 
ontological function.
Simply because, as Kane rightly observes, a "common 
feature of [such] signatures [as "Cou . . . cy" ] is
their obscurity" (69) does not mean that they could not 
have been grounded in larger, weightier matters that 
entered into and affected their reception. What for 
instance does it mean, what is the full import, of 
Langland's keying of his signature in Piers Plowman B 
XV.152 by the words, ray. name is? Kane writes that 
this phrase "apparently" keys the entire signature, yet 
there is an obscurity here (note the possibly puzzled 
arrangement of Lonqe Wille— "'I have lyued in londe', 
quod I, 'my name is Longe Wille1" [my emphasis]--to 
indicate in transposition William Lanqland). The "full 
meaning would be denied, it must seem, to anyone 
initially ignorant of the poet's surname" (69). On the 
other hand, the statement's direct assertion, its claim 
to provenance of a particular name-- that is, its 
underlying ontological claim--would have held a 
fascination for Langland's audience; the character 
speaking his name, who overtly signs himself in this 
manner, furthermore, would have had the effect of a 
close identification on the part of his audience.
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III
Marcabru names himself in his poems, has his poem's 
voice--the poem's persona--proclaim himself as 
"Marcabru." Thus the persona is understood under the 
aegis of its author. Dante's persona does not proclaim 
himself as the poet "Dante," though it is quite evident 
that this is the persona's name (he is actually named 
by Beatrice). Langland goes out of his way to name 
himself by explicitly proclaiming, "my name is longe 
wille." The differences in methods of self-naming 
among these three poets disclose important turning 
points in the evolution of the poetics of authorship in 
the later Middle Ages, as they reveal a common 
underlying Weltanschauung founded in two sources of the 
European intellectual and otherwise textual tradition, 
both the Judeo- Christian and the Greco-Roman.
Once again, the interweaving of these two streams 
can be located in Augustine's De Doctrina 
Christiana— but particularly in Thomas Aquinas' reading 
of this text. At the end of De Doctrina1s second book, 
Augustine, having discussed the nature of signs, 
finally asserts that all signs will ultimately indicate 
the truth of the divine; in other words, all texts are 
ultimately univocal (Gellrich 113). Having inherited 
Augustine's basic distrust of figurative language,
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Aquinas (in De sacra doctrina. art. 9) , who is echoing 
Dionysius as well, observes that in principle 
figurative language must lead us away from the truth; 
however,
it is natural for man to seek intellectual truths 
through sensible things [from which metaphors and 
other figures are drawn], because all our knowledge 
originates from sense. (trans. Gellrich 111)
Employing the idea of dissimilarity, Aquinas concludes 
that such figures are a kind of necessary evil, and 
therefore figures that are constructed to signify 
divine things should by their nature be only remotely 
connected to these things.
Rather than a world whose presence is being 
profoundly felt in Augustine's construction of 
univocity, in Aquinas' thought we find the development 
of a second element. Here Aquinas is invoking, 
essentially, a doctrine of absence, which takes the 
form of his notion of dissimilitude and which is 
predicated on the belief that in our attempts to 
understand God we come not to know Him: "what he is not 
is clearer to us than what he is" (Summa theoloqica 
la.1.9.; trans. Gellrich 111). According to Dionysius, 
the via negativa "accords more closely with that which 
is ineffable" (trans. Eds. Mystical Theology 25; cf. 
Gellrich 112) . In order that we not attempt a 
comprehension of the divine in terms of (lesser and
198
thereby misleading) worldly images, Scripture uses 
"unlike images" that will not easily allow for 
comparisons, since what the "Invisible, Infinite and 
Unbounded" is not is what we learn of it, which is 
"more in accord with Its nature" (Mystical 25; cf. 
Burrell, and Gellrich 112). Hence what Dionysius calls 
"'inharmonious dissimilitudes' or negative images do 
not risk the identification of sign with 
signified"— which is always a danger in Augustine's 
construct of univocity— "because an 'unseemly image’ 
cannot be mistaken for that which surpasses all 
comparison" (Gellrich 112).
What we see in all three writers, then, Augustine, 
Dionysius and Aquinas, is an acute sensitivity to the 
forces of absence and presence; this sensitivity is 
rooted in what Auerbach has called "foregrounded" (and 
therefore present) meaning in classical mythology, 
versus the relative absence of meaning in the 
ellipticality and consequent mystery of the Bible. In 
Homer, for example, we find "externalized, uniformly 
illuminated phenomena, at a definite time and in a 
definite place, connected together without lacunae [and 
with] thoughts and feelings completely expressed 
[. . .]" (Mimesis 7). In contrast, Biblical accounts
externalize "only so much of the phenomena as is 
necessary for the purpose of narrative"; only the 
"decisive points" are made explicit, and so "time and
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place are undefined and call for interpretation," as do 
thoughts and feelings (7; cf. Gellrich 123). What 
confronts readers of Scripture, then, is an essential 
mystery.
Exegetical practices, however, constituted an 
attempt to fill in the lacunae left by Judeo-Christian 
sources, in order to explain in typological terms the 
actions described therein, so to achieve conformity and 
unity, and in this fashion to invoke a peculiarly 
Christological power. What amounted to a rewriting of 
religious history meant that the literature of this 
tradition, which comprehended "the essential secrecy 
and mystery of divine meanings, and an appreciation of 
their absence," would be rendered into an entirely new 
form, a form of presence that derived from the other 
sensibility reflected in a text like the Odyssey whose 
"'foregrounded' style of myth seems to be of a piece 
with the immanence of divinity in signs--the 
logocentric presence of meaning" (Gellrich 123). 
Ironically, although medieval exegetes undoubtedly knew 
the difference, there might be no sign of such 
knowledge in their writing styles, "and where one style 
[slid] into the other, the earlier mythological form of 
signifying [. . .] left its mark on the course of the
medieval hermeneutic project" (123-24). This rewriting 
need not be examined here. What does have to be noted,
200
however, is the effect of this early tradition on the 
later Middle Ages when we essentially see within the 
texts of poets and theologians a dance taking place 
between the contingencies of both forces, absence and 
presence. Dante and his relationship to Aquinas are a 
particularly good example of this tension. It is 
possible to achieve an unusual illumination of the 
Dantean triad, "io sol uno"— in which Dante the author 
of his poem is both absent in name, yet ironically and 
powerfully present as poet— through the establishment 
of a connection with Thomas' ideas about absence and 
presence generally, and especially as they concern 
themselves with the question of language. We have seen 
how Aquinas draws upon Augustine and Dionysius in his 
discussion of metaphor, which in turn is determined by 
the larger perception that worldly reason cannot hope 
to describe the mysteries of the divine; as with the 
Trinity, reason will never capture its esse, for it can 
only "clarify--manifestare— the articles of sacred 
doctrine" (Summa Theoloqica la.1.8, 2; Gellrich 66).
In order to fully appreciate the Dante-Aquinas 
relationship, a brief summary of the background of some 
of their shared ideas is necessary.
In the philosophically based insistence on studying 
the "how" of language signification instead of the 
"what" that language signified, a group of later 
theologians, the Modistae. continued to assert that
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there was a separation between language and the world 
it attempted to describe; they sought to place language 
in a category unto itself. We have noted how, prior to 
the twelfth century, this development can be traced to 
Anselm in his use of the term naturaliter to describe 
statements that may not accurately reflect reality 
although they might possess an internal cogency, a kind 
of "truthfulness," in and of themselves. For, truly, 
language could be seen to be self-consistent, as a 
consequence of progressive advances in dialectics and 
logic. But after Aquinas another Thomas, of Erfurt, 
and other modistae who continued the study of language 
beginning where twelfth century grammarians had left 
it off, further established for language a self- 
sufficiency that has been placed squarely in the 
provenance of the phenomenal world, that world of human 
rather than divine affairs. Before Thomas of Erfurt, 
Roger Bacon had "[summed] up much of the theoretical 
speculation of his age" in his insistence on a single 
grammar, that is, Latin; this grammar was "subordinate 
to the nature of the physical world and the structure 
of human understanding" (Gellrich 105). In the next 
century Thomas of Erfurt furthers Bacon's ideas while 
appropriating the terms of Scholastic logic, the 
"contrast of matter and form," in order to talk about 
language per se (106).
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Another of the modistae. Siger of Courtrai, found it 
possible to elevate the noun to a place of greater 
importance than the verb. Siger made a formal 
distinction between a word's material appearance, its 
d ict i o . and its class, its pars o r a t i o n i s . 
Furthermore, he found there to be a difference between 
being, essens or ens. and understanding, intelligens. 
His decisions were based on a consideration of 
p otent i a l i t y  and actuality, which in turn was 
predicated on assumptions about language that still 
linked it to natural and historical origins in the 
prelapsarian world, as was understood about language 
since at least the time of Augustine. Within this 
framework, however, Siger is able to say of the noun 
that it "is the mode of signifying substance, 
permanence, rest, or being" ("modus significandi 
substantiae, permanentis, habitus seu entis"); that is, 
the noun is more clearly and directly rooted in the 
prelapsarian origin of language than the verb. The 
verb, according to Siger, is a "mode of signifying 
becoming or being" ("modum significandi fieri seu esse" 
[Summa modorum significandi in Les Oeuvres de Siger de 
Courtrai 95, 108] Gellrich 107 n. 33). In other words, 
the verb resides more in a state of activity and 
temporality, and in the sense that its temporal quality 
causes it to be relatively transient, in comparison 
with the noun, it possesses, perhaps, less presence.
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Siger concludes that in the hierarchy of being nouns 
precede their verbs, as ontologically prior— we might 
presume that verbs are derived from their nouns—  since 
it is clear that "the state of esse (action) obviously 
follows the state of ens (rest)" (Gellrich 106-7; cf. 
Summa 108).
After Siger, what became particularly significant 
was the privileging, on the part of Thomas of Erfurt, 
in his respective analysis of language, of the first 
person pronoun over that of the second person. The 
distinction is important in light of Dante's 
autocitational triad, "io sol uno", and before him, to 
a far less extent, Marcabru's "ieu mezeis seu" (cf. the 
"Introduction," and "Chapter Two" above); for these 
poets are employing words that act as pronouns 
would— in that the words stand in for the kind of first 
person insistence we see later in Langland, whose 
dreamer will overtly claim for himself, in his own 
words, his actual name: "'I have lyued in londe,' quod 
I, 'my name is Longe Wille'." All three poets, 
moreover, do employ pronouns. We can say that,
modulating the troubadour tradition of naming, Dante 
insists on his presence in his text through, 
paradoxically, employing a poetics of absence (not to 
be confused with emptiness). Marcabru's ieu. Dante's 
i o . and even Langland's £--like Thomas of Erfurt's 
ego— are ontologically richer and more powerful than a
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lyrically anonymous address to a reader or listener, a 
rhetorical posture which corresponds to Thomas1s second 
person, tu. In Thomas's Grammatica speculativa there 
are two possible modes of signifying, which derive from 
the active and passive forms of understanding and 
verbal moods, as delineated by Siger. Hierarchical and 
ontological priority of signification had been most 
clearly defined by Hugh of St. Victor in the 
Didascalion. in his stipulation that all language 
descends from the divine Word. Hugh, like Thomas after 
him, identified discourse with presence (Gellrich 108). 
For Thomas hierarchy became a function of what he 
called propriety; he writes that "every active mode of 
signifying comes from some property of the thing 
[signified]" ("omnis modus significandi activus est ab 
aliqua rei proprietate" (GS ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 
136-37).
Proprietas is a principle that Thomas can apply to 
all elements and particles of a language, and which 
ultimately subsumes the possibility of human convention 
to what occurs naturally. In Thomas's thinking 
"grammar," as Gellrich shrewdly comments, "is imitating 
nature, which is in turn imitating it" (107). We might 
now consider how the principle of proprietas functions 
in Thomas' description of pronouns. In the 
demonstrative pronoun, a thing is signified by means of
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the "property of presence" ("proprietate praesentiae" 
fGS 200-01) .
IV
Thus it is that through a growing interest in grammar 
we can understand a consonant development in poetry: 
namely, the various uses of authorial personae, which 
are, more or less, present in their poems in a variety 
of ways. In Anselm we first see a critically new 
alignment of language per se with nature. This 
alignment also divorces the decisive criterion, in 
Augustine's thinking, for determining falsehoods— the 
criterion of intentionality. Anselm's terminology, his 
changing concept of what is natural, drives a wedge 
between intentionality and the judgment of what is true 
or false. Now a statement can be true in the sense 
that, let us say, grammatically, or else syntactically, 
the statement makes sense; yet such coherence need have 
nothing to do with the world beyond the statement. In 
other words, in Anselm's thinking, a statement may be a 
falsehood in that it does not accurately describe the 
experiential world. "My chair," as Anselm would have 
it, may not really be "upside down," and in fact I know 
this to be true by virtue of the fact that I am able to 
sit in it as I write this passage, while I am quite 
free to assert that "my chair is upside down" and in 
doing so I would be using language to denote a falsity
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even though my statement (i.e., "my chair is upside 
down") is perfectly understandable; my statement, 
however, is unbelievable. Due to Anselm's separation 
of intention and objective reference, centuries later 
Thomas of Erfurt feels free to prioritize various 
grammatical elements based on a natural hierarchy. By 
the time of Langland— whose poem Piers Plowman can 
conveniently be viewed as the culmination of the 
poetics of naming— author, persona and theme are all 
brought into a single linguistic embrace. Langland's 
elaborate "signature" takes into account its own 
textual dimensions in a special way, moreover, for 
Piers Plowman consists of a profound meditation on the 
nature of language. Two phrases particularly anchor 
the poem's discussion of the nature of language and 
discourse, each echoing the other; at one point the 
poem states that "grammar" is "the ground of all" and 
at another, "God is the ground of all" (see below). 
Langland's persona, Will, a figure who allegorically 
represents human intentionality,1 and who is in search
1. The most extensive discussion of this is John Bowers 
The Crisis of Will in Piers Plowman, who also includes a 
comprehensive review of scholarship on this topic; see 
pp. 41 ff. My discussion here presumes that the C text 
is the most fully realized version of Langland's 
endeavor; all the same—  in light of my remarks in my 
introduction and those of Vance et alia. condoning 
multiple text critical approaches to the study of 
medieval literature— I must consider Piers Plowman as a 
poem that to a degree will always be in flux. In short,
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of Truth, must struggle to understand the language that 
may hopefully serve that truth. The linguistic 
"ground" of Langland's poem is abundantly fertile. It 
has been nourished by intellectuals and poets who have 
preceded him.
Common to Marcabru, Dante and Langland, who as has 
been stated are pivotal in the evution of the modern 
persona (Chaucer's "Geoffrey" may be the most 
brilliantly drawn instance of poetic presence, but this 
persona does not demonstrate a new development in the 
poetics of naming), is the understanding that moral 
integrity is a necessity for enjoyment of truthful 
perception and for the proper use of language (which 
is, therefore, a truthful use) . At one and the same 
time they view language as separate from them and as 
having a life of its own. Within this understanding, 
one evolved into a discourse, each of the poets 
insinuates himself; and, as well, another element is 
injected into the d i s c o u r s e — the question of 
authorship. The issue of authorship is linked to the 
search for the truth; therefore finding for o n e , 
according to the equation of the poetry, will lead the 
reader to the other.
. . . Continued . . .
I want things both ways, yet such a procedure should not 
foreclose on the possibility of a close, intimate 
reading of Langland's poetic and philosophical 
tendencies.
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The modistae specifically located the discipline of 
linguistics as functioning somewhere between "being" 
(essens or ens) and "understanding" (intellicrens  ^. 
Their construct reflects a central preoccupation among 
poets who are contemporary and nearly contemporary with 
them, and who strove to achieve an ontological fullness 
through their capacity to understand their world. 
Since it is through the personae of these poets that 
the drama of this struggle is carried out, it should 
not be surprising that for these poets the power to 
understand and indeed to be redeemed, was self- 
centered. The voice of a poem, to be identified by the 
reader-1istener, will both lay claim to the poem's 
discourse while seeking its own distinction from that 
discourse; that is, the voice will, in a manner of 
speaking, seek its own integrity. This distinction 
reflects the original breach of language and intention 
that had been instituted by Anselm.
The proper noun, like the first person pronoun, 
epitomizes the poet's attempt at autonomy and 
centrality, which if achieved will bring to this 
author's, the persona's text, a profound sense of 
presence. In Langland this poetics is brought to full 
flower, since the sine qua non in assessing autonomy 
and distinction is individual volition— which we see 
portrayed in the Langland persona, Will. Hence the
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presence of the individual will becomes the theme of 
Piers Plowman, as the poem progresses, and in fact the 
poem can easily be viewed to be the testing ground of 
Langland's ideas about precisely how salvation is to be 
accomplished for the autonomous individual of later 
fourteenth century England. Not only do we see the 
roots of Langland's vision in earlier theologians and 
philosophers, but of course in earlier poets; we see 
the origins of Langland's issues as they are centered 
in thinkers like Aquinas, Siger, Thomas of Erfurt, and 
Ockham, just as well as in the poetics of Marcabru and 
Dante. In Thomas of Erfurt, the question of the first 
person pronoun goes right to the heart of the poetics 
of all three poets, first of all because, like all the 
modistae and for many thinkers before them, what holds 
Thomas' attention is the modus of language rather than 
the object of language's reference. Likewise, 
Marcabru, Dante and Langland, are interested in 
aligning themselves with their texts, as they locate 
themselves or we might say as they insert themselves 
into their respective discourses. The discourses 
thematically characterize these texts. Just as what is 
important for Thomas is the ways in which language, in 
and of itself, actually works. so too the preoccupation 
of the poets' discourses is with the very making of 
poetry and, furthermore, with the viability of poetic 
and by extension all linguistic expression. In the
210
later Middle Ages both the philosophers and the poets, 
then, are involved in an examination of self- 
referential systems, which they are able to separate 
from the world they describe and perhaps even enact, as 
autonomous. Furthermore, both groups seek to 
ontologically ground their projects, as if poetry can 
be viewed as a kind of reality. On the one hand, the 
world of the poem is of at least equal importance with 
the world beyond it, that* world to which it, as a 
minimum, purports to refer. On the other hand, a 
philosophy of language might enjoy the status of being 
a full- fledged, "scientific" discipline of thought.
Thomas's prioritizing of pronouns is a 
crystallization of this issue, for it invokes the 
question of presence in language as well as in the 
world at large. We can recall that for Thomas 
p r o p r i e t a s . as a function of meaning, becomes 
peculiarly crucial in the case of pronouns, since 
although a pronoun can only, as it were, stand in for a 
noun, it nevertheless "signifies the thing by means of 
the property of presence" ("proprietate praesentiae" 
[GS 200-201; cf. Gellrich 107-08]). Of importance is 
the fact that Thomas finds six indications of presence. 
the five senses as well as the intellect. This finding 
generally parallels the epistemological concerns that 
fuel the poetics of authorship of Marcabru, Dante and
Langland, for they can only truly be, in their poems 
and in the world, if they can rightly know and 
therefore speak or write. In turn, at the risk of 
putting it perhaps too simply, such intellection can 
only come through the benefices of caritas. Thomas 
does after all make distinctions between sensual 
pres e n c e  and intellectual presence; there are 
"different modes of certainty and presence" ("diversos 
modos certitudinis, et praesentiae" [200-201]). Yet 
even though he constructs different categories of 
perception, what is constant for him is that linguistic 
expression can convey presence; Thomas conceives of 
"spoken or written utterance as a property of the 
presence of meaning" (Gellrich 108). Remarkably, it
is in distinguishing among relative degrees of presence 
that Thomas privileges the grammatical first person, 
which he uses as a metaphor to help his reader 
conceptualize these distinctions. And although he 
might not apparently construct a hierarchy of presences 
in an expression such as "the grass is growing in my 
garden," spoken by someone who might actually 
be holding a bunch of grass in his han d — where 
obviously one "thing is being demonstrated 
(demonstratur) and another signified (significatur) " 
(108)— Thomas surely does, all the same, create a set 
of priorities when he likens these different presences 
to a hierarchy of personal pronouns. We can conceive
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of what is "actually established or present, as is 
demonstrated by the pronoun ego. to the less certain 
and present [. . .] demonstrated by the pronoun tu,"
and so on down the line ("contingit enim rem esse 
praesentem et certam, et maxime certam vel praesentem, 
et sic demonstratur per hoc pronomen ego. vel non 
maxime esse certam et praesentem, et sic demonstratur 
per hoc pronomen tju, et alia similia" [200-201; 
Gellrich 108]). In Thomas' view, and Hugh of St. 
Victor's before him, "discourse" enjoys a fundamental 
identification with presence. "But this factor means 
that, for Thomas and the other modistae. the modus 
essendi is just as much defined by, as it defines, its 
modus significandi" (108).
This same impulse is clearly operating in the poetry 
of Marcabru, in his unqualified assertions that he can 
sing best of all poets, that he is the one who can 
truly use language to its fullest, truthful potential, 
and in his claims that his language and his written 
texts are the representations of him— that they indeed 
speak for him. This both philosophical and poetic 
position is carried on after Marcabru, as it is 
elaborated and enriched, until it is fully evolved in a 
poet like Langland. Dante, Chaucer and Langland 
present far more complex versions of the troubadours' 
poetics, yet they never depart from the recognition 
that the discourse which embraces the issue of
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metapoetry will ultimately best define their more overt 
philosophical and/or theological themes, and, too, that 
such discourse will most profoundly enunciate 
themselves who are the auctors of texts that have, 
through such self-assertions, staked out a literary 
territory distinct from literary and theological 
traditions. At bottom, here is the import of Marcabru's 
railing against eroticism, for the act of true loving 
will bring eloquence with it. Marcabru makes himself 
present most overtly by mentioning himself in his 
poetry; presence is enacted more deeply through his 
discourse on the nature of morality and its 
relationship to the possibilities for eloquence. On 
the deepest level we sense Marcabru's presence in an 
ongoing discussion of the means to knowledge, which 
takes him into the issues of language and self.
In "Per savi * 1" wisdom belongs to the person who 
can perceive ("devina") the way in which his song 
presents meaning, how each word unfolds ("chascus motz 
declina") to reveal the poem's theme or reason ("si cum 
la razos despleia"). What Marcabru and all wise 
persons seek is the illumination that is a property of 
clarity ("d'esclarzir paraul' escura"), which brings 
the understanding of truth and which in turn will show 
the way to living an upright life, the life of "joy, 
patience and restraint" ("Jois, Sofrirs e Mesura").
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This is a likely description of how truthful poetry 
might operate or decline (again, "declina"). Thus the 
epistemological question is bound up in the issue of 
poetry itself; and so is, too, the question of the 
individual as being someone who can know and act 
autonomously through the use of language that at one 
and the same time can be viewed as capable of either 
falsity or truth, depending on who uses it (cf. 
"Chapter Two," above). For Love ("Amors" rather than 
"amars"), "by its word, action and its look, comes from 
a true heart when it gives its promise and pledge" 
("Segon dich, faich e semblanssa, / es de veraia corina 
/ car se promet e*s plevina"; cf. Goldin Lyrics 85). 
Contrary to what occurs in many of his other poems, 
Marcabru does not employ his own name in "Per savl" 
but the question of naming is within the poet's 
purview; a person might befoul love's gifts, he 
continues, and "whoever does not hasten to [Love] / 
bears the name of fool" ("ab sol que'l dos no sordeia, 
/ e qui vas lieis no s'enanssa / porta nom de 
follatura" [trans. Goldin 85; my emphasis]).
V
In Dante the epistemological issue is more fully 
evolved. The philosophical question of knowing had 
always impelled the later, but it is in the Divina 
Commedia that we encounter a Dante persona who has
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become a virtual witness. The term virtual is most 
appropriate here, because the Dante figure will speak 
of the ability to see as virtu; the word is almost as 
fecund for us today as it was in Dante's time. 
Virtu's range of meaning extends from the ability to 
negotiate the physical world, to the comprehension of 
ideas per se. to spiritual truths, to a moral integrity 
and/or stature. Dante's work contains an abundance of 
themato-imagistic cruces that exemplify the issue of 
poetry, epistemology and morality; in the larger 
context of our discussion of authorship and 
epistemology, his exploitation of the Italian word 
virtu. and the cachet it brings with it, will more 
than suffice.
At sunset, at the center of the Commedia. Puraatorio 
XVII, in his climb up the mountain of Purgatory the 
Dante persona first sees the sun again through the 
smoke of the third terrace; this re-vision is poignant, 
elegiac. The light is fading, almost totally gone. 
Strategically, at this moment the pilgrim calls upon 
the reader's power of imagination, and aligns it with 
his own, and sets it against the ebbing, tangible 
world— for when that world is gone, how does one 
"see"?:
e fia la tua imagine leggera 
in giugnere a veder com' io rividi 
lo sole in pria, che gia nel corcar era. (7-9)
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"then your imagination will be quick
to reach the point where it can see how I 
first came to see the sun again— when it 
was almost at the point at which it sets."1
Dante's use here of "rividi"— "saw again" (ri-vidi: 
literally, to have "seen again")— is set in opposition 
to "imagine"—  "imagine" (in the sense that Dante uses 
this word, in an appeal to his reader's 
imagination)— specifically to invoke two texts, a past 
text that is philosophically central to Dante's poem, 
the Summa Theologica. and a future text by Dante 
himself, Paradiso XXX. The nexus of these texts is 
Purgatorio XVII, which describes the transit from the 
third to the fourth terrace. Here is where, as noted 
by Italo Borzi, "through the speech of Virgil Dante 
expounds the theory of love that represents the 
fundamental problem of his philosophical thought 
[. . . . This theory will lead him finally to the]
infinite love [of God. . . . The road Dante will
travel is] part poetical and part ideological" (363, my 
trans.). Paradiso XXX, the beginning of the end of
1. All translations of the Commedia are by Allen 
Mandelbaum. In this section of my discussion I am 
deeply indebted to Professor Mandelbaum for his 
commentary on the Commedia generally and specifically 
for his glosses of Purgatorio XVII and Paradiso XXX. I 
am also grateful to Paul Spillenger for his careful 
reading of my analysis of these cantos and his helpful 
comments, especially for pointing out some lapses in 
translation. Last but not least, I must thank George 
Economou for his careful reading of this section.
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Dante's journey (cf. Shaw 191), will synthesize 
imagistic, philosophical and theological issues raised 
in this middle canto, Purgatorio XVII, thus bringing 
together preceding and engendering texts. In the 
Commedia Dante wants to test the integrity of material 
existence, just as he would want to reach essential 
immateriality and behind it the divine; in short, his 
strategy aims at developing a dichotomy in Aquinas' 
thinking about knowledge.
Sight, for instance, is mediated by spirits of 
sight, according to the science of Dante's time and as 
discussed in the Convivio (III, ix, 7-10); the agency 
of sight, then, is non- physical, so that the act of 
seeing a three dimensional world is contingent upon a 
power that derives from yet another dimension or 
dimensions. Indeed, there can be more than one kind of 
sight, and so in the Commedia we find an "identifiable 
pattern" involving "the pilgrim's sensory faculties," a 
progression that is
central to the theme of redemption. Throughout the 
narrative the poet documents the pilgrim's 
spiritual progress with careful attention to a 
shift in the use of verbs of perception and to his 
gradually increasing ability to interpret what he 
perceives correctly, so that spiritual truths 
finally can be apprehended directly with the 
intellect. In this second pattern [of seeing] 
Dante demonstrates the role of perception to 
conversion. (Adams 3379)
Dante, ultimately, is able to portray Aquinas's 
construct of the material/non-material universe, by 
bringing the question of the making of poetry— the 
question of, finally, an amorphous but decidedly poetic 
imagination--to bear upon the Thomistic dichotomy. 
Dante wishes to forge theology and poetry into a 
unified world. In this regard the relationship of the 
Summa is crucial to an often subtle and complex 
communication between Purgatorio XVII and Paradiso XXX. 
The key passage in Dante's parent text deals with the 
struggle to arrive at the Aristotelian concept of 
vision through likeness, by way of categories (i.e., 
briefly, we see an object in that its form resides in 
our soul [ST. 1.1.85.2]). In the spirit of Plato, 
Aquinas' diction here tellingly links the verbs videre 
and intellegere. as if to assert the evolution of 
natural knowledge out of two kinds of activity. One 
activity remains within the agent, such as seeing or 
understanding ("ut videre et intelligere"), and one 
passes over into a thing outside; each activity is 
produced in accord with a form. Thus, "what is 
understood is in the one who understands by means of 
its likeness"1 ("quod intellectum est in intelligente
1. Mandelbaum uses "fantasy" and "imagination" 
interchangeably to designate "that internal sense or 
power that retains sensible forms drawn from external 
things through the 'outer' senses" (Purgatorio 345, n. 
for 11. 13-18).
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per suam similitudinem") ; and, so, "what is actually 
understood is identical with the intellect as 
actualized" ("quod intellectum in actu est intellectus 
in actu"). In Purgatorio XVII this natural knowing is 
to be coupled to the divine through the querying of the 
origin of any sensible form that might reside in the 
imagination when no external thing is present. Aquinas 
had written that "with natural reason we only come to 
know God through images in the imagination" ("per 
rationem naturalem in cognitionem divinorum pervenire 
non possumus [etc.]").
However, "the same is true of the knowledge we have
through grace" ("nisi per phantasmata, similiter etiam
nec secundum cognitionem gratiae"). Even so,
By grace we have a more perfect knowledge of God 
than we have by natural reason. The latter 
depends on two things: images derived from the
sensible world and the natural intellectual light 
by which we make abstract intelligible concepts 
from these images. . . . The light of grace
strengthens the intellectual light and at the same 
time prophetic visions provide us with God-given 
images which are better suited to express divine 
things than those we receive naturally from the 
sensible world.
"per gratiam perfectior cognitio de Deo habetur a 
nobis quam per rationem naturalem. Quod sic patet: 
cognitio enim quam per naturalem rationem habemus, 
duo requirit, scilicet phantasmata ex sensibilibus 
accepta, et lumen naturale intelligible, cujus 
virtute intelligibiles conceptiones ab eis 
abstrahimus. . . . lumen naturale intellectus
conforatur per infusionem luminis gratuiti; et 
interdum etiam phantasmata in imaginatione hominis 
formantur divinitus, magis exprimentia res divinas 
quam ea quae naturaliter a sensibilibus accipimus, 
sicut apparet in visionibus prophetalibus 
[ . . . .]" (ST 1.12.13).
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Yet faith, which is necessary to the attainment of 
grace, "lacks the element of seeing"; hence, faith 
"fails to be genuine knowledge, for such knowledge 
causes the mind to assent through what is seen [. . .]" 
("Et sic in quantum deest visio deficit a ratione 
cognitionis quae est in scientia, nam scientia 
determinat intellectum ad unam per visionem [. . .]").
All the same, faith may be necessary to knowledge of 
the divine, as it may perhaps be a prerequisite to 
truly prophetic visions ("visionibus prophetalibus").
Perhaps Aquinas is trying to chart a progression
from physical sight, to imaginative "sight," to divine
knowledge that somehow eludes empirical procedures such
as those predicated on sight, understanding and
imagination. Dante plays out this resultant dialectic
of the material-immaterial through a likely metaphor
for revelation; first the act of seeing the sun and the
question of how a reader might be able to imagine such
a thing are delineated at the beginning of Canto XVII:
Ricorditi lettor, se mai ne l'alpe 
ti colse nebbia per la qual vedessi 
non altrimenti che per pelle talpe, 
come, quando i vapori umidi e spessi 
a diradar cominciansi, la spera
del sol debilimente entra per essi [. . .]. (1-6)
"Remember, reader, if you've ever been 
caught in the mountains by a mist through which 
you only saw as moles see through their skin, 
how, when the thick, damp vapors once begin 
to thin, the sun's sphere passes feebly through
them [. . .]."
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This is the place where the imagination will be linked 
with physical sight ("e fia la tua imagine leggera / in 
giugnere a veder com'io rividi / lo sole in pria, che 
gia nel corcar era"; cf. above). To be sure, the 
entirety of Purgatorio XVII is nothing less than a 
paean to the imagination that is frequently invoked in 
the words "imagine" (6, 21, 31), "imaginar" (43),
"imaginativa" (13) and "fantasia" (25). All of these 
terms are philosophically grounded in A q u i n a s ’ 
assertion (above) that the mortal imagination can at 
times serve as the vessel for images that are "divinely 
formed," so to better express divine things of the kind 
often conveyed in prophetic visions (cf. Pasquini, esp. 
144-45, 151). As Mandelbaum asserts, however, Dante's
usage reveals an ontological claim for the poetic 
imagination or fantasy:
while Aquinas would hardly have qualified poetic 
fictions (or fictions within a fiction— as Dante's 
are here) as 'prophetic visions', Dante does 
conjure that possibility both here and, implicitly, 
in the fiction of which these fictions are a part.
(Purgatorio 345-46)
In considering this fictio-visio context, then, it is 
especially important to note that words out of the 
Latin root videre occur in signal fashion throughout 
the canto— in "vedessi" (2), "veder" and "rividi" (8), 
as we have seen already, in "veder" (46, 130) and
"vede" (59), distantly in "visione" (34), more
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distantly in "vista" (52), and even in a word like 
"viso" (41, 68, 107; i.e., "face," especially the
forehead where sins are inscribed, each to be lifted 
off with the brush of an angel's wing as the Dante 
pilgrim makes his way upward [68]; cf. Ferrante 124 on 
this use in Par. XXX). There is also "apparivan" (72), 
"sentiva" (74), "sai" (93) and "comprender" (103).
More importantly, perhaps, there are the varied uses in 
this canto of the Latin root v irtus, which first 
appears in "la mia virtu quivi mancava" ("my power of 
sight was overcome" P u r g . X V I I . 54); "virtu" 
substitutes for words like sight. or eves (cf. Paradiso 
XXX.58-9: "che nulla luce e tanto mera, / che li occhi 
miei non si fosser difesi"--"that the purest light 
would not even have been so bright / as to defeat my 
eyes"). Although the Dante pilgrim continually bemoans 
what seem to be his own perceptual mortal limits, his 
use of virtu progressively transforms him and extends 
those limits. In his attempt to climb up to the fourth 
terrace, it is not long before he is moved to exclaim, 
"0 virtu mia, perche si ti dilegue?" ("0 why, my 
strength, do you melt away?" Purg. XVII.73). Then, 
shortly thereafter, Virgil's commentary makes an 
epistemological leap to: "Quinci comprender puoi
ch'esser convene / amor sementa in voi d'ogne virtute" 
(From this you see that— of necessity—  / love is the 
seed in you of every virtue" 103-4). Other word play
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leads to the same Thomistic knot in which the corporeal 
somehow becomes the vehicle for the spiritual. Note, 
for example, the much removed rhyme of "raggi" in "li 
ultimi raggi che la notte segue" ("the final rays of 
[sun]light before the fall of night" Purg. XVII.71) 
with the implication of reason. ragione. embodied in 
the verb to discourse. ragionare. which is shrewdly 
employed at the canto's end:
L'amor ch'ad esso troppo s'abbandona, 
di sovr'a noi si piange per tre cerchi; 
ma come tripartito si ragiona, 
tacciola" (136-39)
"The love that— profligately— yields to that 
["different good" Dante will meet further on 
in his journey] 
is wept on in three terraces above us; 
but I'll not say
what three shapes that love takes— "
The association of reason and speech was an "antique 
ideal [of] rhetoric as the integrating factor of all 
education" (Curtius 77). This association is evident 
in the twelfth century, most notably in the popularity 
of Martianus Capella's The Marriage of Mercury and 
Philology. which was "perhaps the most widely used 
school book of the Middle Ages" (H. 0. Taylor Classical 
Heritage 49). The particular conjunction of the image 
of light rays and both reason and discourse--which 
incidentally brings to bear upon Dante's pun the 
assumptions on the part of later modistae that presence 
resides in discourse (cf. above)— has precedent in none
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other than Marcabru's trope, " d 'esclarzir paraul' 
escura," which we have already examined extensively. 
Nearly concomitant intellectual developments in the 
universities may help to account for the figure, such 
as the influx of Averroism generally and specifically 
that of "Arab natural science and a 'metaphysics of 
light'" (Curtius 56). While there may be a false 
etymology to account for the association of light and 
reason or, alternately, discourse, actual etymology 
reveals a profound difference ("raggi" from the Latin 
root r a d i x , "ragionare" from the Latin ra t i o ) . 
Nevertheless this figure, and indeed this intellectual 
association, exhibits a great tenacity, as evinced in 
writing as late as that of the seventeenth century. 
The Spanish poet, Graci&n, like the earlier Marcabru, 
employed the negative version of the Dantean 
construction, to emphasize darkness and obscurity. 
Graci&n speaks of an "eclipse del alma"; this figure, 
immediately likened to the "pardntesis de mi vida" 
(cf. Curtius 415), implicates discourse as the medium 
for knowing by employing the rhetorical term 
parenthesis as a metaphor, which in turn can suggest 
that, again, presence is a function of such discourse.
Previous to the composition of the Commedia. Dante 
had aligned both reason and discourse with the powers 
of the sun and its manifestation in its rays of light.
225
The song, "Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona"— a part of 
the Convivio that is resurrected in the Purgatorio 
conversation between Dante and Casella, who starts to 
sing it— begins by proclaiming that Love discourses in 
Dante's mind; the discourse is about his beloved. The 
song's second stanza creates a parallel with the sun, 
which in a sense, like the discourse that speaks of his 
lady, "never sees a thing so noble as in that moment 
when it lights the region where she dwells" (Non vede 
il sol, che tutto '1 mondo gira, / cosa tanto gentil, 
quanto in quell'ora / che luce ne la parte ove dimora / 
la donna"). She is, says Dante, "the lady of whom Love 
makes me speak" ("di cui dire Amore mi face"); and 
indeed, "every intelligence above beholds her" ("Ogni 
Intelleto di la su la mira" [trans. Goldin German 
377]). Just as the sun can see. so can the intellect 
behold his beloved, of whom Dante speaks. Perhaps even 
more closely anticipating the Purgatorio passage, 
several stanzas later Dante further elaborates this 
topos of the weak intellect that can barely express, 
that can barely comprehend the truth of his beloved's 
beauty, which was established early in the poem 
("[. . .] se le mie rime avran difetto / ch'entreran ne 
la loda di costei, / di cio si biasmi il debole 
intelletto / e '1 parlar nostro, che non ha valore / di 
ritrar tutto cio che dice Amore," 14-18 [if my verses 
are not adequate / that undertake the praise of her, /
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let the infirm intellect be blamed, / and our speech, 
which does not have the power / to recount all that 
love speaks]). He proclaims that "Divine power 
descends into her" ("In lei discende la virtu 
divina"), much as the sun's rays descend to earth to 
illuminate the world; the implication here is that the 
rational intellect—  which determines the ability to 
discourse— and one's physical powers of sight are on a 
Platonic scale perhaps alike although not as 
powerful, not as penetrating or comprehensive as the 
supernatural powers afforded by the bestowal of grace. 
The song "Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona" also 
anticipates a Pauline echo that is crucial to the 
relationship between Purgatorio XVII and Paradiso XXX, 
the recounting of the blinding light, on the road to 
Damascus, which brings Saul revelation. The Convivio's 
song continues its elaborate analogy:
Cose appariscon ne lo suo aspetto 
che mostran de piacer di Paradiso, 
dico ne li occhi e nel suo docle riso, 
che le vi reca Amor com'a suo loco.
Elle soverchian lo nostro intelletto 
come raggio di sole un frale viso: 
e perch'io non le posso mirar fiso, 
mi convien contentar di dirne poco.
Sua bielta piove fiammelle di foco, 
animate d'un spirito gentile 
ch'e creatore d'ogni pensier bono; 
e rompon come trono
1'innati vizii che fanno altrui vile.
(11. 55-67)
In her aspect things appear
that image the joys of Paradise,
in her eyes, I mean, and her sweet smile:
Love leads them there as to his realm.
227
These things overcome our intellect 
as a ray of sunlight eyes that are weak; 
and because I cannot gaze on them continually 
I must be content to speak little of them.
Her beauty rains down flames of fire 
alive with a gentle spirit 
that is creator of all good thoughts; 
and like a thunderbolt they shatter 
the inborn vices that make us vile.
(trans. Goldin German 377)
For Dante, the confluence of "raggi" and "ragiona" 
in Purgatorio XVII helps to delineate how it is that 
the intellect can become the mediating force between 
spirit and body, one which, in its capacity for 
abstraction or, that is, for the non- palpable, mimics 
or perhaps mirrors the truly divine experience. Dante 
can see the rays of the sun, and can as well understand 
the idea of divine light even if he cannot (yet) 
experience it. Other ghost rhymes with Paradiso XXX 
make this clear, such as "[Ojcchio" (Par. XXX.48), and 
"occhi" (Ear. XXX.60), as mentioned earlier, and 
"raggio" (Par. XXX.106), which denotes the "light that 
[has made] apparent the Creator to the creature" ("Lume 
e la su che visible face / lo creatore a quella 
creatura" [Par* XXX.100-1]). Here "raggio" represents 
the ultimate in Thomistic teleology— that is, how the 
divine may be apprehended by a mortal. In this context 
"virtute" (Par. XXX.57) denotes the pilgrim's new 
(divine) knowledge when, concomitantly, he finds 
himself in a state of levitation due to an agency that 
"[sormante] di sopr'a mia virtute" (that surmounts. is
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"beyond the power that [was] mine"). Of course, the
thematically critical passage in Purcratorio XVII, which
makes all that ensues in the poem possible, is Dante's
apostrophe that grows out of his recognition of the
possible depth of imaginative experience:
0 imaginativa che ne rube 
tavolta si di fuor, ch'om non s 1accorge 
perche dintorno suonin mille tube,
chi move te, se '1 senso non ti porge?
Moveti lume che nel ciel s'informa,
per se o per voler che giu lo scorge. (13-18)
"0 fantasy, you that at times would snatch 
us from outward things— we notice nothing 
although a thousand trumpets sound around us—  
who moves you when the senses do not spur you?
A light that finds its form in Heaven moves you—  
directly or led downward by God's will."1
Doctrinally, these lines come right out of Aquinas (as
we have seen) , but also evident here is the general,
experiential manner, in which Dante has come to
sympathize with, to understand the very instigation of
Aquinas' pursuit; it is out of a state of rapture, in
which the normally sensible world would fall away, that
Dante can acquaint himself with an "inner" light.
Hence, just as a dialectic of the material- 
immaterial is established in this canto, in another 
canto, Paradiso XXX, the play of sensible and divine 
light is adumbrated in, likely enough, direct response
1. Mandelbaum uses "fantasy" and "imagination" 
interchangeably to designate "that internal sense or 
power that retains sensible forms drawn from external 
things through the 'outer' senses" (Purgatorio 345, n. 
for 11. 13-18).
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to this earlier phenomenological meditation (perhaps 
anticipated at the start of the Commedia in the line, 
”0 mente che scrivesti cio c h ‘io vidi"— "0 memory, 
that set down what I saw" [Inf.. II. 8; cf. Pasquini 
135]J.1 The light in the Paradiso canto is sumptuous 
and dazzling to its unique witness, Dante, who writes 
of it employing forms of the verb to see no fewer than 
16 times. As well, he uses the words "vista" and 
"occhio-i," each appearing five times; in addition, we 
should note the noun "palpebre," the adjectives
"visible" and "visivi," and the verb "Mira" (Di Scipio
156, n 7 ; cf. Pasquini 134-35, 138- 39). Beatrice,
furthermore, speaks a succession of three sentences
that begin with the imperatives "Mira," "Vedi" and 
"vedi" respectively (Shaw 211). Indeed, such 
repetition and alliteration suggest, as Joan Ferrante 
puts it, "the 'vita nuova' that the vision in each case 
[each imperative] heralds," particularly in the rhyming 
of vidi with itself (XXX.95-99)—  which focuses on the 
concept of vision and "also connects Beatrice, the 
sight of whom started Dante on the journey to God, with 
the God to whom she has now brought him"— vidi being 
the only self-rhyme in the Paradiso apart from Cristo 
(124) .
1. In passing, let us not Chaucer's Proem in Book II of 
the Hous of Fame: "0 thought that wrot al that I mette,
/ And in the tresorye hyt shette / Of my brayn [. . .]."
230
These lines crystallize the question of the 
individual's capacity, his spiritual and intellectual 
depth as well as volition— that is, the question of an 
individual's r e s o l v e — to make poetry that can 
comprehend a truth beyond linguistic expression.
VI
In Dante the epistemological aspect of the poet's 
struggle is more fully explored than in Marcabru. But 
so too is the question of the individual will, which we 
see dramatized broadly in the frequent exhortations of 
the pilgrim's various guides to continue his journey. 
That journey finally leads to a splendor that is almost 
more than can be beheld and is of course much more 
than, as the poet-pilgrim tells us, he can report to 
us. His vision, as well as his resolve, and ultimately 
his ability to speak of his experiences, are all 
determined by his faith. Much as Marcabru establishes 
a link between the individual poet and the question of 
knowing, which is fully explored by Dante, in turn the 
link Dante establishes between faith and volition will 
be fully developed by Langland. In this light we might 
better understand what takes place in the Commedia; we 
particularly need to comprehend the inter- and 
intratextual relationships Dante has created there, 
such as the special communication between this
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Purgatorio and this Paradiso canto. Poetically, Dante 
is attempting a critique of experience, one which he 
would like to have reach beyond Aquinas' phenomenology.
What is remarkable is that Aquinas can be seen to be 
both doctrinal and poetic source for Dante. Aquinas 
has written, for instance: "the stronger our
intellectual light [is] the deeper the understanding we 
derive from images, whether these be received in a 
natural way from the senses or formed in the 
imagination by divine power" ("quod ex phantasmatibus 
vel a sensu acceptis secundum naturalem ordinem, vel 
divinitus in imaginations formatis"). Revelation 
provides a "divini luminis." Yet "Faith is a sort of 
knowledge" ("fides cognitio quaedam est"); but (again) 
because it "lacks the element of seeing faith fails to 
be genuine knowledge" ("Et sic in quantum deest visio 
deficit a ratione cognitionis quae est in scientia" [ST 
I.I.13.2]; cf. above).
Considering Aquinas, who is so thoroughly 
appropriated by Dante, it is fair to ask how the poetry 
of the Commedia is new—  how might it strive to resolve 
the dialectic beyond Dante the reporter's, the 
witness', retreat into his topos of ineffability when 
confronted by Godly things? An answer lies in the 
special relationship between these two cantos. The 
earlier one, Purgatorio XVII, invokes the question of
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knowing the nonsensible and even the divine, 
establishes the terms for such knowing in the imagery 
of the sun and otherwise a light whose apprehension 
might bring such knowledge, and describes the ascent 
from the third to the fourth terrace, where Dante will 
have another burdenful sin removed while the sun has 
almost wholly set. The corresponding canto, Paradiso 
XXX, when Dante first apprehends the celestial 
Rose— finally, a rose of light— occurs when the sun is 
about to rise; this rising sun counters the Purgatorio 
canto's sunset.
This pivotal relationship is unique, ultimately 
founded deep in the linguistic fabric of Dante's 
doctrinal sources: Aquinas, and his source, Augustine. 
In trying to find a way out of Aquinas' epistemological 
dilemma, the dilemma of how to know the divine with 
only the tools of perception (i.e., the Aristotelian 
aspect of Aquinas) , Dante can only name the unnameable 
through a poetics of intense linguistic "play." He 
employs strategies like alliteration, rhyme and 
repetition. He uses neologisms. More pertinent to 
this present focus is Dante's telescoping of Latin 
syntax and morphology in the simpler Italian (as 
Ferrante has examined at length). Along these lines, 
however, we find an even subtler and truly penetrating 
play, which has everything to do with Dante's loaded
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use of the word virtu--a key to a finer, almost 
subliminal procedure that is grounded in polysemous 
punning.
Aquinas speaks of how knowing— and its necessary 
adjunct, mental knowing, by which the sign of the 
object is apprehended (or, as Augustine calls it, the 
"verbum mentis")— unavoidably means consciousness of 
both good and evil. Thus Dante paraphrases Aquinas in 
Purgatorio XVII:
Lo naturale e sempre sanza errore, 
ma 1 1altro puote errar per malo obietto 
o per troppo o per poco di vigore. (94-96)
"The natural is always without error, 
but mental love may choose an evil object 
or err through too much or too little vigor."
Aquinas' authority for this assertion derives from 
Augustine, who is quoted in the Summa (1.1.12) in the 
general context of Aquinas' discussion of grace as that 
capacity to bestow divine knowledge— a knowledge that 
belongs only to the good. Aquinas writes that 
Augustine says in his retractions, "Non approbo quod in 
oratione dixi; Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire 
voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non 
mundos multa scire vera" ("I do not now approve what I 
said in a certain prayer, '0 God who hast wished only 
the clean of heart to know truth . . .' for it could be 
answered that many who are unclean know many truths"; 
my emphases); then Aquinas adds to Augustine the
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explanatory: "scilicet per rationem naturalem" ("i.e., 
by natural reason" [3.43]).
It remains for a poet, rather than a theologian, to 
appreciate the depth of Augustine's diction, and to 
profit by it. Here Dante finds the opportunity for 
semantic expansion in Augustine's use of "mundos" (as 
in, "multos etiam non mundos verum scire"—  "many who 
are not clean know many truths"). In Augustine's 
Latin, as in the Italian mondo, there are two meanings 
for this word: "clean," as well as "world" or
"universe."1 Therefore, privileging mondo as a rhyme 
word, Paradiso XXX begins with a description of a world 
in shadow:
e questo mondo 
china gia 1'ombra quasi al letto piano [. . . .]
(2-3)
"and now our world 
inclines its shadow to an almost level bed. . . . "
Such a world presages the Pauline echo (first 
indicated, by the way, in Inferno II. 28-33) of later 
lines:
1. Lewis 1175. Souter's A Glossary of Later Latin (to 
600 A.D.) cites for mundus as an adjective: "clean from 
(some filth)," and for mundo: "cure, heal; blot out
(sins), purify (the sinner)." Niermeyer's Mediae 
Latinatatis Lexicon Minus also cites for mundus as an 
adjective: "3. lave d'un blame. innocent —  clear of 
quilt, innocent."
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Come subito lampo che discetti 
li spiriti visivi, si che priva 
da l'atto l'occhio di piu forti obietti, 
cosi mi circunfulse luce viva, 
e lasciommi fasciato di tal velo 
del suo fulgor, che nulla m'appariva. (46-51)
"Like sudden lightning scattering the spirits 
of sight so that the eye is then too weak 
to act on other things it would perceive, 
such was the living light encircling me, 
leaving me so enveloped by its veil 
of radiance that I could see no thing,"
Before Dante, Saul— whose life was, in a sense, still
in shadow—  was blinded by a uniquely strong light on
the road to Damascus (Di Scipio 151-52):
Factum est autem, eunte me, et appropinquante 
Damasco media die subito da caelo circunfulsit me 
lux copiosa: decidens in terram, audivi vocem
dicentem mihi: Saule, Saule, quid me
persequeris? . . . .  Et cum non viderem prae 
claritate luminis illius, ad manum deductus a 
comitibus, veni Damascum. (Acts 22.6-11)
"And it came to pass, as I was going, and drawing 
nigh to Damascus at midday, that suddenly from 
heaven there shone round about me a great light: 
And falling on the ground, I heard a voice saying 
to me: Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? . . . .
And whereas I did not see for the brightness of 
that light, being led by the hand by my companions, 
I came to Damascus." (trans. of Rheims 161-62)
Thus we find the Dante pilgrim speaking of a veil of
light that can blot out the ordinary light of the world
(derived from Paul's "da caelo circunfulsit me lux
c o p i o s a " ) . 1 This image turns on the verb for
1. But note Aquinas (ST I.I.13.2 and contra): " . . .  for 
Dionysius says, * It is impossible for the divine ray to 
shine upon us except as screened round about by the 
many-coloured sacred veils' [De caelesti hierarchia I. 
PG 3.121]"; and, Sed contra: "St. Paul says, 'God has 
revealed to us through his Spirit [I Corinthians 2, 8, 
10] a wisdom which none of this world's rulers knew' and
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apprehension, "appariva" (51; above). Arguably, the 
earlier distant rhyme of "raggi" and "ragiona" 
foreshadows this revelatory development. Yet, finally, 
discourse and reason (ragione, ratio) must belong only 
to the clean of heart.
This dynamic— sight, reason, discourse and spiritual 
purity-- has been abundantly drawn previously. In 
Purgatorio X, the pilgrim comes upon a sculpted wall 
with three examples of humility, prior to his encounter 
with the prideful souls. Marilyn Migiel comments that, 
although Virgil has pointed them out (11. 101-02),
the pilgrim has difficulty deciding what it is that 
he sees, and says to Virgil, "Maestro, quel ch'io 
veggio / muovere a noi non mi sembian persone" 
("Master. . . what I see moving toward us does not
seem to me persons") (Purg. X.114), but then in a 
more severe outburst, "0 superbi critiani" ("0 
proud Christians") (X.121-29), Dante presents his 
inability to see as the result of a scene which is 
in reality confused: in short, it is the proud who 
are blind, unable to integrate themselves into 
Christian society, and therefore render themselves 
unrecognizable as men. (151)
Dante has in effect spoken to the reader several lines 
earlier, by explaining the purpose of the bas-reliefs:
[. . .] io mi dilettava di guardare 
1'imagini di tante unilitadi, [. . .].
(X.97-98)
. . . Continued . . .
a gloss says [Interlinear Gloss from St. Jerome. PL 
30.752] that this refers to philosophers."
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[. . .] I took much delight in witnessing 
these effigies of true humility [. . .].
This previous address to the reader becomes the agency 
by which the question of "who it is who really sees, 
and who on the other hand is responsible for the visual 
confusion," is clarified.
If the pilgrim has trouble figuring out what the 
"text" of the body says, the fault lies in the 
inability of the text to communicate virtue 
properly; the fault of the text is, interestingly 
enough, also called blindness, in accordance with a 
theology of humility which associates pride with 
blindness and humility with clear vision.
(Migiel 151-52)
The intertextual message embedded in the complex of 
texts— that is, the testimony of Paul, Purgatorio XVII 
and Paradiso XXX--is that only the good, whose sins 
have been removed, who are now pure, may know a divine 
and clear light. The diction of Paradiso XXX, and 
perhaps the imagery, are anticipated in Purgatorio XVII 
through a Thomistic dichotomy imagistically introduced 
in Dante's observation of the sensible light of the 
stars:
Gia eran sovra noi tanto levati 
li ultimi raggi che la notte segue, 
che le stelle apparivan da piu lati. (70-72)
"Above us now the final rays before 
the fall of night were raised to such a height 
that we could see the stars on every side"
In this "re-seeing" of the sun another truth emerges; 
lights appear through the rays of another (sun)light.
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The implicit, ultimate Thomistic meaning, of an 
opposition like this is that the sight of the divine is 
a moral sight, the virtue enjoyed by the purified; for 
in Paradiso XXX Dante counterpoints Purgatorio XVII's 
paradox of fully sensible starlight in a night sky, 
when the sun has yet to fully disappear, in his playful 
use of vidi to enact the absolute Godly radiance:
0 isplendor di Dio, per cu1 io vidi 
l'alto triunfo del regno verace, 
dammi virtu a dir com' io il vidi!
(97-99; my emphases)
"0 radiance of God, through which I saw 
the noble triumph of the true realm, give 
me the power to speak of what I saw!"
In Purgatorio XVII the sun is seen again ("rividi") as 
the light of the stars overtakes it. Likewise, in 
Paradiso XXX there is a twice-seeing ("vidi . 
vidi"). And even if Dante does not have the power 
("virtu") to speak of what he sees (he does , 
however!), he nevertheless has clearly been given a 
vision that is possible because of both his purity and 
his "understanding."
The poet Ezra Pound might have been thinking of this 
moment when he wrote that artists are the antennae of 
their race (73). Paul Ricoeur writes that in the use of 
metaphorical expression we extend the frontiers of 
meaning and thus extend the reach of human knowledge 
(257-313). And James Hans has stipulated (cf. the
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"Introduction," above) how artistic activity allows the
employment of "the furrows of [a] predictable range [of
experience] to get outside of those furrows of
predictability and, in going outside of them, [to
enlarge] the field of some of the furrows" (90).
Perhaps this is, in a fashion, what Dante has in mind.
The bas-reliefs in Purgatorio X, for example, raise the
question of a mortal poet's limitations. The
sculptures are Godly art, of course. Yet they are art.
Rather than a prideful emendation of Aquinas, what we
can find stipulated in the very presence of the
sculptures is that they
are in fact a most effective way of presenting the 
necessity of the expression of humility. Humility 
is given life here in a medium which is otherwise 
silent, a medium which in its cold stoniness could 
remind us of tombstones, which conceal rather than 
reveal. Clearly, this association was present to 
Dante, who notes in Purgatorio XII.16-24 that the 
images of the proud were like tombstones. Not only 
do the images immediately communicate their 
message, but that message is immediately available 
to the interpreter. (Migiel 150-51) Dante was
at least indirectly influenced by new Aristotelian 
texts, particularly the Nichomachean Ethics. As a 
result of these texts, "[h]umility came to be 
defined as a mean in opposition to extreme 
exaltation or deprecation of the self" (156). 
Francesco Tateo asserts that for Dante, rather than 
a "mortification of one's person"— as conceived of 
by theologians and as Aquinas might have understood 
it, "that deprecation of the self with which the 
Middle Ages was familiar in the even exaggerated 
behavioral manifestations of certain kinds of 
mystics"—
[h]umility is the awareness of human limitations 
(just as pride is blindness, unawareness of those 
limitations); and it is precisely the sense of 
human containment that renders man equal to 
himself, a creature worthy of the highest divine 
acknowledgement. (trans. Migiel 153)
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It is the ability of art, of poetry, through its 
inherently artistic tensions, tensions founded on 
ambiguity of expression, which makes possible both the 
realization of mortal limits and the promise of 
transcendence of these same limits through divine aid, 
that is, through grace. Thus it can be said that 
through the reportage of the pilgrim-witness he creates 
Dante attempts a universal unification through poesis. 
In doing so he will deny that he has the power 
to authentically name his experience in Paradise; 
perhaps, though, he has quietly spoken that name in the 
sense of, not only Paul's vision that only sees 
"through a glass darkly," but, more graphically, in the 
sense of the parables that end: "let those who have
eyes to see, see."
VII
Dante does not actually name himself in the Commedia 
but has others do it for him. In this sense we can 
speak of him as absent in his poem— in comparison with 
both Marcabru and Langland, who do specifically name 
themselves. However, Dante is profoundly present 
throughout his writing, by virtue of his poetic 
ingenuity; though he is not self-named, he is just the 
same signified by a construction like "io sol uno" as 
well as through the naming of others. Beatrice, for
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instance, actually calls the pilgrim "Dante" (Purg. 
XXX.55) j*1 she actually speaks his name aloud.
Dante invokes presence, too, by bringing to the fore 
of the Commedia the issue of discourse itself, its 
possibilities and its dangers, which he examines in the 
context of a larger epistemological discussion. 
Discourse is first and foremost dramatized in the 
conversations with his various guides, which represent 
spiritual as well as intellectual unions. These 
conversations are carried on as vehicles for alternate, 
in a sense absent, "intertextual conversations" Dante 
enjoys between himself and others. In the case of 
Purgatorio XVII and Paradiso XXX, for example, it can 
be said that Dante "discourses" with Aquinas, 
Augustine, Paul, and quite possibly Dionysius, 
Aristotle and Plato.
The Commedia finds its contrast in the fourteenth 
century English poem Piers Plowman. Like the earlier 
Marcabru, William Langland invokes presence in his 
poetry by specifically naming himself. Langland 
presents us with a newly poetic and philosophical 
development. He aligns his name with the thematic crux 
of Piers P l o w m a n . which centrally involves the
1. See Holloway's discussion of Beatrice's naming of 
Dante, and its parallel in Piers Plowman (pp. 220-21), 
to be examined later.
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individual's capacity to direct his or her own journey 
towards salvation. The poem further asks how that 
journey is determined by knowledge; once again and most 
of all, the poem asks whether or not that journey can 
be comprehended by discourse— because for Langland 
journey, discourse, knowledge and salvation, are all 
represented repeatedly by images of texts and books. 
This is no longer the merely Augustinian book, however, 
nor is it that which had been conceived of by 
Scholastics or Aquinas. Rather, Langland's 
understanding of the symbol of the book shows how 
symbolism can be pushed to its extremes, by the 
nominalist point of view, as was most comprehensively 
developed by William of Ockham.
Dante's poetic authority is ultimately asserted by 
the fact that, symbolically, he triumphs over his 
"father poet" Virgil; Dante the pilgrim continues on 
into Paradise while Virgil the pagan must turn back 
from making that ultimate journey. Subtextually, too,
Dante triumphs over Aquinas through a peculiarly poetic 
"resolution" of Thomistic doctrines. In like fashion 
Langland triumphs over Ockham and other thinkers of his 
time— the later Modistae, the Moderni; he transcends 
his circumstances, specifically through his 
philosophical meditation on language and reality. The 
transcendence is depicted in the triumph, in a sense,
over other characters Will the pilgrim encounters on, 
as in the Commedia. his own journey towards salvation. 
For Dante, self-enunciation is linked to the thematics 
of the persona's poem. In Langland's work we see a 
final stage in the development of the poetics of 
authorship, as the poem's theme and its persona are 
seamlessly fused into one entity. This fusion 
occurred— perhaps it can be said that it was first 
attempted— in the Roman de 1a r o s e ; but in this 
encyclopedic, early allegory, the persona was merely an 
allegorical figure. Langland's Will, on the other 
hand, much like the Dante persona, is fully drawn. He 
is a flesh and blood individual with whom a reader can 
easily identify. Thus, as we shall see, Langland's 
persona is fully present.
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Chapter Four 
Ockham, Chaucer and Langland:
Poetic Voice, Poetic Text, Thematics and the Individual
I
In Piers Plowman the sheer preponderance of proper 
nouns— names—  incidents in which things or characters 
are named, and the like, attest the theologico- 
philosophical currents of the poem's time. In the B 
text, for instance, there are an astounding number of 
names of individual personages (approaching three 
hundred), of which the greatest majority represent 
allegorized, personified concepts. Nominalist views, 
professed by thinkers like William of Ockham or Robert 
Holcot, brought to a critical mass what had already 
been a progressively focused meditation on language. 
Language could be identified by theologians with the 
processes of nature. As we have seen, the
identification arose as early as St. Anselm, in his 
recognition that any given utterance contained a 
natural ("naturaliter"; cf. above) cogency or internal 
logic that inhered in a statement regardless of its 
objective truth or falsity. Anselm's recognition 
modified Augustine's description of what was natural 
and true. Both men held that naturalness could be the 
criterion of a kind of truth, and separated that 
criterion as distinct from other means of determining
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knowledge and truth. In effect, Anselm had begun to 
elevate the realm of the natural world to a greater 
status than it had previously enjoyed, first and 
foremost by recognizing its unique character and its 
autonomy.
The shared concern of theologians from the time of 
Anselm to that period characterized by what became 
known as the modistae. and even later the moderni of 
the fourteenth century, involved the attempt to 
describe the role and significance of the noun in the 
dynamic of language, especially in relation to a 
reality beyond the dynamic proper. Inevitably, the 
moderni involved themselves with the role of the name. 
Within this particle of language resided the greatest 
possibility for language to reflect reality, it was 
thought, because nouns, and proper nouns (and, 
secondarily, pronouns), were in the most radically 
philosophical inquiries viewed as containing the full 
plenitude of being (cf. "Chapters Two and Three," 
above). As nouns and pronouns functioned within their 
utterances, their language was understood to be as 
ontologically full as any mortal language could be. 
Or, rather, we can say that particularly these parts of 
speech could be understood as possessing immanence. 
Therefore, they were capable not only of fueling the 
phenomenological processes of linguistic expression,
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but of ordering such expression as first of all 
proceeding from a source within them.
The issue of nouns speaks directly to Langland's 
poem. As Coleman writes, furthermore, pertinent to any 
examination of Piers Plowman is the recognition that 
"[t]he way in which the moderni understood language as 
signifying reality shows us how they would later, as 
theologians, deal with the language of Scripture as 
signifying historical reality" (Piers 19). The twelfth 
century expansion of the Aristotelian corpus included 
the Sophistical R e f u t a t i o n s . which was of great 
importance to a seminal nominalist work, Peter of 
Spain's Summulae Loaicales; the Summulae. in turn, 
concerned itself with what Peter considered to be the 
primary elements of propositions— nouns and verbs 
(Coleman Piers 21, 198-99 n. 12). Augustine had linked 
signs to real and true signifieds. Aristotle, and 
Boethius, had recognized that through the 
significative function of substitutive nouns things in 
themselves could come into being, within the confines 
of statements about these things (cf. Aristotle Soph. 
Refut. I .165a.6-13). This shared view was succinctly 
expressed, for example, in Boethius' assertions that 
"nomen est vox significata," and in commenting on 
Aristotle's Categories. that the work seeks "de primis 
rerum nominibus et de vocibus res significantibus 
disputare" (In Categorias Aristotelis Libri guattuor
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in PL 64.159a-294c, espec. 159a-61c; in Coleman 21, 199 
nn. 13 and 14). This traditional view of language was 
elaborated in the early nominalism of Peter Abelard, 
who over 11 [emphasized] Scriptural word as signifier" 
(Coleman 21) .
All of these critical turns in the intellectual 
history of the Middle Ages set the stage for the 
fourteenth century moderni to "[press] the methodology 
of speculative grammarians and logicians onto issues of 
dogma" (Coleman 22). The adoption of the basic 
position of earlier thinkers like the speculative 
grammarians resulted in a "linguistic realism," since 
the moderni were virtually following Peter of Spain who 
ascribed "physical properties to terms" and hence 
endowed "words with material and formal causes usually 
reserved for substances." In propositions, words 
substituted for things whose physical characteristics 
were attributed to their signifying words (199 n. 16). 
This resulted in a further vitiation of the discipline 
of theology, as this speculative energy continued to 
spread into a newer discipline of philosophy that 
comprehended questions of language and logic. Perhaps 
such a change could be better understood as the 
inability of theology to withstand purely abstractive 
procedures that also relied on rationalism, in a denial 
of mysticism. The common medium between the two— the 
rational and the mystical— was language.
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Instead of grammar, logic and theology remaining 
separate but interrelated disciplines, they were 
merged under the conceptual rubric of Logic. 
Theology was, so to speak, dragged down by the 
"scientific" methodology of the logicians. All 
knowledge was resolved into propositions. Rational 
dialectic with its emphasis on argumentation by 
means of the soundly argued sophism analysed the 
parts of speech in the proposition. This 
methodology intruded into all other fields of 
knowledge and invaded the realm of theology with 
dramatic consequences because of the belief that 
all knowledge, thought, language, could be broken 
down into the terms of propositions. (22)
As Paul Vignaux writes, "[bjeginning with the logic of 
language, the nominalist consciously [set] up 
ontological problems" (in Coleman 22).
A counterpart of this emphasis on language is the 
deepening conviction that the mortal individual "was 
exalted in the realm of nature, to the point of working 
his own salvation through the exercise of his free 
will" (23). Again, it is possible to see the origin of 
these views in Anselm's observation of the natural 
machinery of linguisis, as well as in nominalistically 
literal readings of Scripture. Yet by the fourteenth 
century the properties of statements had become 
integrated into a more complex vision in which 
language, human will, and salvation through divine 
grace, exist in an interactively existential structure. 
In fact the new theology, more than before, is 
concerned with moral issues, especially after the 
thirteenth century and particularly in England (cf.
249
Damasus 1256-1956. 146- 274, espec. 149; in Coleman
23-24, 200 nn. 22, 23). These issues centered around 
the necessity for humanity's "conformity to God's 
reward or justification and acceptance" (Coleman 24), 
which in a thinker like Holcot is embodied in the claim 
that to do one's best naturally ("ex puris 
naturalibus") facilitates the bestowal of Grace upon 
the individual ("Facientibus quod in se est Deus non 
denegat gratiam" [In Librum Sapientie Salmonis 28 B and 
120 fol. clxxxiii.ra-va; cf. Coleman 24 and 200 n. 
25]) .
In the thirteenth century, Aquinas had distanced 
himself from Aristotle by likening the rational 
appetite (appetitus rationalis) with the Christian will 
(voluntas) (W. H. V. Reade 116 ff.; in Freccero Dante 
47-48). In the fourteenth century, as we see virtually 
mirrored in Piers Plowman. pivotal theological and 
philosophical concepts become the sense of obligation 
and merit on the part of the individual. Now the focus 
is on the viator, and his possible reward. Ultimately, 
the question being asked by both Langland and the 
nominalist moderni is, can there be a natural act that 
is a prerequisite for salvation? For the natural act 
might be that which is distinct from human actions that 
unfold with the aid of divine grace (Coleman 25).
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II
It is within this theologico-epistemological construct 
that the ways in which reason and conscience were 
conceptualized in Langland's time intersect in his 
poem. In it Langland holds, "'wot no man . . . who is
worthy to have1," since, as Coleman has keenly noted,
worthiness for reward is to be understood so that 
God's free will as well as the free will of men 
might survive intact. A reconciliation of the 
wills, like a reconciliation of the two orders of 
justice, finds its unity in Christ. The poem, 
then, is an elaborate gloss on John l:17--"for the 
law was given by Moses but grace and truth came by 
Jesus Christ." Through Christ, justice and mercy 
are reconciled. (195)
This conception of reconciliation represents a 
decided shift in how the workings and effect of divine 
grace were conceived of, a shift away from what was 
generally held to be true in the previous century. The 
new alternative, also mirrored in Langland's poem, a 
poem of epic stature, can easily be viewed as the 
ethical expression of its time. As elaborated by Dante 
in the Commedia. Thomistic philosophy sees the realms 
of the senses and of the imagination as distinct from 
faith and grace; these realms are alternative points of 
departure for acquiring knowledge of the world and 
furthermore for expressing that knowledge. Such a 
poeticized theology receives a total renovation in 
Piers Plowman. This fourteenth century poem's ideas 
about knowledge, language and reality embrace the
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thinking of Langland's contemporaries, the moderni. 
Not only Ockham, of course, but other grammatico- 
logistic theologians such as Holcot, Thomas Buckingham 
and Adam Woodham, all caused a reaction and radical 
turn to orthodoxy (23). The reaction is central to 
Langland's vision, measurable in shared concerns for 
grammar and epistemology.
From the point of view of the history of philosophy, 
ironically, we can say that these fourteenth century 
figures needed to construct a world vision that 
contained two fundamental aspects, the potentia 
absoluta and the potent ia ordinata of God. 
Respectively, the one was designed to express the 
absolute freedom of God within a world of necessity, 
the other to indicate divine power in its aspect 
relative to humankind and the possibility for the 
exercise of the individual will towards the achievement 
of salvation, all according to the divine covenant. 
This ultraconservative response was a consequence of 
the dismantling of miraculous thinking that, in 1277, 
resulted in the condemnation of the Paris arts faculty, 
an event brought about by advances in philosophy that 
included rationalism as a central procedural tenet of 
current theology. Just as Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) 
had approached theology as a science that he held must 
be as mathematically exact as geometry, so too
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succeeding theologians "felt their inadequacy as 
scientists when it came to knowing and demonstrating 
properties of the divine essence which they knew only 
as a general idea, not as a distinct object of 
knowledge" (18).
In defense of logic and philosophy, Ockham and 
others chose to make a stand within the domain of 
language, by pursuing the question of whether or not it 
could contribute to the establishing of truth or 
falsity in the demonstration of principles. This in a 
sense became their "geometry." Yet there was, perhaps, 
a cost to be paid in this "retrenchment." Just as the 
paradoxical nature of the Trinity was irreconcilable 
(cf. Auerbach Dante 8-9, and above), God's "primacy and 
unity" could not be demonstrated. Consequently, the
realms of experience and faith were split as they 
never were for thirteenth century thinkers. This 
meant that logical analysis applied more to the 
workings of God in the world as it is (the 
ordinata). than to God's nature per se.
(Coleman 19; see Scotus I Sent, d. 17 q. 1,
and Ockham Ouodlibet VI q. 1).
As we have seen in the Commedia. Dante diverges from 
Aquinas' doctrines in relatively conservative ways. We 
have examined this attempt to establish poetic thought 
and language as an entity unto itself and subsequently 
to integrate the poetic processes into an all 
embracing, theologically grounded epistemology. 
Langland perpetuates such a claim for poetry. Dante
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also places the heathen emperor Trajan and Ripheus in 
Paradise (Par. XX.121- 24) despite the Thomistic 
doctrine of the supremacy of Grace in the machinery of 
knowledge and salvation (i.e., Dante's claim for the 
pagans was based on their good faith apart from other 
circumstances) . In the fourteenth century there is an 
even greater accommodation to the idea that the 
individual will, which can manifest itself as faith, 
through good works performed naturally, can achieve 
salvation. In the C text of Piers Plowman. Langland, 
having elaborated the Trajan story more emphatically 
than Dante before him, in order to show the importance 
of following natural law (cf. B XI.140-59, C XIII.86- 
7, B XII and XV, and C XV and XVIII throughout; in 
Coleman Medieval 251), gradually settles into a 
position similar to Wyclif. Langland has done so, 
moreover, after having taken up the more radical views 
of Ockham or Holcot. We can say in hindsight, from the 
point of view of the development of philosophy as a 
discipline that would someday be considered as distinct 
from theology, that Langland has traveled great lengths 
beyond what was possible in the thirteenth century. 
Taking the latter portion of the C text to be 
Langland's ultimately evolved position on these 
matters, it is possible to conclude that he at last 
held there to be a concord necessary to salvation 
between individual deeds and divine grace, attainable
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through the agency of faith. This doctrine is espoused 
in C's later passus by Liberum Arbitrium, whereas 
earlier in the poem a more extremely "modern" position 
had been proposed by figures who represent "the more 
intellectual faculties" (Coleman 252). In any case, 
what needs to be underlined here is that Langland's 
theology is clearly at odds with Dante and Aquinas.
And here is the context in which we might understand 
Langland's intense poetics of naming, a poetics that at 
least matches the vast array of personages in Dante's 
Commedia. The number of proper names in Langland's 
poem reflects, perhaps, its unusually intense, animated 
quality, which we see in the three dimensional 
characterization of personified abstract qualities such 
as Reason, Conscience, or Truth (they need only be 
compared with previous and succeeding counterparts, 
such as in De Meun's and Lorris' Roman de la rose or 
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress). Even Dowel, Dobet and 
Dobest are arguably memorable within the limits 
Langland sets for them, although these terms do not 
readily adhere to clearly recognizable forces in the 
objective world existing beyond the purview of 
Langland's poem--that is, they are "coined terms" 
(Middleton "Two Infinites" 171). We shall examine, 
shortly, their existence within the poem as grammatical 
anomalies. And as poetic figures, our conclusion
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concerning them can only be that within themselves they 
provide a unique integration of Langland's concern to 
establish a discussion about the making of poetry. 
This discussion is intimately connected to his 
conception of the availability of salvation to the 
individual. Of course, we have already tentatively 
advanced the notion of such an integral 
relationship— one suggesting that poetry possesses the 
power of redemption— as operative, albeit in less 
determined forms, in the works of Dante and 
Marcabru--those predecessors of Langland who develop 
the later Middle Ages' poetics of naming.
Beyond the instances of Langland's allegories we 
also appreciate his poem's unusually animated energy, 
in the many levels of consciousness through which a 
reader views "reality" within the poem, as in the 
persona Will's frequent dreams, the multiple levels of 
dreaming, dreams within other dreams, and so on. These 
dreams interweave in terms of points of view and 
perception and as pertains to their thematic contents, 
with the pilgrim's waking states in which, ostensibly, 
the drama of the poem unfolds. The dream vision genre 
is fully exploited by Langland in ways we might presume 
never occurred to Dante, who in comparison with 
Langland hardly makes use of the relationship between 
dreaming and waking. In hindsight from Langland's 
point of view, we see in Dante's hands the dream vision
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as almost a mere vehicle, a context for his overall 
discourse. And Marcabru does not really concern 
himself with dreams and the questions of perception 
within the confines of different states of awareness. 
The genre had yet to become useful for poets of his 
time. Nevertheless, there is a relationship between 
the growing popularity of dream poetry and the 
concomitant development of a poetics of naming, and a 
relationship, too, which includes the changing 
theologico-philosophical landscape of the later Middle 
Ages among contemporary intellectuals who were not 
poets. The "animation" that deeply characterizes Piers 
Plowman finds a parallel in contemporary nominalist 
beliefs about language and particularly the hope for 
the efficacy of language, which, in extreme cases, when 
driven by the forces of rationalism, had embraced the 
logical conclusion that words could contain 
reality— that they could contain beincr and, therefore, 
that they could enjoy at least an ontological parity 
with the things of the world beyond language. In Piers 
Plowman dreams too are at least as interesting, espouse 
at least as complex, profound and provocative beliefs, 
and are at least as vivid and in terms of plot as 
important, as anything that occurs during the dreamer 
Will's waking moments.
In other words, we might say in sum that the poem's
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language itself contains an animated quality in its 
capacity to contain being. For Langland, the dream 
visio was integral to his philosophy and his poetics. 
In one sense, we can read Piers Plowman as a poem that 
makes its strongest statement through its poetics, 
which represent not only the culmination of the 
development of a poetry of naming but ultimately the 
explosion of the very poetic forms Piers Plowman 
inhabits. Langland is of course interested in availing 
himself of the inherent grace and power of the dream 
vision genre, just as he is writing a poem of 
pilgrimage, and, moreover, composing an allegory. Yet 
he is intent upon employing these genres to achieve new 
ends. He wishes to demonstrate his vision rather than 
directly to state it; thus his poetry, a poetry of 
indirection, ultimately expresses its author's world 
vision through subversions of various poetic genres. 
In Langland's view, we might presume, these genres have 
become stale, even obsolete.
Hence one question that invites examination is the 
possible significance in Piers Plowman of the dreamer's 
waking states—  beyond the mere exigencies of the story 
itself and aside from those values embodied in the 
poem's dreams— since the poem's dream sequences 
comprise the vast majority of the poem. The phenomenon 
of dreaming and its connection to language, knowledge 
and poetry, take us to the very heart of Piers
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Plowman1s critical "problems" and its power. This 
phenomenon is operative particularly in its 
relationship to the manner in which the poem proceeds, 
in all three versions, as an allegorized set of dream 
visions.
We will note at some length, however, that in the C 
version's autobiographical fifth passus the insertion 
of the awakened Will, and what he says to Reason and 
Conscience, not only considerably alters the 
significance of the dreams in and of themselves but of 
the poem as a whole, when seen as being one instance in 
the large context of a dream vision tradition. On the 
other hand, if readers can say that the poem is an 
allegory, they must also admit that its allegoresis is 
in the final analysis maddeningly equivocal in terras of 
its possible "meaning." The problems of interpretation 
attendant upon any close reading of Piers Plowman must 
first be met by setting Langland's poem within the 
dream vision genre's literary history, precisely 
because the poem departs from generic expectations in
C3*
unique ways. In a manner of speaking, Langland's 
originality can be described especially in terms 
regarding what might be viewed as the radical attempt 
to take apart his very own dream vision architecture, 
for prior to Langland the dream vision structure has 
lent itself to the allegory process. Langland's
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attempt, a success in large measure, is to set Piers 
Plowman apart from all other dream visions by creating 
a poetic structure that implodes; in so doing the 
structure calls attention to and thus implicitly 
comments on itself. By extension, moreover, the 
structure of the poem comments in large on the nature 
of the poetic imagination. And it is this connection, 
to a radical poetics, a poetics that is characterized 
by a self-awareness as both dream vision and allegory, 
which discloses most fully the significance of the 
Langland persona.
Ill
We need only consider the dreamer Will's contemporary, 
"Geffrey," as he functions in Chaucer's dream visions 
and perhaps as we see him at work, even if not so 
named, in Troilus and Crvsede and the Canterbury Tales. 
It is perhaps not making a minor point to say that 
Langland, unlike his contemporaries or predecessors in 
the tradition of self-naming (cf. Kane Authorship 26- 
51, 56-57), chooses precisely not to name himself,
though this aberration does not take the form of 
absence as we find in Dante. All the same, there is a 
strong parallel between the Commedia's protagonist, who 
late in the poem is first actually called by the name 
"Dante," by Beatrice, and the first actual naming of 
"Wille" by Lady Church (C.I.5; cf. "Chapter Three," n.
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7, above). While textual evidence tells us that
Langland was called William or Wilhelmus, in his poem
his persona is never called by these names but by the 
name Will (Bowers 177). To appreciate the full
dimensions of this maneuver, and its significance
within its larger tradition, requires some lengthy 
discussion.
In C.V Will's debate with Reason becomes profoundly 
important when we consider that in Langland's time the 
human will was often viewed as an antithetical force to 
wit (Bowers 177; cf. OED XII.201, "wit" 1.2; and cf. 
Alexander, and Gilson, in Bowers 177 n. 33) ; wit was 
almost indistinguishable from ratio. Unlike Chaucer's 
persona, indeed, whenever Langland's dreamer is called 
by his name we must read a special import into the 
event itself. On two occasions it is clear that Will 
is being named specifically in order to establish a 
relationship with Reason or Wit.
While Skeat maintains that Will is first named in 
the B-text after Reason has delivered the sermon 
that "made Wille to wepe water wi£> hise ei-jen" 
(B.v.61), there is some doubt that this is anything 
other than the collective voluntas of the people 
[11.71; cf. Kane 59]. Yet the Dreamer is certainly 
the one later named Will by the figure Thought, who 
has taken him in search of Wit: "Wher Dowel and
Dobet and Dobest ben in londe / Here is Wil wolde 
wite if Wit koude hym teche" (B.viii.128- 29). In 
the B-text, Wit's sermon represents the first 
expansion upon the teachings of Holy Church since 
Passus I, placing important emphasis on the 
internal rather than external reality of the good 
life. The C-poet, knowing that the action would
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eventually focus upon the Dreamer and his inner 
quest, inserts the personal allegory of C v and 
uses it to signal future difficulties by pitting 
Will against Reason, the faculty that should be his 
partner and guide, in an informal but recognizable 
debate. (Bowers 179)
In modern times the Chaucerian figure has been far 
more widely admired than Langland's Will. While both 
personae confront themselves with their own activity of 
making poetry and while they are confronted by others, 
in both cases in comedic ways, we tend to derive 
greater enjoyment from Geffrey because of his author's 
realism generally, and especially because of this 
persona's obviously ironic demeanor for a modern 
audience. Yet both personae, Will and Geffrey, emerge 
from the same traditions. There are more similarities. 
Both personae are first and foremost identified as 
poets, and are concerned time and again with the act of 
recording their respective experiences, with being able 
to achieve revelation on some level or other through 
the possible reflection makvng might afford. Both 
concern themselves with what the meanings and uses of 
texts, books, stories, and so on, are. As well, for 
instance, both cannot adequately defend themselves in 
their roles as poets against the accusations of those 
who can see no use for their verse making, an activity 
which, furthermore, allows both of them to bring into 
their poems or stories the issue of poetry's and by 
extension language's suitability and effectiveness.
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Undoubtedly aware of a tradition as old as Western 
letters, in which poets complained that the buffoons of 
their respective societies received the better 
treatment, these "medieval poets too had every reason 
to emphasize the value and dignity of their art and to 
defend it from reproaches" (Curtius 473).
Where the conceptualizations of the two personae 
most obviously part company is in the fact that Will is 
clearly an allegorical representation of voluntas, if 
he is nothing else (he surely i_s, however) , while 
Geffrey clearly does not serve any obvious allegorical 
function in Chaucer's poems (which accounts in part for 
the realistic sense we have about this character). We 
feel, so to speak, that we need not see past Geffrey or 
rather through him to some didactic value for which he 
might be standing in; he does not seem to be carrying 
out some mission for his poet. Nevertheless, we need 
not see Will in this fashion— even if it is so very 
easy to do, and we should hesitate before presuming 
that we understand him in ways similar to readers' 
responses in his own time. Perhaps it is fair enough 
to assert that a certain critical reception of Will in 
his own time is often presumed, and therefore 
categorical condemnation of Langland's supposed lack of 
creativity or vitality may follow— or rather, his lack 
of realism— when he is judged by the standards of a 
later era that prizes a realism most vividly
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exemplified in the fourteenth century in Chaucer's 
writing.
Other critical theories, however, make possible new 
forays into Langland studies, and there is a new 
appreciation of Piers Plowman based on its metatextual 
dimension. An examination of Chaucer's use of dreams, 
how he uses the dream vision genre to help to define 
his persona, and to instigate an epistemological 
discussion that will include a focus on the making of 
poetry, will in comparison with Langland tell us much 
about this latter "allegorical" poet's metalinguistic, 
m e t a p o e t i c a l , and ultimately self-enunciatory 
intentions. Particularly in Chaucer's dream poems, 
there is an underlying philosophical dialogue taking 
place, which unites in a single poetic vision the 
interrelated motifs of authorship, dreaming, language, 
and the possible perception of reality. As noted 
earlier, Chaucer makes the attempt to reconcile a 
discrepancy between the principle of formality, and 
knowledge— an essentially epistemological problem that 
we see most vividly addressed in the opening of the 
Parlement of Foules. which draws an analogy between 
formalistically determined courtly love that occurs 
within the realm of experience, and artful writing; if 
writing, then, by extension, the capacity to truly know 
the world, is held to be a likely possibility through
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the act of writing that must also take place, for the 
author, as an experience (cf. "Chapter Two," above). 
In short, having at one's disposal only the forms of 
postlapsarian languages, and the artful uses to be made 
of them, how can the truth be told, Chaucer is asking, 
considering that the truth is an ideal state existing 
ultimately beyond all physical and/or temporal 
structures— that is, beyond all experience? Hence, the 
poet can at best only gesture--perhaps ultimately 
through the very failure of his language, and thus it 
is a linguistic gesture— towards the ideal truth beyond 
his language.
IV
The question of God's active presence in the palpable 
universe (i.e., ideality perceived as existing in or 
through the sensible objects of the world) does not 
involve Chaucer directly, yet there is an underlying 
philosophical dialogue taking place in his dream poems. 
Philosophical nominalist thought of the twelfth, 
thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, remained 
intimately bound up in what was a skepticism regarding 
a subtle relationship that might exist between 
imaginative and experiential cognitive realms. 
Nominalist doctrine emphasizes the particulars of the 
world landscape but refuses to accept the possibility 
of a universal ordering of these "things" of the
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world: the ideal may only be apprehended indirectly— if 
at all— through knowledge of the individual or perhaps 
the instant in time. The dream visio, on the other 
hand, is the esthetic alternative to a wrestling with 
this dilemma, in that a dream state's miraculous-like 
texture, if at times a sharpening force, may also blur 
or otherwise undermine differences between 
particularity and abstraction, time and eternity— the 
feasible as opposed to the supernatural. Yet the dream 
vision poem eventually returns to these distinctions, 
from within the visio context, because it recognizes a 
paradoxical truth that resides in the imaginative 
literary impulse, a truth that exists separately from 
the sensible, factual world. Thus in the Prologue to 
the Legend of Good Women Chaucer confronts the 
conundrum of knowing through literature as opposed to 
first hand, material experience (cf. Payne Key 93 ff.):
But Goddes forbode, but men shulde leve 
Wei more thyng than men han seyn with ye!
Men shal nat wenen every thyng a lye,
For that he say it nat of yore ago.
God wot, a thyng is nevere the lesse so,
Thow every wyght ne may it nat yse.
Bernard the monk ne say nat al, parde!
Thanne mote we to bokes that we fynde,
Thourgh whiche that olde thynges ben in mynde,
[. . .]. (G 10-18, F 10-18)
The philosophical and problematical relationships 
between memory and the factual present, the auctoritee 
of books (history and imaginative literature) and 
experiential reality, are eventually resolved in
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Chaucer's "Prologue" through the narrator's intuitive 
epiphany that a dream may afford: in the dream state
alone, we are told, will humanity be able to solve the 
riddles of nature such as, for example, the possibility 
of communication between man and beast. The marvelous 
qualities of dreams, and nature as well, will be 
celebrated through the joy readers find in the poem's 
narrator when he listens to and understands in his 
dream, as if with a new mind, the singing of birds:
This song to herkenen I dide al myn entente, 
For-whv X  mette X  wiste what they [the birds] 
mente,
Tyl at the laste a larke song above:
"I se," quod she, "the myghty god of Love"
[and so on (G 139-42) my emphasis].
Here a reader bridges the real and surreal, in 
witnessing the unfolding of events leading to the God 
of Love's savage and comical indictment of Chaucer's 
persona, a topos that finds an apt parallel in the 
dreamer Will's ineffectual defense against Reason's 
charges of "ydelnesse" in C.V (cf. L. K. Stock 463), as 
well as the defense of Geffrey's actions cleverly 
brought about by the goddess Alceste. But to appreciate 
what transpires the reader needs to remain cognizant of 
the fact that Chaucer's narrator is dreaming. Although 
Alceste and Cupid, and the Chaucerian persona, become 
real enough for the sake of momentary dramatic success, 
in the back of a reader's mind it is never quite
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forgotten that all which is being viewed takes place 
through the persona's fantastic vision. This awareness 
is the result of the Prologue's enchanting quality, 
since it is possible to understand through the memory 
of one's own dreams, which informs one's reading, the 
magical quality of dreaming. The dream visio. then, 
moves readers precisely because of its unreal nature. 
However, when they partake of its fantasy they also 
intuit, or derive, a sense of unity out of a 
contradictory actuality— that is, the experiential as 
well as literary "reality."
Indeed, the introduction of gods, Cupid and Alceste, 
into an existential equation is announced by the 
fictive birds in the narrator's dream;1 they are 
precisely like the birds he would encounter on his 
walks through the countryside in his worship of the 
daisy. And after all they are the same birds. One 
realizes this duplication in part because the settings 
and actions of visionary and waking states are closely 
aligned, although what the birds say and do are altered 
by dream consciousness. It is a wondrous and lovely 
scene. Nevertheless, and perhaps paradoxically, a more 
serious note is sounded at this juncture in the poem.
1. My discussion throughout this chapter focuses on 
Chaucer's G text that I am considering to be the later, 
revised version of the Prologue. The birds in the F 
text do not introduce Cupid and Alceste.
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This same dream circumstance becomes the vehicle by 
which Chaucer's persona and the gods take up the 
problem of epistemology itself; it is because all that 
finally occurs in the "Prologue" happens within a dream 
framework that the very real problem of how to know, by 
way of a cerebral process like literature, may be 
discussed and synthesized. Literature enjoys a kinship 
with dream consciousness because, like dreaming, it is 
once removed from the experiential, perhaps physical 
and certainly objective reality that is its very 
"matter." In fact, the problem of matiere is the 
raison d 1etre. though not necessarily the crux, of the 
God of Love's argument against what Chaucer has 
accomplished in his translations of poems that become 
the Romaunt of the Rose and Troilus and Crysede: 
Chaucer has "lat be" the "corn" and written the "chaff" 
of old "apreved storyes." This confusion is, again, 
paralleled in Will's misprisions and misquoting of 
scripture when defending himself against Reason (463).
In Chaucer's poem, the answer the dream state 
allows will preclude philosophical dogma. The dream 
vision itself, therefore, becomes emblematic of an 
imaginary, intuitive process that may engage the 
complexity of "truth"; the dream vision represents, 
moreover, as Chaucer understands, language's idealized 
potential for which literature may strive: literature,
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like truth, is a complex affair, and if we try to make 
less of it than it is, if we try to simplify it, we 
will be lost in what becomes meaningless language. 
Exactly and disjointedly so, the God of Love misreads 
Chaucer's translations. Likewise, Langland's Reason 
thinks the making of poetry is not a proper occupation. 
The Chaucerian narrator is accused of crimes against 
love. Confusion ensues, in consequence, to be sorted 
out by Alceste who like the daisy, and rather than 
Cupid, is a symbol of love. Alceste becomes a figure, 
a poetic embodiment, the "apotheosis" of the daisy the 
Chaucer persona had been worshipping earlier in the 
poem (Payne Key 106), as part of his poet's revamping 
of the French maraerite lyric genre; as the deified 
flower, she also exists as an inscription, a symbol of 
intelligence.1
To overstate the case, let it be said that the God 
of Love perceives what Chaucer has written, and in fact 
the phenomenon of traductio itself, through nominalist 
eyes. The irony in this circumstance is that he is a 
god who remains an icon for ideality in its
1. I am assuming, here, an equivalence between the 
philosopher's striving for a world unity and 
intelligence that may serve as an emblem for such a 
unity; intelligence may also be perceived, however, as 
being the way of achieving knowledge of unity, or as 
being the paradigm of that knowledge. In the daisy- 
Alceste figure we may also see, because of its idealized 
beauty, the paradigm of that striving for unity. See 
Appendix A, below.
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interactivity with the phenomenal world. To return to 
the larger philosophical problem this situation 
implies, by definition the God of Love is a 
contradiction in terms, for the nominalist question 
precludes ideality's capacity, paradoxically, to 
manifest itself. How, then, will the ideal be known 
through literature? Moreover, in a sense the poem's 
persona is being asked for the impossible when the God 
of Love misinterprets the Troilus and the Romaunt of 
the Rose. Even in a dream this seems to be a bit much. 
Yet for many thinkers of Chaucer's and Langland's time 
an awareness of the limitless ideal, the immortal, is 
an actual possibility. Hugh of St. Victor had said 
that the whole sensible world is like a book written by 
the hand of God (Didascalion. PL CLXXVI.814) .1 Then 
one only needs to "read" the book, an imaginative act 
Chaucer is about in his writing of the dream poems and 
the Troilus. Conversely, the God of Love is incapable 
of reading Chaucer's translations correctly; thus he 
prefers them rewritten to suit his own sensibility.
This method of knowing the world body, in which
1. "The entire sensible world is, so to speak, a book 
written by the hand of God [. . . .] All visible things, 
visibly presented to us by a symbolic instruction, that 
is, figured, are proposed for the declaring and 
signifying of things invisible."
Hugh of St. Victor died in 1141; nevertheless, his 
thinking influences others in the fourteenth century.
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writing itself becomes a form of "reading" the world as 
well, is not an altogether new notion in the fourteenth 
century, though Chaucer occupies himself with it often 
enough. We have noted how this way of knowing surfaces 
through Chaucer's analogy, in the opening assertion of 
the Parlement of Foules ("The lyf so short, the craft 
so long to lerne," etc.; cf. above) which sees love as 
a truth to be attained through the struggle for 
craftsmanship (as in Horace's "ars longa, vita brevis"; 
see Everett 1 ff.).1 Like the skill in loving that 
helps to define courtly love, Chaucer's "craft" or 
makvnq becomes the agency by which man may establish a 
vital relationship with his environs, with the natural 
world and God. Therefore, also, readers often find the 
perversion of skvl or craft--humanity out of synch 
with nature— a disorder such as occurs in the Prologue 
when a fowler is cursed by Spring's birds for betraying 
them:
Now hadde th'atempre sonne al that releved, 
And clothed hym in grene al newe ageyn.
The smale foules, of the seson fayn,
That from the panter and the net ben skaped, 
Upon the foulere, that hem made awhaped 
In wynter, and distroyed hadde hire brod,
1. Robinson's note to this first line indicates its 
origin with Hippocrates (cf. Skeat, Early English 
Proverbs 57.135 [Oxford: 1910]); but see also, J. M.
Manly, "Chaucer and the Rhetoricians," Proceedings of 
the British Academy. 12 (1926): 8; and in regard to
Horace see especially Dorothy Everett, "Some Reflections 
on Chaucer's 'Art Poetical'," Proceedings of the British 
Academy. 36 (1950): 1 ff. (Cf. n. 1, p. 137, above.)
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In his dispit hem thoughte it dide hem good 
To synge of hym, and in here song despise 
The foule cherl that for his covetyse 
Hadde hem betrayed with his sophistrve 
This was here song, "The foulere we defye"
[G 116-26, F 128-38 (my emphasis)].
Although nominalist thought emphasizes the 
importance of the physical, the potentia ordinata. one 
might reasonably include words as part of this 
natural, phenomenal world. Augustine's notion (to 
offer another example of miraculous thinking) is that 
words, perhaps even literature, we may surmise,1 
indicate the knowledge of God as signs to be used, 
furthermore, to make truth pleasing, plain, and 
effective (De Doctrina Christiana 4.11.26).^ On the 
other hand, recalling the problem of palpability in and 
of itself as being devoid of human power to abstract or 
to draw any universal or class distinctions from what 
can be discovered in such a sensible world, "words" 
must also be the names for these things of the world
1. "Augustine, in Solilocruia 2.16, explains that the 
feigning of art is pleasing rather than deceiving 
[ . . . . ]  In De mendacio Augustine lists eight 
categories of lies; but in Soliloquia 2.18 he 
distinguishes between those who will to be false and 
those who are capable of being true. He excludes from 
opprobrium the artist's will to imitate truth" (Taylor 
315-16nn, 325n).
2. Earlier in De Doctrina Christiana Augustine writes: 
"Rerum autem ignorantia facit obscuras figuratas 
locutiones" (2.16.24). Hence words, as being the 
beginning of any potential figuration, figuration's Ur- 
forms, would seem to be contingent upon at least one's 
knowing the "things" of the world, which are the source, 
it appears to be here, of knowledge.
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and are therefore at variance from the physical 
universe (i.e., they are apart from these material 
instances).
V
It is in a complicated, philosophical context, that we 
see Chaucer composing a literary realism in verse, 
which departs radically from the verse forms, and thus 
the thinking of his contemporaries. No one, certainly, 
can equate the Canterbury Tales with Pearl. or with Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight, a work like the Temple of 
Glas or with Piers Plowman. Yet we hardly need observe 
that none of these works are "philosophical" in the 
same manner as are the writings of, for instance, 
William of Ockham, Thomas Bradwardine, Robert Holcot, 
or Chaucer's friend, Ralph Strode. Furthermore, 
although poems like Pearl or Piers Plowman are 
perceived to be allegorical by nature, they do just the 
same include dramatic and otherwise tropic material not 
to be found in a work such as, say, Boethius' 
Consolatio. And, conversely, dream visions such as 
Pearl, or Machaut's Pit du Verqier. Froissart's Paradys 
d 'Amours. Deschamps's Lav de Franchise, and so on, do 
not take up the questions we see Chaucer grappling with 
in his own dream poems, problems the Consolatio 
certainly engages.
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In one of its aspects the dream visio genre remains 
celebratory, while Chaucer will use the panegyric mode, 
such as the Prologue's praise of the daisy, as but an 
entree into his real discourse that of necessity (if 
not at least tangentially, as in the Book of the 
Duchess) mounts a philosophical inquiry. Questions in 
regard to nominalist or other schools of thought did 
not interest Chaucer in themselves; nor, most likely, 
were they of special interest to authors of these other 
"imaginative" works (i.e., Deschamps, Froissart, et 
al.). Yet Chaucer had access to a branch of 
nominalism in the Stoicism of Macrobius1 commentary on 
the dream of Scipio Africanus, which asserts that 
"every word has a true meaning" (Somnium 20.1); words, 
as it were, possess their ontological realities after 
all. The point is that for Chaucer there is a 
confusion, or at least a disagreement of fourteenth 
century thinking, a plethora of divergent philosophies 
ranging throughout the time and place he inhabits.
As well, although Chaucer puts forth at the 
b eginning of the Parlement o f Foules a rather 
sophisticated notion of the relationships among art, 
life, and love (and perhaps intelligence), we as 
readers nevertheless re-discover in this poem his 
ingenuous, perhaps bumbling narrator who has been and 
will continue to be the poet's alter ego throughout the
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Chaucer corpus. This persona acts as a foil as he is 
set against Chaucer's philosophico-esthetical dilemma 
(i.e., the contradictions comprising the background 
against which his characters live in the poems).
As Russell Peck writes, Chaucer
is profoundly interested in the moral implications 
of nominalistic questions. Dorigen will gladly 
leave the fine points of disputation to the clerks 
f vi z her complaint to "Eterne God" in the 
Franklin1s Tale 865-93 , but especially 885-90]; 
after all, she has the conclusion. Chaucer, for 
the most part, is her opposite. He seems to prefer 
the questions and will leave the conclusions to the 
clerks (or rather, the clerks to their 
conclusions). Though he may not be interested in 
whether we can know with certitude only individual 
things, he is profoundly interested in how we know 
individual things. And though his concern may not 
be with the questions about whether universals 
exist in creation or only in our heads, he is 
always interested in those generalizations which 
fill people's heads and which exist there 
exclusively insofar as they matter to that 
individual. (745)
Chaucer's various examinations of this same nominalist 
versus anti-nominalist theme through characters and 
plots in all of his poetry are thrown askew, to one 
degree or another, by his narrator, thus producing what 
Diomede in the Troilus calls an "ambage" or, in this 
case, a wanted ambiguity:
That is to seyn, with double wordes slye,
Swiche as men clepen a word with two visages
[5.898-99].
These "two visages" of language, and more to the point 
of poetry, are what gets Chaucer's persona into trouble
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with the God of Love in the "Prologue,11 because this 
supernatural god can only understand literature in 
ideological terms. Yet the ambiguity is desirable 
because Chaucer the poet's literary realism recognizes 
the hesitancy of conflicting philosophical dogmas which 
are themselves exegeses of human, fallible situations. 
Moreover, ambiguity operates even when the persona is 
merely one who may report events though he cannot, he 
claims, understand them, as in the Troilus in which the 
narrator tells his tale of erotic love and betrayal 
even though, he dutifully reminds us, he has never 
experienced such a love for himself and so he may not 
pass judgment on the events transpiring in his poem.
In Chaucer's dream poems, furthermore, as any writer 
of this genre must have realized, the problem of an 
ambiguous reality is compounded by the addition to the 
poetic terrain of the psychological dream dimension. 
Dream consciousness may violate at will the strictures 
of rationality and sensibility, more so in order to 
demonstrate the unique, pristine but ineffable absolute 
that underlies and otherwise engenders, ironically, an 
imperfect state of world affairs. In fact this is one 
purpose most dream visions serve, in a variety of 
fabulous, fantastic, and to one degree or another 
allegorical constructs. Because the reader will never 
quite forget he or she is reading a poem within a dream
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framework, the poem, by virtue of its own structure, 
will therefore never escape its allegorical orientation 
as a result of, simply, this very same structure that 
insists upon the distinction between experience and 
imagination. Such bipartism might work against the 
unified vision that is the ideal of the poem's method 
of discovering and describing the world— -the poem's, as 
it were, potential or kinetic epistemology. However, 
in terms of Aristotelian principles of mimes i s . 
Chaucer's inclusion of philosophical themes within a 
framework in which dream and reality share more than a 
coincidental similarity of setting and plot, such as 
occurs in the Prologue, indicates his choice to abandon 
an allegorical impulse (Malone 96) for the more viable 
"fusion" of literary realism. Perhaps the re-creation 
of experience in art will not lend itself to polemical 
(i.e., philosophical) and otherwise allegorical 
exegesis.
Chaucer's dreams are actually valued by modern 
readers precisely because they have gone far in 
abandoning what can be viewed to be burdensome 
apological frames, since allegory reduces the 
possibility of semansis in the sense of such meaning 
being an accurate reflection of the sensible, real, 
synthesized world— in other words, of "reality." Angus 
Fletcher has pointed out that because allegories tend 
to be anatomical, or otherwise depend for their success
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upon principles of enigma (i.e., the inclusion of a 
formal obscurity that results from mysterious, so to 
speak, elements of a poem or plot [5n]), allegories 
tend to subvert the poet1s capacity to create textures 
consonant with the more complicated reality of living, 
those actual complexities of life and love alluded to 
in the opening lines of the Parlement of Foules and 
elsewhere.
The whole point of allegory is that it does not 
need to be read exegetically; it often has a 
literal level that makes good enough sense all by 
itself. But somehow this literal surface suggests 
a peculiar doubleness of intention, and while it 
can, as it were, get along without interpretation, 
it becomes richer and more interesting if given 
interpretation. Even the most deliberate fables, if 
read naively or carelessly, may seem mere stories, 
but what counts [. . .] is a structure that lends
itself to a secondary reading, or rather, one that 
becomes stronger when given a secondary meaning as 
well as a primary meaning. (7)
Although an allegory's virtue is its ability to sustain 
a consistent "secondary meaning," Fletcher's comment 
makes clear that such a duplicity, almost by 
definition, will not readily lend itself to the 
mirror-like unity, the distillation of intellect and 
experience which in fact constitutes esthetic realism, 
possibly something closer to the metonymic versus the 
metaphorical impulse. On the other hand, Chaucer 
perceives the problem of re-creating complexities in a 
poem that might satisfy the demands of imitatio. 
Truly, it is because Chaucer, his persona, has achieved
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a "wholeness" in a poem such as Troilus and Crvsede 
that he becomes subject to Cupid's displeasure in the 
"Prologue," and will therefore have to write the Legend 
of Women who were "true in love" as penance.
As Lisa Kiser observes, the most significant 
shortcoming
in the God of Love's reading of the Troilus is his 
failure to perceive the poem's complex expression 
of the relationship between pagan secular love and 
Christian caritas [. . .]. In short, his thought
is dominated by a rather simple-minded conflation 
of pagan and Christian love, both of which he sees 
as the same virtue. (82)
Again, considering the comedy Chaucer creates, we might 
remind ourselves of the matter of the legends he 
resuscitates, which is particularly violent and 
uncharacteristic of an idealized courtly love (Frank 
26) the God of Love is supposed to but does not 
represent. The legend genre, though, is especially 
appropriate to assuage him because of its didactic 
nature. Kiser rightly notes, as well, that the
Legend is also a poem about the difficulties 
inherent in Chaucer's role as a teller of others' 
tales, one who has obligations to his sources and 
also to the new and different audience [here, of 
course, the audience must include the God of Love] 
for whom these sources were to be adapted.
To present his views on the uses of classical 
fiction, Chaucer finds it necessary to include 
several other issues in his poem [i.e., in the LGW 
entire] as well. He reacts to certain traditional 
theories of art, he comments on allegorization 
(one of the commonest ways in which medieval poets 
made classical texts confirm Christian truth), he
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reveals to us many fourteenth-century assumptions 
about literature's usefulness to everyday life, and 
he betrays his beliefs about the act and purpose of 
translation. (26)
All the same it is because the God of Love thinks in 
a simplistic, polemical, perhaps allegorical fashion 
(as many fourteenth century readers of religious 
sermons and other exemplary literature might have 
done), that he has misunderstood Chaucer's 
translations.
In the simplest terms, allegory says one thing 
and means another. It destroys the normal 
expectation we have about language, that our words 
"mean what they say." When we predicate quality x 
of person Y, Y really is what our predication says 
he is (or we assume so); but allegory would turn Y 
into something other (alios) than what the open and 
direct statement tells the reader. Pushed to an 
extreme, this ironic usage would subvert language 
itself, turning everything into an Orwellian 
newspeak. (Fletcher 2; my emphasis)
In this sense, that allegory "destroys" our "normal 
expectation" for discourse, we might conclude that the 
proclivity of dream visions is toward allegory because 
they are indeed dreams, not real; yet they make use of 
reality's very space in order to establish something 
other out of it, some new meaning from this same 
ground. This is a problem of poetics. As we shall 
see, it is worked out in a novel and radically 
different fashion by Langland, other than that which 
Chaucer attempts. And it is indeed a problem. By 
modern standards, allegory is understood as a form of
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thought and/or expression that might naturally subvert 
reality, as it forsakes language's full semiotic power. 
A case in point, "Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy, 
with its dialogue form, its verse interludes and its 
pervading tone of contemplative irony, is a pure 
anatomy, a fact of considerable importance for the 
understanding of its vast influence" (Frye 312). The 
Consolatio does not need to appeal to readers on 
grounds of drama (although it certainly makes that 
attempt within the medieval expectation of sermonary 
and other allegorical literature); for if anything is 
true of it, it is that the Consolatio's metaphoric 
vitality is so shaped and directed as to create 
meanings that are nothing less than ideological, 
nothing short of unqualified polemic.
If Boethius' work is popular in Chaucer's time, 
however, this is because it affords a certain matrix in 
which logical functions take precedence. Unlike 
Shakespeare's or Henryson's version of her, for 
instance, in Chaucer's Troilus we find Crysede's 
betrayal agonizing because, on one level, it defies 
logical dicta. It is as if fourteenth century readers 
were intent upon working out the subtleties of 
nominalist and realist doctrines extant in literature 
like the Consolatio. Yet this is in fact the case, 
precisely so because Boethius' poem takes the form of 
an "anatomy," as Frye has termed it (above). What such
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a structure will not allow is the "uncertain" tropism 
and simulacrae (a hypersemiotic, multiplicity of 
meaning) that occur more and more throughout Chaucer's 
career. If we were to change the form of some of 
Chaucer's imagery, we as readers would "stop looking to 
think, to condemn, to marvel, exult, pity, or judge" 
(Tuve. 101). It is because we instead suspend such 
judgments, participating in language and 
characterization itself, that we know an experiential 
reality, as we might say of it, in the poems. In turn, 
Chaucer would have us condemn or praise by virtue of 
tensions he establishes between personalities and 
situations, which depend for their vitality upon shaped 
meanings that avoid a one to one, "unreal" or fantastic 
deciphering of imagery on the part of the reader.
Yet the dream vision that so readily— and here it is 
assumed "dangerously"— lends itself to an allegorical 
epistemology, may also achieve an effect of quite 
another order. As stated, readers of the visio 
sequence of "events" will eventually be brought back to 
the realization that what occurs in the dream state is 
merely a fantasy, a dream. A reader cannot avoid this 
reflection, even in the "Prologue." Yet to know the 
miraculous—  the dream— so might the logic run, means 
that indeed the dream sequence suggests a principal, 
unifying God-force behind an imperfect and sensible
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world: the dream is itself a psychological miracle 
implicating the fantastic, allowing the reader who 
indulges in such a state of mind a helpful machinery in 
his or her exegetical search for the divine. This 
inclusion of the imaginary is readily perceptible in 
poems like Piers Plowman. but such a dynamic is more 
deeply embedded, and more powerful because it is more 
subtly present, in a work like the "Prologue." After 
all, the dream poem is in turn a creation of the 
miraculous world by way of the hand and an almost 
Coleridgean imagination of the poet (of course, the 
"Prologue"'s focus is directly on the poet and his 
striving to "make" truth in his poetry [Payne, Key 93 
ff.].)1
In part, this is Chaucer the makvr1s meditation, 
based on the assumption that dreams, like words, have 
their ontological realities, even when words are names
1. As stated, the "Prologue"'s dream sequence is in its 
setting and emotional structure (such as, e. g., the 
worship of the daisy that occurs in both dream and 
waking states) so very like reality that the problem of 
limited semansis, which occurs when allegory distances 
primary and secondary literary interpretations from one 
another (i.e., unlike settings between dream and 
experiential reality), is reduced to its minimum so that 
the poem may be said to approximate, to a greater 
degree, the natural synthesis of philosophical 
contradictions— the gestalt of the real, natural world 
experience (i.e., the intellect-sensibility dynamic), 
which philosophical speculation disrupts, intrudes upon, 
as it were— occurring in God-ordered nature. On the 
Chaucer's relationship to the allegorical tradition, see 
this chapter, and Appendix B, below.
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sequent to, instead of concomitant with, the things 
named (a sentiment he might have found expressed in 
Dante's La Vita Nuova; "nomina sunt consequentia rerum" 
f C ap. 13]). By logical extension, imaginative and
historical literature1 seem also to be real, suggesting 
truth in themselves and beyond their own instances of 
being--beyond themselves as well. In other words, 
literature may partake of a protean nature— art as the 
product of the creative impulse. Chaucer points to 
this phenomenon in his preoccupation with the viability 
of adherence to tradition and a u c t oritee. as an 
epistemological method, his way of knowing the world. 
Set against such a construct of knowledge is the real, 
experiential world. Hence, the Prologue to the Legend 
of Good Women begins with this very discussion, finding 
in mind-sustained memory a unifying force (here is the 
opening passage in full):
A thousand sythes have I herd men telle 
That there is joye in hevene and peyne in helle, 
And I acorde wel that it be so;
But natheles, this wot I wel also,
That ther is non dwelleth in this contre,
That eyther hath in helle or hevene ybe,
Ne may of it non other weyes witen,
But as he hath herd seyd or founde it writen;
For by assay there may no man it preve.
But Goddes forbode, but men shulde leve 
Wel more thyng than men han seyn with ye!
Men shal nat wenen every thyng a lye,
1. In my argument I am of course presuming the medieval 
world's confusion in which imaginative literature is 
taken, to a degree, to be synonymous with written 
history.
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For that he say it nat yore ago.
God wot, a thyng is nevere the lesse so,
Thow every wyght ne may it nat yse.
Bernard the monk ne say nat al, parde!
Thanne mote we to bokes that we fynde,
Thourgh whiche that olde thynges ben in mynde,
And to the doctryne of these olde wyse 
Yeven credence, in every skylful wyse,
And trowen on these olde approved storyes 
Of holynesse, of regnes, of victoryes,
Of love, of hate, of othere sondry thynges,
Of which I may nat make rehersynges.
And if that olde bokes weren aweye,
Yloren were of remembrance the keye. (G 1-2 6)
The poem begins by outlining precisely its own and 
Chaucer's prevailing and very workable strategy: 
literature as a viable world force will be set against 
the trial of present experience, even when the 
experience occurs within the poem-sustained dream 
frame. Furthermore, Chaucer's poetry will be put to a 
test by his own persona's artlessness— though we may 
easily concede the simpleminded reading of the poetry 
by Cupid as well and, if Alceste is not at least 
artless in her defense of Chaucer, she does not really, 
either, invoke his poems' fundamental virtues. But 
the controlling philosophical stance is Chaucer's.
Readers view the events of the dream poems and 
Troilus. however, if not always through the eyes of the 
narrator then at least through what is going on, so to 
speak, from over his shoulder. As Robert Payne points 
out in connection with the Prologue (to one degree or 
another his remarks obtain to the narrator we meet in 
each of the poems in the sequence— whatever that 
precise order might be), Chaucer's whole discussion
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is framed in that troublesome defensive irony— the 
self- revealing pose of naivete— which provides him 
simultaneously with a sub-liminal awareness of the 
limitations of human certainty, and with a 
prearranged escape from having to face up finally 
to the profundity of the aesthetic problem which 
his poetry constantly raises. (Key 96)
Payne goes on to say that our participation in the poem 
through the agency of the persona's point of view, or 
at least as a result of this tangential connection with 
the narratorial machinery, involves us in one of a 
number of the poems' "paralyzing system[s] of ironies" 
(109) .
VI
To return to the discussion of form and ideality for a 
moment, we need to bear in mind the nominalist thinking 
of Ockham, which raises a key contradiction. On the 
one hand, nominalism proclaims that all knowledge 
resides in the "things" of the world, unordered by any 
universality man might know. But Ockham tends to 
"subordinate questions of intellect to questions of 
will," thus shifting the nominalist focus:
Just as God's ordained power (potent i a de i 
ordinata) ties the contingencies of the world to 
God's Will, so are the mental structures created by 
men within their intellects instigated by voluntary 
choices which give them meaning.
(Renortatio III, q.10-12 [in Peck 746])
In light of Ockham's point of view, it might be
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possible to conclude that Chaucer's translations are 
the result of the poet's or translator's wil l . his 
ability and inclination to engage the semiosis of 
language in order to make cognitive choices. Again, an 
allegorical structure circumscribes to a great degree 
"choosing" in this manner, almost by definition. But 
reaching further for a form, beyond allegory, means the 
poet may effect a truly— in the modern sense— literary 
meaning, hopefully to resurrect or intimate immanence 
if not the presence, at least on the metaphysical 
level, of the ideal. The warrant for the poet, then, 
is to be like God, or rather, to discover the real that 
resides in multi-meaningful figuration and to convey 
these same figures. Paradoxically, the God of Love 
either cannot understand or simply will not tolerate 
Chaucer's deified project(s) in which the poet seeks to 
invest words, literature, with ontological 
substance— the excuse or the reason for being.
Further, because Ockham "places the efficacy of the 
will at the center of his epistemology," his views are 
all the more "compatible with Chaucer's strongly 
Boethian orientation. Knowing, for Ockham, becomes a 
combination of desire, perspective, choice, and 
judgment" (Peck 746). P. B. Taylor has speculated 
about the source of Chaucer's nominalism. The concept 
that
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universal ideas have ontological reality in words 
is an aspect of philosophical realism, and [as 
stated] Chaucer knew its most persuasive expression 
in De consolatione philosophiae. [Yet] nominalism, 
which posits that particulars precede the idea of a 
universal and that words are without real referents 
may have become known to Chaucer through Boccaccio, 
if indeed the Decameron was known to Chaucer, for 
Boccaccio's epilogue stresses the indeterminacy of 
intent over word and word over effect. (318)
Assuming that Chaucer had not seen the Decameron. it 
must nevertheless be conceded that even if a unity of 
philosophical point of view is not derived from 
Chaucer's poems, it is at least possible to read there 
the discrepancy of points of view being demonstrated 
through characters and situations. This diversity is 
as it should be, because these characterizations are 
derived out of language's signifying power. They are 
the creation of language and so they implicate language 
as being a creative force. The medieval mind, Stewart 
Justman contends, understood symbols as a reality in 
the sense that analogies were "nothing arbitrary or 
verbal" (cf. Mazzeo "Universal Analogy" 302).1 In the 
medieval tradition
an analogy can pass for a literal identity [. . .]. 
The bread of the Eucharist was not just a symbol of 
Christ's body, an analogy for it? it was Christ's 
body. Again, St. Paul says, "as the body is one 
and hath many members; and all the members of the 
body, whereas they are many, yet are one body: so
1. Justman quotes Joseph Mazzeo here, "Universal Analogy 
and the Culture of the Renaissance," Journal of the 
History of Ideas. 15 (1954): 302.
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also is Christ [l Cor. 12:12]." But this is not 
merely an analogy for merely illustrative purposes. 
In fact it is not an analogy. Paul means it: "Now
you are the body of Christ" (1 Cor. 12:27) 
[ . . . .] For another medieval ideal of the
perfect symbolic body, we may look to Dante. In 
his ascent through Paradise, Dante sees souls which 
form the symbols of eagle and rose. In each case 
the symbol literally is the larger community. The 
symbol of the eagle stands for law and literally 
embodies law, in that all the souls that make it up 
have taken their proper places. To the modern 
reader, the rose may signify transfigured 
sexuality. But the great transfiguration that has 
made the rose is also an actual display of 
something much like what we understand by 
"sublimation," the redirection of will according to 
"law" and in the mode of symbols. In each case the 
symbol is more than a symbol. It is itself real. 
It is a claim for the reality of analogical 
thought. (Justman 200)
In the Canterbury Tales. some of which were being 
composed during the period in which the G version of 
the Prologue to the Legend of Good Women was also being 
written, certain characters are clearly using language 
to attest the idea that words are more than merely 
"verbal." Rather, the words
are real, formal acts [e.g., the power of oaths in 
the Friar 1s and Summoner1s Tales. the Pardoner's 
rhyme of "swere" and "totere," and so on]--a 
contract with reality. On the other hand, though, 
we have the Reeve's statement, "when we may nat 
doon, than wol we speke" (A 3881); S y m k y n 's 
challenge to the clerks, "Lat se now if this place 
may suffise, / Or make it rowm with speche, as is 
youre gise" (A 4125-26); the absurd verbal dilation 
of the N u n 's P riest's T a l e . as opposed to the 
brevity within it [and so forth]. In these cases, 
words are vain, inauthentic fictions that stand for 
nothing. (200)
Taylor's commentary is appropriate here, in his attempt 
at reconciling the two Chaucerian aspects:
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It has been recently suggested that Chaucer the 
poet is a Boethian realist while Chaucer the 
[. . .] reporter [. . .] is a confused nominalist. 
In general, [. . .] Chaucer's emphasizing of
nominalist views on language are found more often 
in comic and satiric contexts than in serious ones, 
and considerations of linguistic realism occur in 
serious contexts. Sometimes it is difficult to 
distinguish one from the other. (318)
In the "Prologue" to the Legend of Good Women it is 
indeed, often enough, difficult to make such 
distinctions; but they are there. The "Prologue" makes 
a claim for figuration and tropism, for the reality of 
symbols and "analogical thought," as Justman terms it, 
just as there is an understanding of the psychological 
and philosophical necessity in the experiential 
present. It is the tension that Chaucer establishes 
between these divergent viewpoints which in fact 
unifies the poem. His meditation is at the same time 
humorous while it is considering serious, linguistic 
and philosophical alternatives; and he uses this double 
edged sword in striking an esthetic unity in the poem.
What is important to see here is that Chaucer is 
interested in demonstrating a breach of faith, the
1. Taylor cites, here, Rodney Delasanta, "Chaucer and 
the Problem of the Universal," "forthcoming in 
Mediaevalia. Delasanta suggests that the purpose of 
Chaucer's translation of Boethius was to clarify and 
reassert his own faith in the neo-Platonic universal. I 
[Taylor] read this paper too late to incorporate his 
provocative conclusions into this study" (318n).
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known lapsarian world, in the discrepancy between 
intent and deed (Taylor 318-20). The "Prologue” 
demonstrates conflicting philosophical points of view 
with which Chaucer was familiar. He develops his 
persona through the successive dream poems in part 
because the dream state demonstrates the resolution of 
these philosophical opposites; in this the dream state 
is akin to language when language is not limited and 
thus being abused— when it is meaningful— and in this 
Chaucer departs from the mere, conventional dream visio 
mode. According to Ockham, "insights of faith, though 
they cannot be proved by reason, are not therefore 
contrary to reason, but simply go beyond it” (Peck 
747). Of course, there is as well the knowledge of 
experience. But because of the
mind's capacity to manipulate words and images in 
the shaping of its state of being, the boundaries 
of man's interior reality are open to almost 
limitless variation. (747).
Chaucer's narrator in the dream poems, therefore, 
strikes a pose, for the sake of the matter being 
presented by and through him, which depends upon 
Diomede's ambage:
1. Ockham's insistence upon the primacy of faith to 
higher understanding, a faith partially determined by an 
act of will, is in keeping with St. Anselm's fides 
cruaerens intellectum and credo ut untel 1 iaam (Peck
1 A i n ).
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Though the ficta of the mind have no independent 
reality outside the mind, they form the basis of 
man's deductions. The nominalist idea that the 
mind and its knowledge are an ongoing imagistic- 
linguistic process is appealing to Chaucer.
(Peck 747)
In all likelihood, one source of Chaucer's interest in 
the relationship between language and perception was 
the Consolatio. where Philosophia's therapy is largely 
an elaborate words game that utilizes words and images 
to break down other words and images, and then uses 
words and mental pictures to construct a psychological 
dwelling place (747n).
This idea of an "ongoing imagistic-linguistic 
process" forms the basis of Chaucer's claim for the 
efficacy of literature vis- a-vis tradition. Another 
fourteenth century nominalist, Robert Holcot, noted 
that despite man's double incapacity of weak intellect 
and weak will he still can achieve his final end if he 
does what is in him to the best of his ability (Oberman 
241-8).
Holcot's views stem from Ockham, who attempts to 
show that although God cannot be known in Himself 
or as a single concept proper to Him, He can be 
known in a concept which is predicable of Him and 
others (i.e., creation, especially man's mind.
(Peck 750)
VII
These existential descriptions of mankind— it is not a
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coincidence— certainly obtain to the narrator we meet 
in all of Chaucer's poems, but especially in the dream 
poems and then, especially, in the "Prologue." 
Chaucer's posturing through his persona as being a bit 
obtuse reveals for us the philosophical and theological 
dynamic (in conjunction.with a meditation on esthetics) 
which is deeply embedded in the other characters of the 
poems and in the action of the poems themselves. And, 
as Kiser points out, in the Legend of Good Women 
Chaucer's esthetical problem is brought under control 
through a contrast with the God of Love who is as 
obtuse as the poem's narrator (though this manifests 
quite differently since he is a god and not a poet) in 
his accusations against what the Chaucer narrator has 
translated. It is the God of Love's inability to make 
a distinction between exemplary literature and that 
which may be paradoxical, and thus perhaps 
t r u t h f u l — more so because of the force of 
traductio— which Chaucer has brought into being. The 
God of Love has a hard time separating "wheat" from 
"chaff"; he cannot distinguish between 
language— traductio — and the matiere that language 
treats— auctoritee. However— keeping Holcot's view of 
humanity's double incapacity in mind (above)— it is 
because of Chaucer's
characteristic refusal to be self-congratulatory 
[that] we do not get a "corrected" interpretation 
of the Troilus from the Legend's narrator, even
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though he is given a chance to respond to the 
accusations of his deified (and reified) reader 
[Cupid]. Instead, the only remark we get from him 
is the reminder that authorial intent ought to be 
weighed in the literary Last Judgment over which 
the God of Love presides (F 471-74, G 461-64). 
Neither articulate nor forceful, the intimidated 
narrator only weakly asserts his innocence in 
response to the charges brought against him. 
Finally, Alceste is left with the responsibility of 
defending him, which she does with shrewdness and 
skill. (83-4)
Alceste as dream figure exists barely beyond an 
allegorical pale; yet she is not merely allegorical in 
intention because of, among other reasons, her striking 
resemblance to the real daisy. She resolves the 
discrepancy between ironic narration and a 
philosophico-esthetical problem, embodied here in the 
indictment of what Chaucer has written (vide Cupid's 
". . . in pleyn text, it nedeth nat to glose, / Thow
hast translated [etc., G 254-55]"; and, earlier, 
Chaucer's own remark; "For myn entent is, or I fro yow 
fare, / The naked text in English to declare / Of many 
a story [G 85-87J").1 But note that she only resolves 
the problem within the context of her own figuration, 
at Chaucer's hand (as well as in Chaucer's dream), and 
therefore we view the indictment of translation by the 
God of Love from within the dream vision mode (in the
1. My reading of the poem, here, is emphasizing the 
leitmotif of Cupid's displeasure with the act of 
traductio itself. This I understand to be a decidedly 
nominalist view of all art and, underlying this 
attitude, a distrust of language itself.
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point of view of Alceste) as well as out of the 
objectively real, experiential position (the poem's 
narrator who relates to us both his dream and his 
feelings about how one may "know" the truth— either 
through books or through experience or, we are left to 
conjecture, through a combination of the two).
Chaucer as persona may therefore claim to be making
no judgments upon what he sees taking place around him
1 • * «in the poems, but since he so begs his own question he
prepares readers to finally pass judgment, to condemn
1. The persona does, however, subtly indicate through an 
ambiguous syntax his preference for the daisy within the 
context of the courtly flower-leaf debate:
And if it happe me rehersen eft
That they han in here freshe songes said,
I hope that they wole nat ben evele apayd,
Sith it is seyd in fortheryng and honour 
Of hem that eyther serven lef or flour.
For trusteth wel, I ne have nat undertake 
As of the lef agayn the flour to make,
Ne of the flour to make ageyn the lef,
No more than of the corn agen the shef;
For, as to me, is lefer non, ne lother. (G 66-75)
The narrator's analogy between "corn" and "chaff," and 
flower and leaf, makes clear his valuation within a 
larger discussion, in the poem entire, of the value of 
both auctoritee and traductio. He would of course 
prefer the "corn"— in other words, the matter of the old 
approved stories that should be brought to life, once 
again, in English. This problem of the matter of old 
stories is, as has been discussed, the substance in part 
of Cupid's indictment.
Nevertheless— to return to the original point— beyond 
the persona's adherence to one symbol or figure (such as 
the daisy, or the "corn") over another, he does not take 
sides in the larger philosophical debate (that has more 
to do with the phenomenon of translating than it does 
with that of the matter to be translated).
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or celebrate as if they are free to understand all of 
the implications of the poems' events and discussions. 
Readers feel this way, however, not because of the 
poem's allegorical structure, but exactly because the 
poems' narrator has put them off their guard. Because 
they are told, and because they see through the agency 
of Chaucer's deft use of irony and comedy the bungling 
narration of the persona, they tend to take what he 
says and does, not without consequence so much as that, 
rather, what he says may be false (and, therefore, 
readers jump to conclusions of right and wrong based on 
this polarity the poems' persona has in effect 
established for them). Readers make decisions, that 
is, within the narrator's choice of context, though 
they often tend to forget this.
We can thus say that Chaucer uses Horace at the 
opening of the Parlement of Foules to bring together 
the strands of a complex discussion in the dream poems 
and the Troilus; this is a progressively trenchant 
meditation on knowledge sustained in literature and in 
other life experience as well, knowledge that is to be 
measured against a religious and philosophical ideal. 
Rhetoric itself, then— or certainly the question of 
figuration in language such as verse-language, which 
for Chaucer perhaps underlies the concept of 
translatio— becomes the metaphor in a poetic search for
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a truth that may be viable in all spiritual, mental, 
experiential states of being. And in the "Prologue" 
Chaucer seizes the opportunity to write, particularly 
here where he may turn his innovative hand to 
established forms such as the dream visio and maroerite 
genres, what should be understood to be a palinode to 
this poetic form (beyond Ovid, Froissart, Machaut, 
Deschamps). Robert Frank adds his commentary to that 
of a long line of critics regarding the Prologue's 
conventionality (cf., e.g., Kittredge Chaucer and His 
Poetry 2; and Lowes Geoffrey Chaucer 126).1 But he 
rightly observes that in the "Prologue" the appearance 
of orthodox conventionality is misleading, especially 
so because the poet's "explanation and defense of what 
he is about to do [is] not merely conventional. True, 
the Prologue has all the conventional furniture" (12), 
even if these formulae are employed for a new purpose. 
Yet the term palinode must be used advisedly, although, 
as Robert Estrich states, the G prologue to the Legend 
of Good Women certainly makes best use of dramatic 
humor and irony which we recognize, moreover, as a 
predominating quality of the later Chaucer and "in line 
also with the steady development of the poet away from 
the cliches of medieval courtly-love poetry" (329-30).
1. See, for example, G. L. Kittredge, Chaucer and His 
Poetry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U Press, 1915), 2; and 
J. L. Lowes, Geoffrey Chaucer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1934), 126.
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Some of these cliches are of course necessarily 
bound up in allegorical values, even when Chaucer 
finally eschews the dream genre's allegorical 
determinism, most notably in the "Prologue" as well as 
earlier in Troilus and Crvsede and later in the 
Canterbury Tales. Because the dream vision allows the 
poet to wed real and surreal states of consciousness, 
Chaucer manages to include in his examination the 
problem, to designate it so, of civilization's 
historical— and thus its moral— impulse. Chaucer's 
secularity becomes the force by which he may reconcile 
the miraculous nature of religio-historical knowledge 
with that of the tangible, "real" terrain he is 
a witness to in his every day world.
The world "text" Chaucer reads is composed of 
sensible "things," but as Hugh of St. Victor's remark 
intimates (i.e., that the sensible world is like a book 
written by the hand of God), through the imagination's 
power the mysterious force that orders the palpable 
world body may also be known. Allegory, for one, 
reflects the presence of the mysterious through 
enigmatic duplicities of meanings, while it seeks to 
establish a context for logical thinking within an 
esthetic mode; of many esthetic epistemologies, 
allegory is the form that attempts to reconcile the 
factual with the supernatural through a reinvention of
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a world experience often dismantled by philosophical 
attempts to "explain" such an experience. The more 
poetically framed inquiries recognize the supernatural 
because, like language (and dreaming), logically the 
imagination must be God-induced.
Yet logic need not concede, due to its very nature, 
the existence of the less material, supernatural, 
dream-like often enough and literary, world elements. 
This discrepancy is played out in the debate between 
Chaucer's narrator and the God of Love. Translatio. or 
makvna. the imaginative acts of reading the world or 
God's text, are questioned because they are 
interpretive, imaginative ways of being-in-the-world, 
just as dreaming is an interpretive act in its 
rendition of waking reality. Alceste, naturally, who 
finally is real only through her figuration in a dream, 
in a literary work, the "Prologue," "settles" the 
issue.
Smiling and mollified, the God of L o v e , also 
Chaucer's figure, concedes that, after all, Chaucer may 
restore the unified world, may reestablish order by 
writing the "wheat" and letting go of the "chaff" in 
the forthcoming legends of women true in love. We as 
readers know the connection between love and 
imagination; and we restore the unity by reading 
Chaucer's text of the buffoonery of dream-induced gods.
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This text is a reflection of the complex book of the 
world from which it derives— a book whose "narrative," 
as Gellrich writes, "is the 'history' of mankind from 
creation to the ascent to the celestial city" (22; cf. 
211). Peck's notion of the nominalistic idea, that the 
"mind and its knowledge are an ongoing imagistic- 
linguistic process" (above), forms the basis of 
Chaucer's meditation on the authority of literature 
within a world that would rather rely on experience 
alone. But when we "read" the world landscape we may 
also realize a historical, and imaginative dimension 
beyond the physical present. Reading is, indeed, 
humanity's unique, ennobling epistemological virtue, 
and, through the act itself, reading becomes an 
experiential action as well. Thus, through the 
"Prologue"'s comedy, our nobility is remembered in the 
various misreadings by the God of Love, Alceste, and 
even the "Prologue"'s narrator, of Chaucer's corpus. 
Chaucer's comedy serves a serious purpose. Misreading, 
rather than reading, in Chaucer's hands becomes the 
emblem for the efficacy of all artistic endeavor; art 
may most authentically signify the truth, Chaucer seems 
to be saying, in its gesture towards that truth, a 
gesture that takes the form of human expression's 
ultimate failure at truth's description.
301
VIII
No less than Chaucer's, we have noted that Langland's 
innovative skills worked to undermine traditional 
expectations of various literary forms such as the 
dream visio. the poem of pilgrimage, and allegory. 
Like Chaucer, Langland reflects the upheavals of their 
common time— social and political, theological and 
philosophical. Piers Plowman has frustrated as well as 
pleased readers and critics by its virtual 
unwillingness to adhere to what at first appear to be 
the poem's set literary forms; this is how we can 
identify its innovative energy, an energy that in 
itself is a reflection of the changing fourteenth 
century landscape.
While Chaucer turns his back on the allegorical 
tradition, and in doing so sends it up in a spoof that 
has ultimately serious purposes, just as seriously 
Langland achieves power by methodically dismantling 
poetic structures, from within. Considering the wide 
range of theological and philosophical thinking in the 
fourteenth century, and the concomitant range, in 
England alone, of poetic voice and genre, it is likely 
that an innovator like Langland should have approached 
the problem of generic expectation from quite a 
different direction than had Chaucer. In Langland's 
time England produced an extraordinary variety of
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poetry, and literature generally. Cleanness. Pearl. Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight. Piers Plowman. Chaucer's 
dream poems, Troilus and Crvsede. and last but not 
least The Canterbury Tales. are all contemporary with 
each other, and we may safely assume they were all 
popular.
These poems attest, of course, not only a wide range 
of literary taste and originality, but the divergence 
of values between their own period and ours. 
Especially to a twentieth century sensibility, there is 
a world of difference between Chaucer's literary output 
and that of, say, Dame Julian of Norwich. Richard 
Rolle, if we are to judge by the number of extant 
manuscripts and other records in the fifteenth century, 
was enormously popular, more so than his contemporary 
Chaucer. Apparently, the Form of Perfect Living was 
more compelling for fourteenth century readers than was 
the Canterbury Tales. All the same, to gauge these two 
works by such a narrowly drawn criterion as this 
comparison must miss the point? Chaucer's audience was 
surely less clerical, more secular.
In Piers Plowman we see a poem that in all 
likelihood could reach out to many different kinds of 
readers, some of whom would more readily enjoy Rolle 
than Chaucer, or vice versa. Yet what is interesting 
about Langland, in this context, is not so much the
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matter of his poem as his method of treating that 
matter. Both Chaucer and Langland confront the issue 
of allegorical thinking, deeply rooted as it is in 
Christian theology since Paul and Augustine. Again, 
Chaucer has ostensibly rejected the received poetic 
forms of his time— and in so doing he has staked out an 
ontological claim for poetry, in the "Prologue" to the 
Legend of Good Women and elsewhere; thus he has chosen 
to fashion what the modern mind comfortably designates 
as esthetic realism. Langland, however, has decided to 
develop a poem whose very machinery presides over the 
essential Christian question of the efficacy of 
language, in making a claim for poetry as a solution to 
this problem. Moreover, Langland manages this in more 
explicit fashion than is possible for Chaucer, not 
least because Piers Plowman links the question of 
specifically Christian salvation with the act of 
writing. The philosophy of language, as it has come 
down to him in the Christian tradition, provides 
Langland with an alternative poetic strategy. 
Employing a discourse that in comparison with Chaucer's 
is more overtly philosophical, apparently didactic, and 
so on, Langland recognizes that the resolution of 
knotty theological and philosophical issues can take 
place only through a language that can demonstrate its 
own undoing (a decidedly postmodern notion); therefore 
we find in Piers Plowman a cogently self-reflexive
304
intent to make use of irony in the construction of 
poetic genres, which will most eloquently demonstrate 
their own integrity of expression, by dint of their 
ability to unravel or rather to deconstruct themselves. 
From this perspective, it is fair to call Langland's 
method a poetics of self-cancelation; time and time 
again it demonstrates its own impossibility as language 
exists in the Pauline tradition, and perhaps this 
represents the ultimate possibility of an artist's 
self-enunciation within a presence-absence textual 
matrix (cf. above).
Thus, for some readers, of the present and in the 
fourteenth century as well, Langland's poem may be the 
more powerful expression of the human condition. 
Chaucer's is a profound discussion of the ultimate 
confounding that language and poetry cause in their 
quest for absolute truth, whereas Langland's poetry is 
a demonstration of that deeply problematic, deeply 
Christian perception that language and poetry will 
inevitably only lead back to themselves, and that the 
only hope of describing truth lies in the gesture 
poetry can make in its inevitable failure to adequately 
name the absolutely real— to say the truth. Chaucer's 
gesture is oblique, and thus is peripheral, when 
contrasted to Langland's gesture that is central. 
Hence, we might want to reconsider the canonical status 
of works like the Canterbury Tales and Piers Plowman.
305
as our own critical standards both widen and are 
transformed— for in obvious ways Langland's poem lends 
itself to the kinds of critical analysis that have 
become popular since the advent of structuralism. 
Indeed, to view the poem as a demonstration of its own 
poetics is to be able to loosen many of what have been 
widely recognized as the poem's critical problems. The 
poem's attempt at poetic self-reflexivity occurs, 
furthermore, in order to make a clear theologico- 
philosophical statement.
IX
It can be argued that— more so than in Chaucer, or for 
that matter than in Dante or Marcabru— Langland's 
epistemological concerns become crystal clear when we 
place his poem within the intellectual context of its 
time. We have seen how immensely important linguistic 
paradigms were for thinkers contemporary with Langland 
as well as for those before him. Well within the 
embrace of the Augustinian tradition, such as it has 
been herein defined, Langland has resorted to 
linguistic metaphors that are of crucial importance to 
any attempt at understanding his complex, subtle and 
powerful poetic structure. They point to the ultimate 
meaning of his poem, which is conveyed by a self­
reflexive commentary on the nature of poetry and its
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various generic forms. While this self-evaluation is 
as penetrating as Chaucer's, it finally leads full 
circle to where the poem essentially begins, with the 
theological question of free will and its relationship 
to salvation.
This question is foregrounded in the use Langland 
makes of one particular "genre," that of self-naming. 
As in the typical Chaucerian gambit, Piers Plowman 
opens with a description of the Fair Field of Folk; in 
a dream, Langland poses the question of how to 
interpret that dream (cf. Finke "Truth's" 57-58). For 
Langland, the question ultimately becomes whether or 
not the dreamer as pilgrim can exercise the will to 
interpret and to communicate what he experiences. In 
several passages of Piers Plowman it is implied that 
interpretation and communication are the key activities 
for anyone who holds out the hope for salvation. But 
we are explicitly told this through the inclusion of 
the C text's autobiography, a passage that immediately 
highlights the issue of self-evaluation and redemption 
by virtue of the attention the passage, first of all, 
calls to itself. The form this takes is of a textual 
nature. The C passage disrupts an expectation that has 
been previously established in the poem's last version, 
the B text. Hence the discourse in B, which had been 
firmly set within its own chronology, is displaced and 
deferred by Langland's new discussion of his persona
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Will's identity as a poet and what that can mean for
him in terms of his own personal salvation. We are
told this symbolically in the metaphor of the plough,
which would have been for both Chaucer and Langland
immediately apprehended as signifying the poet's pen.
Ploughing was understood as a form of writing; in fact,
in some fundamental fashion it was the very act of
writing, where the field of the pen signified the text 
*1
or book.
Particularly in the C text, the poem's final 
revision, the issue of self-writing is most vividly at 
work, and then most conspicuously in the 
"autobiographical" Passus C.VI, but elsewhere too. In 
these passages the Langland persona seeks to establish 
a complementary relationship between the question of 
the uses one can make of language, such as poetry, and 
the exercise of the individual will within a world of 
conditional and absolute necessity. Indeed, this
1. In this section of my discussion I am of course 
trying to demonstrate the analogous relationships 
between writing and pilgrimage--the source for the 
ploughman as pilgrim is Luke 10, which calls upon 
disciples to preach and therefore to harvest, to be 
laborers worthy of hire— and between writing and 
education-- the sources for which are similar to 
pilgrimage, especially in that both pilgrimage and 
education involve preaching; thus preaching, an orally 
based discourse, is equatable with writing, an otherwise 
literate discourse (see Holloway 79-81). See Appendix C, 
below, for an extensive discussion of ploughing as a 
metphor for writing, as well as ploughing's secondary 
associative network.
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complex of forces is sost graphically depicted in the 
C text's 91 line expansion of a discussion in B 
concerning "heavenly reward, measurable hire, and 
illicit worldly mede" (Coleman Piers 88). The passage 
crystallizes two pursuits: philosophico-theological
truth, and the truth of the poetic vocation. Both are 
founded in a shared epistemological assumption. Thus 
this passage
best comes to terms with the [contemporary] 
understanding of just reward according to the 
covenant operating in the ordinata [i.e., the 
created world]. It is also in keeping with 
[contemporary] interests in logic and grammar that 
Langland should interpolate a grammatical 
explanation of mede in terms of right relation, and 
thereby give us some insight into what an audience 
for the poem was expected to understand.
(88)
Grammar, which as a primary forensic tool had still 
been enormously popular in the last several centuries, 
in Langland's time remained as a vehicle by which new 
perceptions and beliefs might be conceptualized and 
articulated. In a later discussion of the seven arts, 
C.VI has in effect retroactively created a penetrating 
echo, originating in B.XV; the earlier passage deplores 
the fact that, in the present state of society's 
decline, "Gramer, the grounde of al," now "bigyleth" 
children (365). In the C text, use is made of the 
echoing of the earlier perception in a reprise that 
proclaims "god [to be] the grounde of al":
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'Relacion rect,1 quath Conscience 
' ys a recorde of treuthe,
Quia antelate rei est recordatiuum.
Folwyng and fyndyng out
the foundement of strenthe,
And styuelyche stonde forth
to strenghte of the foundement,
In kynde and in case
and in cours of noumbre;
As a leel laborer that by-leuyth with hus maistre 
In hus paye and in hys pyte
and in hus pure treuthe,
To paye hym yf he performeth
and haue pyte yf he faylleth,
And take hym for hus trauaile 
al that treuthe wolde.
So of hoi herte cometh hope and hardy relacion 
Seketh and suweth hus substantif sauacion,
That ys god, the grounde of al 
a graciouse antecedent.
And man ys relatif rect yf he be ryht trewe;
He a-cordeth with Crist in kynde 
uerbum caro factum est;
In case, credere in ecclesia
in holy kirke to byleyue;
In numbre, rotie and aryse and remyssion to haue, 
Of oure sory synnes asoiled and clansed,
And lyue, as our crede ous kenneth 
with Crist withouten ende.
This is new to this revision. Langland's strategy 
here is to come full circle, through these like 
sentiments, in linking together issues of language, 
knowledge, and salvation. It is important to see that 
such linkage especially pertains to the issue of the 
exercise of one's individual will, and whether or not 
such action will result in the ultimate reward of 
salvation; exercise of volition obtains to the activity 
of writing. For Langland, late in a twice revised long 
poem, and more pointedly than in either its A or B 
versions, this relationship is clearly established
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through an identification between the author, William 
Langland, and the poem's persona, a persona who exists 
as both an allegory within the action of the poem, and 
as a fully drawn, round character, about whom we learn 
much in the way of personal details in the uniquely 
autobiographical passage, C.VI.
Not only is this passage in itself new with C, but 
it has been prepared for by a greatly expanded 
discussion of the nature of reward and free will in the 
two passus leading up to it. Indeed, this renovation 
of the A and B texts is sufficient unto itself, to tell 
us of Langland's interest in self-enunciation. Self- 
assertion, however, is not for Langland an end in 
itself. Rather, it is employed in order to examine 
profoundly ontological and epistemological issues of 
the time, which in turn, in their discussion, serve to 
deepen and commemorate the individual author within as 
well as beyond his text. And it is the very mode of 
the actual signing of the author's name in the poem— as 
Kane has so elegantly discussed, the signing changes 
from one version to the next (61-65)— which amounts to 
powerful evidence of Langland's intentions.
Dante, earlier, was intent on defining himself in 
terms of the philosophical issues of his day, 
particularly in an implicit relationship with Thomas 
Aquinas. Langland's intellectual dialogue is
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conducted between himself and, alternately, Ockham, 
Holcot or even Wyclif. In this manner, similar to 
Dante, Langland at one and the same time wishes to 
assert his individuality as a poet, and by extension to 
legitimize poetry as an act that can lead to salvation. 
This of course is an attitude not only common to Dante 
but to Marcabru as well. All the same, like his 
forebears, Langland strives to have himself be subsumed 
into a larger discussion of individual conduct, truth 
and salvation; he wishes to be subsumed, that is, into 
the essential discourse of his text. Here we see 
another instance of the inherently tautological nature 
of autobiography, also operative in Dante (cf. Freccero 
264; and the "Introduction" above). Furthermore, the 
subsumption into a text of pilgrimage, in which a 
protagonist experiences travail and frustration in his 
attempt to arrive at his destination, underscores not 
so much the possibility for understanding the human 
plight as it does the struggle to exercise the human 
will (cf. Freccero 29 ff.). This intricacy in
Langland's poem, particularly as the questions of will 
and understanding intertwine, provokes and satisfies; 
and it is through such a complex that we will finally 
know and appreciate the poet, the person who has set 
all of this in motion.
Another motif germane to this discussion, which is 
modified in all three texts of Piers Plowman. is
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Langland's treatment of minstrelsy. Minstrelsy is the 
only occupation, as Donaldson has observed (C-Text 
136-55; cf. Economou "Self-Conscious" 189), that is 
treated differently in each version of the poem. It is 
valuable and perhaps even essential to consider all 
variants of Langland's poem, as part of a larger poetic 
experience that we can posit as being the real poem we 
call Piers Plowman--the A, B and C texts together 
constituting the "hypersign" (Corti 100 ff.) we 
understand to be the expression that is more than the 
sum total of the poem's parts. In a sense, the 
aggregation of the poem's earlier and last versions 
points to the role the poet plays in relation to the 
central factor in the poetic process, as Gottfried Benn 
comments: "Here is the mystery: the poem is already 
finished before it begins; only the poet does not yet 
know the text. The poem absolutely cannot be different 
from what it then is, when it is finished" (Corti 84) . 
This understanding of poetry may account for George 
Economou's careful separation of the treatment of 
Minstrelsy in the C text, as being of an essentially 
transformed nature, from that which we find in either 
or both A and B. While the earlier texts differentiate 
between "minstrels who guiltlessly 'geten gold with 
hire glee' and those ‘lapers and langelers, Iudas 
children', who could work if they wanted to," C simply 
presents the idea of "one bad class of minstrels, those
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'That wollen neyther swynke ne s w e t e 1 11 (189; cf.
Donaldson C-Text 136 ff.). In C the view of minstrelsy 
is more distilled. Moreover, this last revision
moves from its one-class definition to a view that 
distinguishes between the original class of 
minstrels and "godes mynstrales" (C.viii.100) , a 
phrase deriving ultimately from Franciscan 
tradition. The B-text, between passus x and xiii, 
begins to show a severe judgment against all but 
the most pious kind of minstrelsy, while at the 
same time tending to disassociate the dreamer from 
the vocation. Still, in its identification of 
Hawkin as a minstrel, the B-text appears to persist 
in its preoccupation with minstrelsy, possibly even 
contributing to the connection between Hawkin and 
the poet so many readers see. But it is in the C- 
text, with its explicit separation of God's 
minstrels from the body of everyday minstrelsy and 
entertainment, that we find the clearest expression 
of the poet's "conscious assimilation of himself to 
a minstrel" [Donaldson 155] along the basic line of 
development found in all three texts; "first, an 
honest, plausible, idealistic entertainer and 
ultimately an apostolic- Franciscan ioculator Dei" 
[155]. (Economou 189).
Significantly, the autobiographical section in C is 
related by a Will who is fully awake. In his persona 
Langland has wedded his discourse on volition to a 
recognition, furthermore, that inherent in humankind 
there is a creative aspect that can manifest as 
playfulness and even verse-making. Hence, the 
notion of play, and of poetry largely, is to be 
explained within an otherwise alien, binary context: 
idleness versus work. The question being asked, then, 
is whether or not the exercise of an individual's will 
is contingent upon the desire to work, to work in a way
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that suggests the lack of playfulness. And, it is 
suggested, if poetry is to be legitimized as a serious 
endeavor, on a par with sober work, then salvation may 
be possible by way of unusual, otherwise less than 
serious, or rather willful, means. Of course, poetry 
is ultimately to be seen as a means towards salvation. 
Economou continues his exploration of this theme in 
Piers Plowman by observing the noteworthiness of Will's 
seeming
to identify his making with his search for 
salvation, a quest which is finally profoundly 
affected and directed by this entire crucial 
encounter with Imaginative, a vivid example, 
incidentally, of self-consciousness fourteenth- 
century style. If he could get his answers 
elsewhere— the reader is aware of an earlier 
failure of a pair of friars to provide any— the 
narrator would give up his "werke" and go to church 
to do his more conventional duty. The assertion 
that poetry is his proper work and the suggestion 
that for him it is something more serious than play 
are indeed remarkable, all the more so when we 
consider that after Langland arrived at his view of 
himself as one of God's minstrels, they became 
superfluous. (190-91)
A relationship is established between human will and 
human imagination, not unlike what Dante develops in 
the Commedia. And so "the concept of acceptable forms 
of work must be expanded to contain the calling of 
poetry when it is specifically committed to serving 
God" (191) . Much as we have seen in Chaucer's 
portrayal of an opposition between imaginative 
knowledge and knowledge acquired through the process 
of reason— or rather a kind of right reason, since in
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the "Prologue" to the Legend of Good Women Cupid may 
represent an attack on the imagination, which readers 
might have been all to quick to label as reason instead 
of blind inflexibility— Langland's poem also emends or 
redefines a narrow, received notion of reason that 
otherwise cannot quite serve to elucidate the machinery 
of salvation.
Just as Will1s admission that he has wasted time 
(and his resolution a few lines later not to waste 
it further) in his closing speech of the 
autobiographical passage foreshadows Imaginative's 
claim that he has taught the narrator-dreamer not 
to waste time some nine passus later, the unique 
connection between these two parts of the poem is 
also probably partially based on a rather subtle 
but unmistakable connection between their 
personified interlocutors at the conclusion of the 
passage's opening paragraph. We have already read 
there that Reason, "Romynge in remebraunce, 1 
reproached the conscious narrator for his past and 
current attitude towards work. Considering that 
part of Imaginative1s function, represented by the 
scholastic ars commemorativa. operates through 
memory, we can see that Reason and Imaginative 
resemble each other in their vivid representations 
of experience to the narrator in both dream and 
non-dream states. Indeed, their similarity is 
symptomatic of a much deeper connection [. . .].
(193)
What was an assault on the narrator's verse making by 
Imaginative (in B.xii) turns into, in the C text, a 
"more broadly based attack" on the manner of the 
narrator's working, by Reason. Reason's diatribe has 
"preempted" that of Imaginative, which has been 
deleted. The result is Will's "proposal of a 
commitment and hope in his making, just as
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Imaginative's attack had resulted in a definite, though 
weaker, defense of it" (193; cf. Skeat's gloss for 
"made of" in line 5: "For ich made of tho men as reson 
me tauhte").
X
Finally, however, it is the unique insertion of a 
parity between God and language (i.e., grammar) which 
provides a critical link to Langland's self-identity, 
within his very poem, as a poet. We see him as someone 
who may provide a workable description of truth and 
self-revelation, albeit with the aid of a fallen 
language. We have seen this equation elsewhere, in the 
balance between the natural world and the language of 
Marcabru's verses. Troubadours could suggest that they 
possessed the ability to create poetry, as it were, ex 
nihilo. in the same way as there was a creation of the 
world. Sarah Spence observes that "most of the early 
troubadours start their poems with a word that 
emphasizes the distinction between their role in the 
work, and their role in the world"--for example, 
Guillem IX's use of farai. "So too the troubadours 
emphasize their power over standard topoi, most notably 
the Natureinaang11 (120-21) . In Dante, too, we find a
version of this parity. As Freccero writes, regarding 
the centrality of formalism in the Commedia,
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[i]n a culture which called its central principle 
"the Word," a certain homology between the order of 
things and the order of words is strongly implied. 
This is another way of stating Kenneth Burke's 
"logological" principle [Rhetoric of. Religion 1-7]. 
If theology is words about God, wherein linguistic 
realities are used to describe a transcendent 
divinity, then "logology" is the reduction of 
theological principles back into the realm of 
words. What ensures the possibility of the 
reversal is the central tenet of Christianity, the 
doctrine of the Word, according to which language 
and reality are structured analogously. (260)
How is this poetic tradition made manifest in the 
fourteenth century? For Chaucer language, and 
secondarily poetry, provide the matter of his poetic 
discussion, in which the possibilities of expressing 
the truth are weighed within the confusion that 
language also causes in striving towards that truth. 
For Langland, however, the truth is posited as being 
the language itself, a language that will be perceived 
as being emptied of its content, and a language he will 
literally inhabit. Within such a construct we may 
profitably find a comparison with Chaucer's attempts to 
talk about the problems as well as the hopes for 
language to enunciate the truth. In Chaucer, the 
problems come to be identified with his persona, who as 
a poet nevertheless is seen as standing apart from the 
poetry he has written, while in Langland there is the 
suggestion that the poet is in fact his very language 
and therefore his poetry, without distinction from 
Will. The grammatical analogy in C.iv (cf. above) 
provides a forum for an extended examination of how
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human reason and conscience affect the capacity for 
individual choices in the world; these abilities help 
to determine the vocation of writing, a choice that in 
the C text Langland has finally and unequivocally made 
as his work, a choice that will lead him to the truth 
of salvation existing beyond the vicissitudes of 
language, thought, and the reality of the created 
world, the potentia ordinata. In conjunction with 
other critical passages revised in the C text, C.iv 
establishes the ground for the direct assertion of the 
efficacy of poetry made by Will, to Reason and 
Conscience, in the autobiographical addition, C VI.
The nexus of these concerns inscribes the 
fundamental world vision of the poem, most eloquently 
expressed, though, by the ultimate terms of Will's 
search— Dowel, Dobet and Dobest. And if there is a 
paradox in this equation it is that these are truly 
enigmatic terms. Dante's treatment of Augustine's 
Confessions. in the Convivio. focuses on his life as a 
progress, which went from bad to good, and then from 
good to better, and finally from better to best ("lo 
quale fu di [non] buono in buono, e di buono in 
migliore, e di migliore in ottimo"). What interests 
Dante is the central paradox of the "Divine tautology" 
(cf. above in this chapter and in the "Introduction") : 
I am I, but I was not always so--which finds a 
correlary in Benn's observation on the making of
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poetry: "the poem is already finished before it begins" 
(above). For Langland, the paradox of a journey to a 
fully realized I is dramatized in the enigma of the 
states of being, Dowel, Dobet and Dobest, as these 
terms come to be considered in and of themselves, as 
terms, and moreover as terms that both further and 
undermine the poetic matrix in which they exist. On 
the one hand, as terminology they fulfill the demands 
of allegory (as it was defined by Fletcher; see above), 
that the meaning of an allegory depends upon and gains 
power through enigmatic elements within the allegorical 
dynamic. On the other hand, these terms do not readily 
serve a primary requisite that allegory mean something 
on its literal level, for even if a reader could 
quickly deduce the burden of these portmanteau words, 
they still would not be, strictly speaking, readable as 
components of the syntactical formulations in which 
they are to be found. Their "application keeps 
changing as the poem goes on," Middleton notes; yet to 
observe this fact is merely to perceive the symptom of 
their influence on the poem as a whole. Contrary to 
normal expectations for allegory, we find that
Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest are not personified or 
hypostatized abstractions taken from the stock of 
English common nouns; rather, they are coined terms 
using several parts of speech. Interpreters of the 
poem, like many of the allegorical speakers within 
it--including the a r c h - interpreter Will 
himself--have assumed that since "allegory is 
saying one thing and meaning another" the words do 
not mean what they say. (17 0-71)
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Indeed, Mills has argued that the allegorical value 
of these terms derives from their "syntactic 
impossibility" (195; in Middleton; cf. the 
"Introduction," above). This is precisely the point. 
The ultimate terms of Will's search are syntactically 
and grammatically anomalous, and, like the eventual 
illogicality of so very many of the allegorical motifs 
in Piers Plowman— such as, in a most profoundly, 
apparently unreasonable moment, the tearing of the 
pardon— Dowel, Dobet and Dobest are the terms by which 
the poem attempts its own unraveling. They are central 
to the poem. As a part of Langland's larger project to 
write a poem about the act of interpretation itself, 
particularly through the act of writing or "fynding," 
the use he makes of the three terms requires no simple 
translation but rather a process of "decipherment" 
through which readers can possibly apprehend the terms' 
metapoetical function in their role as "a major 
structural device." Chaucer's comedies of 
misinterpretations and otherwise confusions over the 
truths of texts and experiences find, at the very 
least, an adequate comparison in the many attempts in 
Piers Plowman to explain concepts, terms, definitions, 
and not least of all the three lives. However,
[wjhile there is no lack of capsule definitions of 
the Three Lives in the poem, none of them appears 
to fit all the uses of the triad. Moreover, the
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terms stick thornily in virtually every sentence in 
which they are used, conspicuously at odds with the 
ordinary syntax surrounding them, like creatures 
from another world than that of poverty and 
practical moral precept— and so they are. (171)
As Clergy's analogy in the banquet scene (in the B 
and C texts) indicates, in Scholastic terms an analogy 
based on grammar— as any "meaning" to be derived from 
these anomalies must be— cannot be "referential, but 
purely formal." Their function in the poem, then, is 
to "order the progressive form of the search for 
perfection, rather than characterize its object." Thus 
(to step back a few paces, for a moment, from this 
search for perfection Langland portrays) the 
relationship between grammar and pilgrimage will reveal 
the poem's overall matrix.
The grammar of the three terms suggests that 
Langland coined them in an attempt to show 
intellectual or spiritual relationships in their 
essential, changeless aspects, independent of the 
temporal circumstances into which they may be 
translated. By drawing a complex metaphor from the 
realm of intellectual rather than sensory reality, 
Langland has created in his triad an explanatory 
instrument which is free as is poetically possible 
from the merely contingent. The use of the Three 
Lives as an organizing device is an attempt to 
purify allegorical language— a medium highly 
vulnerable to misunderstanding and misuse— of its 
most immediate rhetorical appeal, and hence one of 
its most slippery qualities. They represent an 
effort, visible everywhere in Piers. which perhaps 
can never totally succeed: to make human language 
eschatologically adequate, valid beyond the narrow 
base in the world and experience upon which the 
terms of its metaphors rest. (171-72)
The "attempt to purify allegorical language" on the
part of Langland, as Middleton has it, must finally 
lead to the undoing of the essential allegorical 
impulse. The poem, which immediately states that it 
will begin a process of self- decipherment, as the 
attempt is made to divine the meaning of the dream of 
the fair field of folk, then proceeds to unfold one or 
another allegory that depends on (not unlike the 
situation in Chaucer) a dreamer who can fathom the 
meanings of what takes place and who, as a poet, can 
record the truth of these events. The problem for 
Will, and for us as well, is that any of the meanings 
proffered are absolutely equivocal. Thus, finally, it 
is only the surety of grammar, whose rules provide 
language with, in a sense, meaning, which allows Will 
any respite at all from the enormity of the confusion 
he perceives in all that he witnesses. Yet even here 
grammar may not serve him "truly"—  when, that is, he 
is asked to consider the meaning of terms like Dowel, 
Dobet and Dobest, and so he must embark on his ultimate 
journey. It is not that these terms do not mean 
anything at all; they are, rather, at one and the same 
time denotatively empty while they retain the power of 
multidimensionality. Recalling the situation Chaucer 
repeatedly presents us with, we can say that these 
terms provide the ground on which nominalist and 
realist thought can merge.
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XI
A discussion of the process by which poetry is created, 
and generally the recognition on the part of the poet 
of the efficacy of aligning his will with that of 
God's, was of course an important aspect of Piers 
Plowman prior to the C revision. But it is in the C 
text that the full implications of the three terms, and 
their relationship to makvng. are made clear.
If it is possible that a revision in an earlier 
part of the C version of the poem helps in part to 
explain the deletion from C.xv of the defense of 
making that occurs in B.xii, it is possible that 
the way the B text was completed also helps explain 
the revision of a passage such as the one with 
which this same passus, C.xv, opens. The writing, 
which mostly means the rewriting, of Piers Plowman 
incorporates poetic activity into the subject 
matter of the poem. What was written in B, 
especially from this very point in the text on, 
becomes part of the personal experience the 
narrator-dreamer brings to bear on his subsequent 
treatment of his continuing quest, the ongoing 
nature of which will be confirmed by the identical 
conclusions of B and C when Conscience announces 
his intention to seek out Piers the Plowman. Thus, 
the accomplishment of B in its explorations of 
Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest influences the removal of 
a passage that predicates its justification of 
making on the condition of acquiring knowledge 
about those three lives; it also influences the 
rewriting of the lines that introduce the figure 
that has already initiated the acquisition of that 
knowledge in the previous version.
(Economou "Self-Consciousness" 191-92)
As Lorraine Kochanske Stock points out, "the free will 
necessary for voluntarily embracing the life of 
spiritual upward mobility in Do wel, Do bet, Do best, 
which is repeatedly suggested and endorsed by Langland,
324
is demonstrated by the renaming of the soul, or Anima. 
as Liberum Arbitrium in Passus XV of the C Text1 
("Will, Actyf" 475). The invention of the three terms, 
in representing a path of spiritual ascent, can be seen 
to have precipitated the exchange of terms that 
designate the soul. The making of poetry is to be seen 
as conditioned by a state of free will; we view the 
spiritual journey in a like context.
John Bowers' comprehensive treatment of Langland 
demonstrates convincingly the intent on the poet1s part 
to make of Will the figure of voluntas. In order to 
accomplish this identification, Langland must invest in 
his poem the theme of language as the most'important 
step on the pilgrimage towards redemption. The poet 
assiduously casts the greatest sacred historical events 
as "miracles" of either
speech or writing. Wit interprets the act of 
divine creation as a linguistic process under the 
control of God: "And al at his wil was wrou3t wi£) 
a speche, / Dixit &. facta sunt" (B. ix. 32-46) . The 
word of prophecy in the Old Testament is fulfilled 
in Christ (B. xix.8 0-82), and because the Virgin 
"conceyued j?oru3 speche" of the Holy Ghost, the 
Incarnation is also transformed into a linguistic 
act: "Verbum caro factum est" (B.xviii.129; v.499). 
Just as Moses had received the Old Law through the 
letters engraved upon the Tablets (B.v.566- 91), 
Christ inaugurated the New Law by saving the 
adulterous woman through the characters he wrote in 
the dust: "Holy kirke knowe^j £>is, £at Christes
writyng saued" (B.xii.76-84). Even the first act 
of salvation is described as a result of language, 
when the gates of Hell are broken with the uttering 
of the words Rex glorie and Christ marshals a 
phalanx of texts against the speechless Satan— "I 
may do mercy £oru3 my rightwisnesse and alle my
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wordes trewe" (B.xviii.389). Langland never misses 
an opportunity to look beyond the evocative and 
even the hieratic powers of language to elevate it 
as the supreme instrument of God's work on earth.
(192-93)
Furthermore, Langland aligns the human activity of 
writing with Genesis1 "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem 
nostram" (1.26) in B.ix.42. In this vein, we must note 
that the first instance of Dowel is represented by 
"Christ's verbal miracle at Cana," to suggest that "the 
use of language must somehow be involved in living the 
good life and repairing man's divine image" (Bowers 
193). Linguistic imagery abounds throughout the poem. 
There are the "lele wordes" and blossoms of "buxom 
speche" on the Tree of Charity (B.xvi.6-7).
The linguistic context especially obtains to the 
three Do's, to argue for a right use of language. A 
person who practices Dowel is "meke of his mou|?, milde 
of his speche" and "trewe of his tonge," according to 
Thought. Dobet, likewise, is described as someone who 
is "louelich of speche," and someone who has not only 
preached to people but who has also translated the 
Bible (B.viii.78-95). The meaning of Dobest, Wit says, 
is a right economy of speech, without wasted words 
"}?at spire is of grace / And Goddes gleman and a game 
of heuene" (B.ix.99-106). Later, the Holy Ghost metes 
out the gifts of grace; the first of the blessings is 
to go to those who aid fellow Christians through 
preaching and instruction. Thus
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definitions offered by Thought and Wit are really 
elaborations of a lesson given much earlier by Holy 
Church herself. When Will asked the question of 
central importance to the whole poem— "How may I 
save my soul?"— she explained that the surest 
treasure was Truth:
For who is trewe of his tonge, 
telle)? noon oojper,
Doo|? £>e werkes Jperwi]?
and wilnej? no man ille,
He is a god by J?e gospel, a grounde and o lofte, 
And ek ylik to oure lord by Seint Lukes wordes. 
The clerkes Jpat knowen it 
sholde kennen it aboute 
For cristen and vncristen cleyme£> it echone.
(B.i.88-93)
This is the first passage in the poem to suggest 
the alliterative trio of words. works and will that 
develops into such an important interlocking theme.
(193)
In order to be saved, Holy Church stipulates, there 
must be a true speech along with true works and good 
will towards others. Thus, as in Thought's defining of 
Dobet, clerics must spread the gospel. However, in 
such an injunction the core problem of signification is 
unavoidably evoked. As Bowers asserts,
beneath the placid surface of her advice lurk 
problems that Langland would discover later when he 
began to plumb deeper. Cannot a man speak true 
words arising from a false will? And cannot a 
well-intended cleric write a long allegorical poem 
but lose the merit of his work through the 
inability of his audience to understand its hard 
meaning? (194)
There are numerous instances of Langland's use of 
exempla in order to further a claim that there can be a 
useful literary endeavor; this is so when the source of
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one's words is divine inspiration and hence when they 
are valuable to a Christian reader. There are the 
writers of saints' lives, Cato, the angel of 
annunciation who appeared "to pastours and to poetes" 
(B. xii. 148-50) . As the Holy Ghost points out: "Aljbou3 
men made bokes, £>e maister was God, / And Seint Spirit 
j?e samplaries, & seide what men sholde write" (B.xii. 
101-02). Plato is called a poet; Lady Scripture lauds 
the "patriarkes and prophetes and poetes," for they 
denounced wealth and praised poverty (B.x.178, 344-45).
The linguistic question, of course, centers on the 
act of writing. Note Will's questioning of writing in 
his discussion of Solomon and Aristotle:
Maistres Jpat of Goddes mercy 
techen men and prechen,
Of hir wordes ]?ey wissen vs
for wisest as in hir tyme,
And al holy chirche holde)? hem bo)?e in helle!
And if I shal werche by hir werkes 
to wynne me heuene 
That for hir werkes and wit now wonye£> in pyne, 
Thanne wrou3te I vnwisly, whatsoeuer ye preche.
(B.x.389-94)
Considering the ambiguity inherent in the events that 
Book (i.e., the Bible) reports in the Harrowing of Hell 
scene, it is reasonable to conclude that
Langland has generated such an atmosphere of doubt 
concerning even moral literature that his poem 
cannot take for granted the merit of its own 
existence. He is therefore acutely aware of the 
need, if not always the means, to justify that 
existence. (Bowers 195)
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The ultimate means at Langland1s disposal for 
justifying the existence of his poem are, perhaps 
paradoxically, to engage in a formal meditation on the 
nature of poetry and language by writing into his text 
the very undoing of that text. In the 1960's, A. C. 
Spearing noted the existence in Langland1s poem of 
textual echoes, including (important to the present 
discussion) intratextual echoes, especially in the 
poem's final revision where "thematic recurrence" is 
key to the evolution of Langland's ideas: "verbal
repetition plays an important part in the rhetoric of 
Piers Plowman and [. . .] its use is consistently
intensified in the C-Text of the poem" (722; in Stock 
461). One theme, that of hunger and bread, which was 
examined by Spearing, is used in the C Text to unify 
the poem by linking together three pivotal passages 
that in turn point towards Dowel, Dobet and Dobest as 
the ultimate expressions of the pilgrim's truth. 
Significantly, the first of these passages is Passus 
C.VI, where Will confesses to his slothful life as a 
clerk:
"Non de solo." y sayde, "for sothe viuit homo.
"Nec in pane et in pabulo.
the pater-noster wittnesseth;
Fiat voluntas dei— |?at fynt vs alle thynges."
(82-88)
These phrases crop up again, first in the C text's
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banquet scene, Passus XV, in which Pacience instructs 
Activa Vita on the nature of being patient. Finally, 
Liberum Arbitrum defines charity for Will and Actyf, 
echoing these phrases, in C.XVI.
Much in the vein of the Chaucerian persona, Will 
thoughtlessly mouths the phrases from Matthew 4:4, "Non 
de solo vivit homo nec in pane et in pabulo," and from 
the third petition of the Pater Noster, "fiat voluntas 
tua," which "betrays his ignorance of their specific 
content and biblical contexts." Later, Pacience and 
Liberum Arbitrum "correct Will's misperceptions." The 
point here is that
each repetition or thematic recurrence of this pair 
of verses serves to rewrite the all-important 
revelation of the narrator's self that Langland 
conspicuously interpolates into C Passus VI. The 
result of this series of revisions or 
reinterpretations [of what, in some broad sense, 
can easily be construed to be misreadings] is the 
gradual emergence of one of Langland's most 
important triads which corresponds to the formulas 
Do wel, Do bet, Do best. (4 61-62)
The parallel with these terms is achieved by an 
inverse progression that includes Will's acedia or 
sloth, which in the fifth passus correlates with Dowel.
Activa Vita's positive recharacterization in Passus 
XV as a foil for Will's inactivity proves that. 
Furthermore, the positive example of Pacience, 
whose role is expanded and refocused in the C 
Text's Passus XV, suggests that to "Do bet" is to 
be patient. Langland's exploration of the theme of 
patient poverty throughout the B Text, the coverage 
of which is increased and intensified in the C 
Text, attests to his admiration for and advocation 
of that virtue. (Stock 475)
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These scenes are "glosses of one another" (468).
If they do nothing else, the scenes at least present 
us with a paradigm of interpretive and/or writing 
strategies, which leads us to the contemplation of Will 
as the poet adumbrated in C.v, a passus that recasts 
the entirety of Langland's final revision in order that 
it center around the activity of makvna. Thus the poem 
is at heart self-reflexive both in its focus on the 
activity of writing poetry (i.e., of producing itself) 
and by extension on the capacity to discover 
significance in either poetry or any other form of 
expression. Laura Finke shrewdly comments that
Piers Plowman. at times, seems almost an allegory 
of the impossibility of discovering either 
significance or truth within language, whether one 
searches for divine or merely for human 
significance. ("Truth's Treasure" 57)
Whether the language serves as "a vehicle for 
classification (of ways of life, or mental powers), a 
means of imposing order (the law), [or] paradoxically, 
a means of disorder and deception"—  uses which more 
often than not are indistinguishable— "although created 
in the image of the Logos, the language of fallen 
humanity "is capable of only an imperfect parody of it" 
(Finke "Dowel" 129). Hence, what becomes plausible its 
that "[t]he more human language strives to represent 
the world, the more it is trapped and frustrated by its 
own failure to assure referentiality" ("Truth's" 57).
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Language may provide a definition of itself as 
ultimately failing to do what it should— that is, to 
signify truth. As has been observed, however, this 
failure of language can also be placed in the service 
of, as occurs in poetry, a fundamental gesture towards 
the truth that is otherwise beyond language's 
denotative ability. As is the case in Chaucer's 
constant reversion to the theme of textuality versus 
experience, two methods of knowing the world, and more 
importantly in his self- enunciatory strategy of naming 
himself as the author of his own poetic works that are 
both attacked by others and both humorously and feebly 
defended by Geffrey, the fundamental poetic gesture 
finds its most stable ground in the act of self­
interpretation. Chaucer's Geffrey does a bad job of 
self-exegesis; through this machinery, though, we not 
only contemplate more than before the depth of these 
literary works Geffrey is a part of, but we also gain 
an appreciation of the multi-layered discourse of the 
present poem that, perhaps innocently on the surface, 
is engaged in a deeply philosophical struggle. It is 
precisely the philosophically determined level of 
discourse that profoundly causes the present poem's 
effect on its reader.
We have also noted the almost painfully baffling 
actions of Crysede in Chaucer's Troilus and Crvsede.
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and how, at a time when among theologians the value of 
logical procedures was being given perhaps its greatest 
test by the moderni as well as by their detractors, 
Chaucer strikes a balance within this controversy. 
Spearing's accounting for the popularity of dream 
poetry misses the point:
A fiction might be seen as an allegory or parable, 
in which case it could be said to convey the truth 
in a veiled form [. . .] Or again a fiction might
claim to be a true history, an account of what 
really happened as set down in authentic sources. 
But there was no way of saying that a fiction 
possessed an imaginative truth or validity even 
though it did not correspond to any literal truth 
[. . .] In these circumstances, to present a
literary fiction as a dream--one imaginative 
product as an analogue or metaphor for another 
imaginative product— offered a medieval poet an 
extremely useful way out of his dilemma.
(Dream-Poetry 74; in Bowers 195)
Truly, Crysede's character resists any univocal 
interpretation of the sort Cupid demands in the 
"Prologue" to the Legend of Good Women. and this is 
because of Chaucer's deep sensitivity to the 
intellectual currents of his day; as well, his was an 
intellect that could grasp the ultimate implications of 
those currents. As for Piers Plowman. an allegory 
that will simply defy the demands of univocity, its 
"resistance to interpretation" of the sort Chaucer's 
Cupid would prize, "inheres in its own interpretations 
of its difficulties"; for the poem is engaged at its 
deepest levels in a discussion of its own poetics.
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This discussion, moreover, must lead to the 
contemplation of language as a viable force in the 
world, which for Langland will explicitly mean as a 
force for salvation.
The dreamer's question "How may I save my soul?" 
leads him in the B. Text 1 to search for Truth 
(Passus I-VII), for Dowel (Passus VIII-XIV), and 
finally for Piers himself (Passus XV- XX). These 
quests become, in one sense, the search for a 
transcendental signified that would legitimate all 
the human signs of the mundane world, the world of 
the "fair field" and the "half acre." Indeed, the 
promise of a truth in, behind, or beyond the poem's 
language, and with it the possibility that Will's 
dreams actually mean "something," is from the 
beginning of the poem both proffered and withheld.
(Finke "Truth's" 57-58)
Will tells us in the opening tableau of Langland's 
poem,
[Ac] as I biheeld into ]?e Eest, 
and hei3 to ]?e sonne,
I sei3 a tour on a toft treiliche ymaked,
A deep dale byne£>e, a dongeon Jperlnne
Wi£ depe diches and derke and dredfull of si3te.
A fair feeld ful of folk fond I £>er bitwene.
(B Prologue 13-17)
We are to take his vision here as figurative, in that 
Will is seeing "representations of things [. . . .]
signifiers— tower, dungeon, and field--that seem to 
mean more than the poet tells us about them, that seem 
to point to other signifiers" (Finke 58). Will 
sees— that is, he beholds ("as I biheeld")— the scene 
that is very much like what he might have been able to 
find in a state of waking. Compared with the
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Chaucerian dichotomy, Langland's equivocation of 
meaning is at least as intense and profound; the
simplicity of the physical scene shades into the 
ambiguity of interpretation. The reader, like the 
dreamer, is compelled to ask, "What my it 
[by]meene?" The scene, in short, demands a gloss, 
an interpretation, additional text to explain the 
poetic utterance. The space that exists between 
the images of the tower, dungeon, and field and 
what they signify becomes the figural space of 
interpretation. It can be bridged or filled only 
by the attempt to understand it, by reading or 
creating a text that comments upon the text.
(Finke "Truth's" 58)
With its complex internal echoes and its constant, at 
times relentless, intention to appeal to texts and 
authorities beyond itself for verification, validation 
and eloquence, Piers Plowman is a poem that foregrounds 
and otherwise privileges the act of s e l f ­
interpretation, an act that may arguably be a quality 
of any literary text, if only to a small degree. 
Chaucer's act of self- interpretation may be, to an 
extent, an act of self-unraveling; but it never finally 
appeals to an authority beyond itself, even as it seeks 
to subsume others' texts within its own discourse 
through echoes, explicit sententia, and the like. In 
Langland's hands, however, textuality (inter-, intra-) 
finally becomes the desirable discussion, as predicated 
on the Pauline and Augustinian linguistic and textual 
metaphors for revelation and salvation. Will aligns 
the virtues of natural, "kynde knowyng" with what 
knowledge and understanding can be achieved through
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"craft," when he seeks from Holy Church an explanation 
of the vision he has beheld at the start of his 
j ourney:
"Yet haue I no kynde knowyng," quod I,
"ye mote kenne me bettre 
By what craft in my cors
it [truth] comse£> and where."
(B.I.138-39)
Yet the answer Holy Church offers Will "simultaneously 
postpones the dreamer's inquiry and widens its 
perspective until it encompasses--or attempts to 
encompass— everything, including the divine" ("Truth's" 
60), as in B.i.148-58:
And alle his werkes he wrou3te 
with loue as him liste;
And lered it Moises for the leuest thing 
and moste like to heuene,
And also the plente of pees
moste precious of vertues.
For heuene my3te nou3te holden it 
it was so heuy of hym-self,
Tyl it hadde of the erthe yeten his fylle,
And whan it haued of this folde 
flesshe and blode taken,
Was neuere leef vpon lynde li3ter ther-after,
And portatyf and persant as the poynt of a nedle, 
That my3te non armure it lette 
ne none hei3 walles.
For-thi is loue leder
of the lordes folke of heuene,
And a mene, as the maire is
bitwene the kyng and the comune [...].
What is important to see here is that in this passage's 
virtual proclamation of language's inadequacy the 
poetry achieves its greatest eloquence; that is to say, 
here poetry is "most full of speech." The effort to
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"explain the mysteries of the divine" results in the 
accumulation of
a series of highly antithetical images. Yet the 
allegory [of the passage] circles ground the idea 
of God's highest expression of love and truth— the 
Incarnation— by calling that love "heuy" and light 
as "leef vpon linde," "triacle," and "portatif and 
persaunt," able to pierce any armor or wall. The 
same phrase, "For heuene my3te nat holden it," is 
used to describe both the Incarnation and Lucifer's 
fall from heaven. This passage is characteristic 
of the poem as a whole: language does not progress 
toward and illumination of truth but falls into the 
deferral of its own rhetoric. Each sign produces 
the next sign in a repetitive sequence that never 
arrives at anything but the next trope. The more 
the poem's language attempts to describe the 
divine, the less r e f e r e n t i a l — and the more 
reflexive— it becomes. (Finke 60)
We can observe this same sort of equivocation in 
another key scene, the harrowing of hell sequence, 
where "words themselves become dramatic acts, 
participants in the central act of salvation." In this 
scene, "resignification of linguistic signs" is an 
absolute necessity, in order that there be a 
"transformation of everyday language into the verba 
arcana of salvation" (Finke "Dowel" 134).
And as Adam and all ]?oru3 a tree deyden,
Adam and all £>oru3 a tree shul turne to lyue,
And gile is bigiled and in his gile fallen; [. . .] 
]?e bitternesse ]?at )?ow hast browe, 
now brouke it £>iselue;
That art doctour of dee]? drynk £>at p o w  mayest.
For i £>at am lord of lif, loue is my drynke,
And for £>at drynke today I deide vpon er£>e.
I fau3t so me £>urste]? 3it for mannes soule sake; 
May no drynke me moiste, ne my £>urst slake,
Til £>e vendage falle in £e vale of Iosaphat,
That I drynke ri3t ripe Must, Resureccio mortuorum.
(B.xviii.358-60, 363-70)
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In his address to Lucifer, Christ has completely 
succeeded in manipulating signifiers; they come to mean 
their contraries: life and death, grace and guile, and 
so on (Finke "Dowel" 135) . The question of text and 
meaning— or, alternately, language and truth--is of 
course epitomized in the pardon scene, whose symbolic 
values, arguably, most vividly elaborate the 
philosophical issues at the heart of Piers Plowman and 
simultaneously resolve them if only in opaque terms.
Piers's tearing of the pardon implicitly 
underscores his recognition of how inadequate human 
language is to comprehend the divine Logos. As he 
rejects the terms of perfection offered by the 
Visio and the pardon, he transforms the Visio1s 
language to propose a very different notion of 
perfection. He rejects the largely economic 
definition of virtue (do well), suggested by the 
image of plowing, by divorcing the sign from its 
signified. (126)
The plow, symbolically the pen, is transformed by 
Piers into prayer and penance, spiritual endeavors: "Of 
preieres and of penaunce my plou3 shall ben heafter" 
(B.vii.122). And "whete breed" becomes tears 
(lacrime):
The plowman who up until now has occupied himself 
solely with the physical needs of the folk ceases 
to concern himself with such necessities as food 
and turns to asceticism, identifying himself with 
God's holy hermits. Like them he abandons the 
world, placing his trust in a power his experiences 
cannot confirm. By way of authority he cites 
Luke's parable of the birds who are fed in winter 
though they neither sow nor reap. The parable's 
command, "ne soliciti sitis" ("be not solicitous"), 
replaces dowel as the poem's definition of 
spiritual perfection. For Piers dowel gives way to
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dobet when he turns his back on the world and sets 
out on a journey whose goal he perceives but 
obscurely. (126-27)
Yet Piers has only gained for himself "the world's 
scorn rather than its understanding." He is not 
readily understandable by the folk (a likely parallel 
to Chaucer's character Cupid in the "Prologue" to the 
Legend of Good Women), because his conversion has been
cast in a language that does more to obscure 
meaning than to reveal it. Piers deliberately 
describes his transformation in a parable, the 
narrative form Christ frequently used. Since a 
parable is primarily a "similitude," usually 
between the physical and spiritual realm, it 
requires and act of interpretation to distinguish 
the "carnal sense" from the spiritual, hidden 
sense. (127)
In all of these passages we are witnessing various 
characters who have recourse to the essential paradox 
inherent in all attempts at expression, which leads 
readers, and Will as well, to the recognition that the 
very act of questioning— rather than any answer that 
might be elicited— is what is most important. Through 
the questions, Will can possibly come to know the 
divine (127-28).
At the moment of his rebellion Wille looks at his 
experiences, at the discourse that surrounds him 
and by which he defines himself (as scholastic 
philosopher, as dialectician), and perceives only 
absence. [. . . .] Wille responds to this
situation by poetically creating himself, assuming 
the ironic personae he has fashioned for 
himself— rebel, sinner, penitent, pilgrim, witness. 
His roles are the trappings of rebellion.
(133, 134)
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XII
In the B text's banquet scene, Clergy describes Dowel 
and Dobet as "two infinites, / Whiche infinites, with a 
feith fynden oute Dobest" (XIII.127-28). An infinite, 
according to Priscian, is usually used in "sentences as 
the object of a wish or command: volo leqere. 'I want 
to read1" (Middleton 176). In the same fashion,
each of the Three Lives is in turn the "object," 
both of the imperative to pilgrimage and the desire 
of Will, who is also the will, the voluntative 
capacity personified. (176)
Will's desires are "infinite" in the sense of being 
incomplete, unfinished or unsatisfied. In the same way 
it can be said that in "Clergy's definition Dowel and 
Dobet, like Will himself, become pilgrims to [a] 
'finite', seeking their own perfection in Dobest." More 
significantly, there is another meaning offered by 
Priscian for inf i n i t e . one which "enforces the 
association of these two Lives and Will the pilgrim 
through a metaphor of asking and answering"; yet the 
meaning also points to the central concern of 
Langland's poem as it is conveyed by his meditation on 
language:
The second grammatical sense of the word is utterly 
unrelated to the first, referring to a pronoun 
rather than a verb, and Priscian makes no attempt 
to connect them. They are for his purposes as 
unrelated as a monkey wrench is to a chimpanzee, or 
an oyster to a cloister. Yet it is the business of 
the poet to see or make occult resemblances between
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things unlike to the merely discursive intellect, 
and in Priscian's discussion of the "infinite" 
pronoun Langland found in an accident of 
terminology further substance for his theme.
(Middleton 176)
For the Scholastics, the cachet for the term infinite 
was Boethius who had to use the word in order to 
translate the Aristotelian term, into the Latin nomina 
infinita. As, literally, meaning "indefinite noun," in 
the Categories it refers to negative predicates such as 
non-albus or non-homo (OED "infinite" [8]; Aristotle 
Categoriae X.3, De Interpretatione X.l; Middleton 180). 
Thus infinite can suggest emptiness and indirection; 
and it acts not unlike the anomalous three Do's.
They are only words whose grammatical form gives to 
the search for perfection the comforting illusion 
that the quest is orderly and comprehensible. They 
are the necessary fiction underlying any cognitive 
pilgrimage. [As Pacience would say,] the terms 
Dowel and Dobet are not the treasure itself, a 
healing substance Will sees, but the "bouste," the 
precious and fragile vessel of linguistic form, 
which contains and transports meaning. (180, 181)
The human cognitive faculty processes information in a 
linear or rather serial fashion, in increments. The 
three Do's reflect this process. As "coined verbal 
nouns" they are "the fictive terms which give 
progressive form to Will's pilgrimage"; in doing so 
their "reassurance of intelligibility" fulfills the 
journey (181).
Piers PIowman will always return to the
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contemplation of its own poetic, generic form; and in 
this examination, it will demonstrate the very limits 
of that form. This is the poem's linguistic gesture, 
which we find enunciated through the relationship 
established among the three Do's and the question of 
the validity of writing itself. But this gesture 
pervades the poem entire. Consider, for example, the 
recurring attention that is paid to "the heuristic 
shortcomings of personifications by exploding their 
narrative and dramatic consistency in mid-scene" (185). 
An example of this is Piers's intercession when the 
figure Hunger acts brutally towards the folk to keep 
them at their plowing. It was Piers who had asked 
Hunger to perform this task. The results of this 
request, however, may be surprising.
The immediate requirement of charity toward his 
"blody brethren" momentarily suspends Piers' 
allegorical role. He must interrupt the sequence 
of symbolic events which would further the 
narrative pilgrimage to charity, in order to act 
charitably. (185)
In doing so, linear narrative is thrown into doubt, as 
is, in large, the "single-mindedness of the pilgrimage 
ideal." Scenes such as this one compel what is perhaps 
an extraordinary conclusion:
Langland's allegory considered as narrative is a 
study in frustration, and therein lies its value. 
We are made to apprehend the meaning of an idea 
only when all its embodiments within time and space 
fail us. (185)
342
The poem's own enigmatic qualities are evinced in its 
demonstration of its formal limits. Thus it is an 
allegory about the failure of allegory to express the 
truth. As we have seen, Chaucer alludes to this 
failure as well; he chooses to satirize allegory, and 
to opt instead for alternative literary forms that we 
understand to be, in contrast, "realistic." Langland 
is equally original. He chooses to reveal the 
"unreality" of the allegorical project by composing an 
allegory that must fail in its effort, in order that it 
can indicate a Christian truth which incorporates the 
allegorical process in its enterprise of debunking that 
very process. In the tradition of Paul and Augustine, 
all that we can see will be through the darkened glass 
of the poem.
What will this "failed allegory" tell us? As 
perhaps can be derived from what the character Book 
says in the Harrowing of Hell episode, the one hope of 
divining the events a pilgrim witnesses is to see, as 
in the Augustinian sense of it, with moral eyes. A. V. 
C. Schmidt, in an attempt to gloss one of Piers 
Plowman's more puzzling lines, "Badely ybedded, no book 
but conscience" (B.XV.534; in "Langland's “Book'" 482), 
reminds us of the myriad uses text and book could be 
put to by Christian theologians. Schmidt argues 
convincingly that the source of Langland's line is St.
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Jerome's Commentary on Daniel 7:10: "ludicum sedit, et 
libri aperti sunt". Set against the unalterability of 
the written word is the will to be conscionable, which 
may deny or otherwise alter the meaning, the "bouste" 
of a text, a text of words. Within this tension 
Langland posits the figure of the poet, who must embody 
and unify the dichotomy. He does so. Of Will's dream 
in church, in which he is also dreaming of, a church, 
Economou writes that we can say of this church, it
has given him the testament and its exegesis that 
allow him to articulate the yearning that charges 
his soul and work. It is no accident that he 
proposes to write this down [. . .].
("Piers" 318)
For in Will's writing he is dramatizing the essential 
poetic of his author, who has named himself by 
constructing an infinite regress of reflected, mirror 
images. Will is the poet and theme of his own 
(Langland's) poem. In a poem of dreams within dreams, 
we find a dreamer whose fictive dream, like Chaucer's 
birds in the "Prologue" to the Legend of Good Women, 
too closely resembles an objective truth; in a church, 
he dreams he is in a church—  God's house. From there, 
he goes to carry out what he has forcefully proclaimed 
to be a godly activity, the writing down of his dreams.
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Conclusion
The Middle Ages and the Modern Persona
The emergence of the modern individual in the Western 
world, the formation of an individual psyche, can be 
located in the act of self-naming that occurred in 
Western poetry of the later Middle Ages. Such a 
development is appropriate, since autocitation 
virtually depended for its existence on tracing its 
relationship to and on identifying itself with the text 
of the author whose name and individuality were being 
invoked. How could it have been otherwise? A 
sensitivity to the idea of a text, even as that idea 
went through numerous transformations, resides at the 
foundation of Western sensibility. Our discussions of 
Plato, Paul, and most of all Augustine, have evinced 
this sensitivity to the concept of a text, a concept 
that was of an ethical nature. In Augustine, the basic 
textual metaphor achieves its full effect; it can be 
argued that the world, for him, was a text. The 
medieval sense of community, whose cement was the 
notion of textuality that often manifested itself in 
reverence for the Bible as well as other specific, 
actual texts, evolved under Augustine’s influence. 
Thus later poets' self-naming functioned as a 
recognition of and belief in a language centered in the 
notion of textuality; this textuality was an accurate,
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authentic way of describing reality. Poets of the 
later Middle Ages could not help but include themselves 
in their attempts to point to the truth. The world 
Marcabru, Dante, Chaucer and Langland portrayed 
supported their self-assertions, for they were a part 
of that world, and the force of Aristotelian logic 
mandated their self-inclusions as well as their self­
promotions .
All of this, however, was only made possible once 
text and language could be viewed as entities separate 
from the poet. The thing that sustained a poet's 
enterprise was the language used in poetry to signify 
the world. Once language was understood to be an 
entity unto itself, the poet's meditation on his or her 
relationship to it could lead to a self-understanding 
in which the self was posited as that which had come to 
exist apart from discourse. And so the poet was the 
user of discourse, the finder (i.e., the trobador) who 
shaped the language that ultimately, by virtue of the 
recognition of its independence, threatened to 
determine the very world thought to have included 
language as a part of it. Language was both within the 
world and outside of it. Now, if the poet could be the 
definer of the poem (i.e., the xnakyr) , why could he or 
she not define the world? Logically, such an attempt 
at definition was the fundamental issue confronting
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poets of the later Middle Ages, an issue that 
ultimately came into being because of a theologian.
In one graceful turn of thought, Anselm altered the 
intellectual, spiritual and social makeup of the West. 
In his emendation of Augustine's meditation on the 
nature of falsehoods, Anselm liberated language and 
thereby ushered in a modern world. First of all, he 
set aside the issue of intentionality, which was for 
Augustine the primary determining factor in assessing 
truth or falsity. Once Anselm could recognize 
Augustine's distinctions, he could also realize that 
statements had integrity though they might fail to 
authentically refer to any objective truth. Anselm 
ascribed to any statement an intrinsic unity, a 
natural cogency. Thus he aligned language with the 
world while setting language at a remove from it. 
Language, then, did not have to conform to the 
strictures of the perceptible world, nor did language 
need "to obey" the poet.
In effect, Anselm had let go of a golden rope 
descending from Heaven. With him a new possibility 
arose, one that was problematic. Even moralistically 
right interpretations of expressions that were 
comprised of language made opaque since the fall of 
Adam and Eve— as depicted by Paul's image of a dark 
glass— might no longer yield revelation. In the later
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Middle Ages poets grapple with this central difficulty. 
Their texts, inherited from Augustine whose ideas 
concerning interpretation derive from Paul, are 
accessible only through a combination of hermeneutics 
and the recognition of any text's autonomy; yet such an 
equation could prove hopeless in the attempt to arrive 
at either absolute beauty or absolute truth. Where 
does this leave poets like Marcabru, Dante, Chaucer and 
Langland, who are faced with the task of realizing the 
truth? They must include discussions of themselves in 
this attempt; otherwise, how else might they come to 
terms with the very separateness of language and 
ultimately of texts? In Langland this discussion 
spirals back to Augustine and the question of 
intentionality; Piers Plowman investigates the role of 
the individual will in the achievement of salvation. 
Yet by the time of Langland, after Anselm, the world 
has become more complicated, and in a sense modern.
Can poetry work? Can it serve? Does it lead to a 
salvation? The questions forced poets to turn to a 
meditation on the nature of poetry and its relationship 
to truth, and, finally to consider their efficacy as 
both poets and mortals. The stakes involved in this 
exercise were immense; and poets went about their task 
with an extraordinary vigor. Their poetic conceptions 
were driven by the new demands of rationalism that 
were a function of a spreading literacy and therefore,
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coupled with technological innovations, of a shift in 
orientation from oral to written discourse. Now the 
text was physically represented as separate, at a 
distance from writer and reader. The complexity of 
this text necessarily deepened, since there was no 
hurry on the part of readers to embrace it; literate, 
increasingly silent readers could indulge themselves in 
it at leisure and reflect on the fact of its 
authorship.
Truth will be both atomized and narrowly defined 
when logic and technology come to be the dominant 
forces in a society. As history and fiction become 
separate disciplines in the later Middle Ages, we see 
the distinction between them being modulated by the 
inevitably creative acts of poets. Poets discovered 
themselves squarely within a larger debate that was the 
context of the evolution into such disciplines; these 
poets possessed varying degrees of objectivity 
regarding their role in the debate, but, intellectually 
curious, and acutely sensitive to the shifting and 
transformation of categories, they were instrumental in 
this process. Marcabru is a poet who writes about the 
efficacy of his poetry, and of all poetry, and 
proclaims that the craft of song cannot be brilliantly 
utilized unless the poet is of good faith. Dante's 
journey through the three realms inscribes once and for
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all the epistemological issues that comprise the fabric 
of his and possibly our own time. Langland continues 
this tradition. As in the Commedia. his persona 
virtually replicates its author. In Piers Plowman a 
poet is named Will. By virtue of his existence he 
reminds readers of the key to mortal striving, that of 
the individual will— not unlike Augustine's notion of 
intentionality. The mere embodiment of this issue in 
this persona confronts the question of writing as the 
way to achieve salvation. Implicitly, though, Langland 
is also examining the structure of this form of 
discourse. In Piers Plowman1s ubiquitous illogical 
turns of plot, such as the tearing up of the pardon, we 
see the signs of a poet's attempt to unravel the form 
of his poem in order to comment on that form and 
ultimately to examine its larger epistemological 
concerns.
Langland's attempts to deconstruct a fundamentally 
allegorical poetic structure are perhaps more in 
keeping with Anselm's approach to the problem of 
language and meaning. Chaucer, too, contemplates the 
form of poetry; his attack on allegory as a viable 
epistemological procedure is overt, as in the "Prologue 
to the Legend of Good Women." Langland's attack, 
however, proceeds from within, with the tacit 
recognition that a poetic in and of itself does not 
necessarily serve to render a believable description
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of reality. Langland's focusing on the poetic asks the 
question, can there be unity, an internal logic or 
efficacy in poetry? In effect, Langland wishes to 
demonstrate that there is a lack of internal cogency in 
allegory. Allegory might not accurately reflect 
actual experience; the assumption is that allegory was 
created to do so. More importantly, Langland implies 
that, structurally, allegory can be said to be 
"unnatural" or rather ultimately untrue. Truth, then, 
continues to reside beyond the pale of expression. All 
the same, we see this dynamic, the tension between 
expression and truth, most vividly portrayed in the 
roles that language plays in the poem. "Grammar," for 
Will the dreamer and for William Langland, like "God," 
is the "ground of all." And so language may bridge all 
realms, all planes of existence, be they dream, waking 
perceivable experience, or books— as Chaucer also 
recognized. For Chaucer as well as for Langland, the 
literatus proffers the "key" of memory, and thereby a 
sort of truth. Language, in other words, strives for 
unity while it may, paradoxically, also intend to 
assert its own individuality.
Accordingly, Langland's poem strives for unity by 
its demonstration of the ways in which poetry and 
ultimately language undo themselves. Hence Piers 
Plowman features the search for Dowel, Dobet and
3 5 1
Dobest; all three are grammatical anomalies. These 
linguistic aberrations underscore the recognition of a 
chasm between language, ostensibly the stuff of poetry, 
and allegory that is quite possibly the very sign of 
all figuration, and so, necessarily, to be associated 
with the idea of poetry. The sign of Langland's 
inquiry into the relationship of language and truth is 
the poem's persona. In the largest terms, this persona 
embodies the tension between Augustine's and Anselm's 
ideas. Will the dreamer is also the sign of unity, for 
in his name the poem's theme and authorship come 
together. Comprehending this sign would be 
particularly welcome, since— as is evident in the great 
lengths Langland has gone in order to demonstrate 
it--there is an inherent disunity in all poetic and 
other expression. In other words, Langland's evocation 
of unity occurs by way of oblique strategies. Self­
naming, both at the margin and the center of his poem, 
remains as Langland's solution to problems of 
signification which he has inherited from past 
theologians and poets who comprise the auctoritas. the 
fabric, of Western thought and aspiration.
How does Will, then, represent the emergence of the 
modern persona? What affinity might he share with, 
say, Tom Jones of the bildungsroman that goes by the 
same name? Part of the answer to this question is 
obvious; a persona's connection to its text may now be
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inevitable— given the tradition out of which modern 
literature emerges— and indeed their alignment 
continues into the present in books like Saul Bellow's 
Herzog and Derek Walcott's Omeros. whose protagonists 
bear the names of their stories. An antagonist can do 
the same, as in Toni Morrison's Beloved. But what
about Joyce's Ulysses or any other modern work that 
does not, overtly, bear the sign of either author or 
character? And, in any case, what has become of the 
authors' explicit self-inclusions in their texts? The 
answer is that any attempt to define the modern persona 
must proceed from a broader base. The purview of this 
study does not allow for extensive probing into the 
nature of modern fiction and its possible relationships 
with fact. Still, it may be suggested that twentieth 
century authors see themselves as quite as fictional, 
as ephemeral, as any speaker or personage created in 
their texts. There is tacit agreement among writers 
and readers concerning these personae, an assumption 
that they are fictional. If we contemplate, then, our 
contemporary literary projects, may we not come to a 
fuller appreciation of what must have been the intense 
pleasure and gratification of authors who saw 
themselves in their work for the first time? The 
mirror that contained the medieval writer's image may 
not be the one used today, but it surely cast a 
reflection.
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APPENDIX A 
Alceste as a Unifying Figure
In the daisy-Alceste figure we find, because of its 
idealized beauty, the paradigm of the striving for 
unity. Chaucer's description of Alceste is so very 
similar to the properties of the daisy that there can 
be little doubt that she does indeed personify that 
flower in his dream; Alceste, furthermore, exists in an 
enchanted garden type sequence while the daisy, of 
course, exists in a real— though garden-like— pastoral 
setting. On the exact inversion of the dream world and 
reality in the Prologue, see among others Malone, and 
Bronson; and Payne, "Making" 202. On the physical 
similarity of the daisy and Alceste, see among others 
Payne, Key 106; and on Alceste as the poem's unifying 
force, Payne writes:
Alceste provides the most obvious means of 
unifying the two different parts of the prologue. 
She is, first of all, the figurative transformation 
of the daisy; she is also the maiden of all 
maidens, as it had been the "flour of alle 
floures"; but most significantly, her relation to 
the poet is the same: she is to provide the
"cause," the compelling attraction for the 
reverential poetry of the legend which Chaucer is 
to write in penance for his "bad" poetry. Finally, 
we ought to observe that these transmogrified 
qualities of the daisy find their physical 
personage in a character from an ancient legend. 
As a thirteenth-century rhetorician would have put 
it, through an invented figure of the poet's, the 
fact of experience and the values of tradition 
become identified. (98)
See also, in this regard, Donald Baker "Dreamer" 11.
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It should be noted that the figure, "flour of all 
floures," has a long and proud history from ancient 
times: Flos Florum
is an image of perfection often used of the beloved 
in medieval lyrics of amour courtois. but it is 
remarkable also for the variety of its 
manifestations— sacred and profane, from a casual 
faeon de parler to a philosophical or mystical 
apprehension of perfect beauty in the paradox of 
the many and the one [. . .]. The paradox lies in
the relation between the beloved and nature, whose 
crown he or she is. When nature fades, the beloved 
can keep nature's beauty alive; when nature 
flowers, the beloved both surpasses nature's 
flowering and fulfills it. (Dronke Medieval Latin 
(Oxford: 181-82; see also pp. 183-92; cf the
"Introduction," above)
On the etymology of margerite and the connection, in 
English, between pearl and daisy (from the French and 
Latin) and the religious associations between the 
daisy and the Virgin Mary, see Dronke and, as well, 
Payne, Key.
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APPENDIX B 
Chaucer and the Allegorical Tradition
The "Prologue to the Legend of Good Women can easily be 
viewed as an allegory, although many readers will pass 
too quickly over the poem's "analogical" elements 
because of Chaucer's seamless, crafted poem in which 
they are doing their work. An example of this subtle 
embedding occurs when the poem's persona returns to his 
house in order to rest (to "conserve" himself) for the 
night; but more than this, he has his house and 
"herber" or garden made up to be consonant with the 
spirit of the new summer. It is here, furthermore, 
that the persona will have his dream of which we will 
read:
Horn to myn hous ful swiftly I me spedde,
And in a lytel herber that I have,
Ybenched newe with turves, fresshe ygrave,
I bad men shulde me my couche make;
For deynte of the newe someres sake,
[etc. (G 96-100, F 200-206)].
Robinson's gloss of these lines is particularly 
revealing; it is as if he has missed the lines' 
allegorical values: "The remark about the house with
the arbor [. . .] seems hardly applicable to Chaucer's
house over the city gate, and he is known to have 
surrendered his lease in October, 1386, [and so on]" 
(842) .
Perhaps a fourteenth century reader, on the other
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hand, would immediately recognize the sententious and 
symbolical quality of the narrator's "house." In 
allegorical terms the house becomes, among other 
things, the symbol of, as well as the place for, 
carrying out procreation; it is the source, in other 
words, of the persona's poetry (the craft and the maker 
of the craft which is the subject of the "Prologue," as 
Payne has observed).
Malone notices the eschewing of personified 
abstractions (that intend to heighten an allegorical 
feeling) in the G text revision of the Prologue:
Al found they Daunger for a tyme a lord,
Yet Pitee, thurgh his stronge gentil myght,
Forgaf, and made Mercy passen Ryght,
Thurgh Innocence and ruled Curtesye [F 160-63].
The indication here is that Chaucer is moving away from 
the allegorical poetic mode in his later career (96). 
He will therefore effect, more and more, a seamless 
quality in his later poems. This is also demonstrated 
by the house image, which is not at all either a 
personification nor an abstraction. Yet it does recall 
Chaucer's earlier use of this image in this way, and it 
does reflect contemporary rhetorical-poetic theory.
The announced purpose of Chaucer's dream in the 
House of Fame. for example, is that it will teach him 
something about what poetry actually is. The words
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that men speak, according to the eagle, have their 
place in the order of the universe:
And for this cause mayst thou see,
That every ryver to the see 
Enclyned is to go by kynde,
And by these skilles, as I fynde,
Hath fyssh duellynge in flood and see,
And trees eke in erthe bee.
Thus every thing, by thys reson,
Hath his propre mansyon,
To which hit seketh to repaire,
Ther-as hit shulde not apaire
[2.747-56].
It is important here to notice the analogy that the 
eagle makes between inclination ("Enclyned ys to goo by 
kynde") that might suggest a volition though here 
ordered by nature ("kynde") , and the skil 1 
( "skilles"--the suggestion may also include 
"reasoning") that are a part of this same universal 
ordering force. The diction in this passage, of 
course, is a reflection of the philosophical debate 
being carried on by Ockham, Holcot, Bradwardine, and 
others. Skill. however, suggests also the technical 
virtuosity such as we might find in the poet's art, 
just as it resonates the deceit implicit in the bird 
trapper's sophistry in the Prologue; here it is the 
"artifice" of nature: so that the poet must seek, in 
some way, to mirror the experiential, paradigm of kvnde 
in his verse. His words must possess or adhere to the 
force of an intuitional, pre-Gallilean gravity (the 
notion that all elements in the world have their proper
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place [Robinson 783]) as much as would any natural 
event. That is, the poet's words must have meaning, 
evolving in turn out of an ordering, a formalism. 
And, the poet's words have their proper place in the 
universe (they have their own gravity, as it were);
every thing has its "propre mansyon."
Other instances of the use of a house or mansion as 
an image standing in for the idea of an originary 
intuition or creativity might be cited. It should be 
noted that this image has a grounding in medieval 
poetics, as Marie Hamilton has observed ("Notes on 
Chaucer and the Rhetoricians," PMLA, 49 (1934) 403-09
[in Payne, Key of Remembrance 16]) . "Miss Hamilton
helpfully quotes, as a supporting parallel [to the 
House of Fame!, five lines from Troilus and Crvsede 
which are translated from Geoffrey of Vinsauf":
For everi wight that hath an house to founde 
Ne renneth naught the werk for to bygynne 
With rakel hond, but he wol bide a stounde,
And sende his hertes line out fro withinne 
Aldirfirst his purpos for to wynne
(1.1065-69 [in Payne 16] my emphasis).
In light of Malone's above remarks on allegorical 
elements and structuring, see also Payne, Key 139.
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APPENDIX C 
Ploughing as a Metaphor
In the Etvmologarium (VI.9.2) Isidore of Seville claims 
that Romans wrote with a stylus made of iron or bone on 
tablets made of wax, and quotes "from a lost comedy by 
the poet Atta": . . Vertamus vomerem / In cera
mucroneque aremus osseo"— which Curtius translates as 
"Turn we the ploughshare upon the wax and plow we with 
a point of bone" (313). See Gellrich 34 ff.
In Chaucer's "Shipman's Tale" the monk has asked the 
merchant for a loan, which is granted. The merchant 
then announces—
But o thyng is, ye knowe it wel ynogh.
Of chapmen, that hir moneie is hir plogh. 
We may creaunce whil we have a name;
But goldlees for to be, it is no game. 
Paye it agayn whan it lith in youre ese
(VII.287-91)
— to which we may add Holloway's comments:
The metaphors of the speech, of ploughing, of 
" c r e a u n c i n g , " hold true for mercantile 
undertakings, yet they are blasphemy. In the Roman 
de la Rose. a Golden Calf of a poem, the plough 
metaphor applied to sex, "Plough, barons, plough!" 
to man's seed sown for the harvest of a new 
generation. In Piers Plowman the plough metaphor, 
as in Christ's parables, applied to preaching, to 
words as seeds to be sown in men's hearts. (192-93)
Elsewhere Holloway has pointed out the "scribal" aspect
of this multipurpose symbol. Her elaboration of
Isidore's pronouncement is particularly germane.
Isidore
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had quoted the metaphor in a lost Roman comedy [cf. 
above] stating that the Ancients had written 
furrow-wise, in Greek [. . .]boustrophedon, turning 
like oxen in ploughing, writing from left to right 
and from right to left alternately. A medieval 
adage reads: "He urged on the oxen, ploughed white 
fields, held a white plough, and sowed black seed" 
[Jeffrey 313-14]. Chaucer is familiar with the 
scribal metaphor though he uses it in an apparently 
oral tale. The knight in order to excuse his 
omission of a complete description of the wedding 
of Ypolita to Theseus explains:
I have, Good woot, a large feeld to ere,
And wayke been the oxen in my plough, (886-887)
[etc.]. (167-68)
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